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ABSTRACT
The focus of this study is the triumph of the Free South Africa Movement (FSAM) over the 
Reagan administration’s Southern Africa policy - “constructive engagement”. The central 
question this study provides answers to is: why is it that within two years of its inception, 
FSAM achieved what had eluded other Afro-American organisations for decades by bringing 
pressure to bear on an incumbent administration to reverse itself on a major foreign policy 
germane to Africa. Afro-Americans had shown both a continuing interest in Africa since the era 
of slavery and a desire to influence the direction of Africa policy of successive administrations. 
FSAM is therefore an important movement worth studying in view of its uniqueness in being 
the first anti-apartheid organisation through which Afro-Americans had achieved what had 
always eluded them.
This necessitated putting FSAM in its historical context with a view to establishing in what 
sense and ways this movement succeeded while others failed. It was this that led us to identify 
four determinants of Afro-American influence. These were the Cold War, Afro-American 
electoral significance or otherwise, the organisational tactics of Afro-Americans in running anti­
apartheid campaigns, and events in South Africa. These four determinants produced three 
scenarios which accounted for at best non-durable influence, and at worst - which was quite 
often the case - failures on the part of Afro-Americans to influence the direction of Africa policy 
of successive administrations.
FSAM succeeded where others failed because it had learned from the mistakes of its 
predecessors and pursued a single issue by confining its attention to a single country - South 
Africa - which it rightly recognised as the sole beneficiary of the administration’s “constructive 
engagement”. It predecessors were always pursuing multifarious causes covering the entire 
African continent or at least a region. FSAM also had a united Afro-American community 
unprepared to put up with four more years of “constructive engagement”. This coupled with 
the fact that it was an era in which Afro-Americans were conscious of their potential electoral 
strength within the Democratic Party and in a balance of power situation, meant that FSAM 
was better placed to reap the wealth of experience emanating from previous numerous failed 
attempts.
Although TransAfrica, around which FSAM was woven, provided the organisational and 
institutional structure, it was FSAM’s ability to carry the public along as a tactical device that 
made all the difference because the pressure which the public brought to bear on the 
administration to change its Southern Africa policy made it impossible for Congressmen as the 
representatives of the people to become passive spectators. The result was initiation of a 
Congressional response to the yearning of the people thereby isolating the President and his 
“constructive engagement”.
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INTRODUCTION.
The focus of this study is the triumph of the Free South Africa Movement (FSAM) over the 
Reagan administration’s Southern Africa policy - “constructive engagement”. The central question 
this study provides answers to is: why is it that within two years of its inception, FSAM achieved 
what had eluded other Afro-American organisations for decades by bringing pressure to bear on an 
incumbent administration to reverse itself on a major foreign policy germane to Africa. As pointed 
out in Chapter One, Afro-Americans had shown both a continuing interest in Africa since the era of 
slavery and a desire to influence the direction of Africa policy of successive administrations.
FSAM is therefore an important movement worth studying in view of its uniqueness in being the 
first anti-apartheid organisation through which Afro-Americans had achieved what had always 
eluded them.
FSAM was founded in November 1984 by an Afro-American lobby TransAfrica, in close 
cooperation with the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) and the Washington Office on Africa 
(WOA), to deprive South Africa of the support it had received from the Reagan administration on 
the basis of “constructive engagement” since 1980. The movement united the existing but 
ineffectual civil rights forces of Organised Labour/White Liberal/Afro-American into a coalition for 
the specific purpose of sabotaging “constructive engagement”. FSAM is neither an organic 
institution nor is it one with a precise membership. It simply united organisations and individuals 
opposed to the direction of the administration’s Southern Africa policy. Its only known spokesman 
and coordinator was TransAfrica’s Executive Director, Randall Robinson.
To achieve its aim, FSAM targeted South Africa and its apartheid policy, called for 
imposition of sanctions against that country and used the tactical device of mass mobilisation to 
turn public opinion against the administration’s Southern Africa policy. It is with the tactics, 
strategy and the results arising from FSAM’s efforts, within its historical context, that this study is 
concerned.
I originally set out to limit my study to FSAM itself, as a case study of interest group 
formation and influence in the field of foreign policy. This would have required extensive field­
work in the United States to gather information about the anti-apartheid campaigns in the 1980s. I
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could not do so because of financial difficulty. Rather what I have done is a study of FSAM in its 
historical context. I am comparing the fate of FSAM with its predecessors. What this led to was a 
problem with literature. I encountered an enormous amount of literature on most of what should be 
dealt with in the thesis except for the activity of FSAM itself. Thus I have tended to be selective in 
my use of the vast range of publication in the early chapters, and treated them mainly as sources 
from which to construct an account rather than as interpretations inviting criticism. In the case of 
the modest FSAM literature there is little apart from the work of Steven Metz that require critical 
analysis; his arguments are discussed in Chapters Five and Six.
The originality of my study is that I have put FSAM in its historical context by establishing 
in what way this movement succeeded while others failed. Broadly speaking, FSAM succeeded 
during the tenure of a “globalist” president, a condition under which its predecessors were 
guaranteed to fail. In the course of the study, four variables evinced themselves as determining 
factors for effectiveness or otherwise of Afro-Americans as a group capable of bringing influence 
to bear on the Africa policy of an administration. These were: the Cold War and its effect on 
foreign policy; electoral significance of Afro-Americans; the organisational capacity of Afro- 
Americans to run an effective anti-apartheid campaign; and events in South Africa. Each of these 
merit a brief discussion if only in outline to elucidate their importance.
(i) The Cold Wan This has been the corner-stone of US foreign policy since the tenure of 
Harry Truman in 1945. The problem with the Cold War as a foreign policy determinant is that it 
ensures the primacy of globalists over regionalists in the policy formulation process. The Cold War 
is an adjunct of the struggle between the East and the West in the international scene; and by 
predicating US foreign policy on Cold War imperatives, successive administrations overlooked the 
regional peculiarities of the African environment. From the point of view of the regionalists and 
Afro-Americans, the situation was made worse by the fact that minority and colonial 
administrations in the continent were the comrade in arms of the US either in NATO alliance or by 
ideological affinity. Settler and colonial regimes in Southern Africa repeatedly took advantage of 
the US anti-communist obsession to secure Washington’s patronage to the disadvantage of their 
indigenous nationalist opponents on the ground. Afro-Americans were therefore torn between their 
concern for the independence of their “kith and kin” in the ancestral homeland and the demand of 
their own country for a national anti-communist consensus. For example, a prominent Afro-
American activist such as Dr. Max Yergan found himself supporting US anti-communist efforts in 
Africa during the last months of the Eisenhower administration even though it was evident to other 
Afro-Americans that the victims were nationalists such as Patrice Lumumba in the Congo.
Those Afro-Americans like Paul Robeson and W.E.B. Du Bois who refused to support the 
Cold War doctrine of “containment policy” in the Truman era had to do battle with both the 
administration and the main stream Afro-American leadership which had thrown in its lot with the 
administration in order to secure official support for civil rights.
The preeminent role of the Cold War as a determinant of US foreign policy was vividly 
illustrated in the Africa policies of Presidents John Kennedy in the early sixties and Jimmy Carter 
in the late seventies. While these two administrations briefly adopted policies that accorded 
recognition to Africa’s regional peculiarities, by recognising the yearning for independence by the 
indigenous African population, the outcry from the right wing in the US so influenced these 
administrations to the extent that by the time each of them left office, one could hardly put a label to 
the directions of their Africa policies. The Kennedy administration’s policy in the Portuguese 
colonies not only lost its bearings when Portugal’s NATO membership and possession of Azores 
bases became the clarion call of right wing opponents, but the administration became a passive 
spectator as if it had never formulated and adopted a policy position in the area in question.
Support for the independence of the Portuguese colonies had to give way to Cold War imperatives.
In the case of the Carter administration, when Cold War protagonists within and without 
the administration overwhelmed its Southern Africa policy, the administration simply abandoned 
the preferences of its Afro-American supporters and joined the bandwagon to highlight the hostile 
designs of “communists” in Southern Africa. The Pretoria regime, which had impeccable anti­
communist credentials, became the administration’s ally in the defence of western interests in the 
region.
(ii) Electoral significance: Although electoral importance may not be a counter to the Cold 
War as a foreign policy imperative, Afro-American insignificance as an electoral factor 
compounded their lack of influence in the formulation of foreign policy. Prior to the Voting Rights 
Act of 1968, this electoral insignificance owed much to the situation in the South whereby Afro- 
Americans were prohibited from registering to vote under real and imagined disqualification 
clauses. The result of this was Afro-Americans’ political powerlessness across the country. With
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the passage of the Voting Rights Act, newly-voting Afro-Americans became overwhelmingly 
Democrats. The result was that they were without influence over Republican administrations. Even 
when they played a major role in the election of Democratic administrations such as Kennedy and 
Carter’s, the administration’s need to adhere to public opinion in order to receive the support of the 
wider American populace necessitated abandonment of Afro-Americans’ concerns.
The implication of this was that successful exertion of influence over an administration 
entailed the ability to carry the American public along, an area in which Afro-American 
organisations (prior to FSAM) were grossly deficient.
(iii) Organisational and tactical factors of Afro-American leadership: The Cold War as 
foreign policy determinant and the electoral insignificance of Afro-Americans in relation to the 
entire populace, were enough handicaps in Afro-Americans’ attempt to influence the Africa policy 
of an incumbent administration. Added to this was the lack of organisational capability of Afro- 
American leadership.
Because this leadership fell into the hands of affluent conservative pro-administration 
factions during World War II and the sixties, Afro-Americans had spoken with discordant voices 
on issues relating to Africa. While the conservatives favoured civil rights at home as the prime 
focus of Afro-Americans’ struggle, others such as Paul Robeson and W.E.B. Du Bois of the 
Council for African Affairs (CAA) wanted a two-pronged struggle between Africa’s independence 
and civil rights at home. Because the pro-administration faction received official acquiescence if not 
approval, it meant not only the consequential demise of the pro-Africa elements but an Afro- 
American community whose leadership followed official positions on issues relating to foreign 
policy. In the eyes of the Eisenhower administration, there was always the risk that Africa’s 
nationalism and quest for independence might lead to alignment with the Soviet bloc rather than the 
West. Thus, the Afro-American leadership failed to create a pro-Africa constituency in the US to 
press for Africa’s independence and to support nationalist movements in the continent. Afro- 
American revulsion at excesses of colonial and settler mle in the continent were a replication of US 
official positions. Perhaps it is worth pointing out that the American Negro Leadership Conference 
on Africa (ANLCA), as an Afro-American organisation for discussing issues relating to Africa’s 
well-being, came to an end in 1967 because the Afro-American leadership was not equipped to 
fight a two-pronged battle of civil rights at home and independence in Africa.
One began to see a revolt against the position of the Afro-American leadership from the 
mid-sixties with the emergence of different though uncoordinated movements. It became common 
to refer to the largest civil rights organisation, the National Association for the Advancement of 
Coloured Peoples (NAACP) as a “bourgeois” organisation.
Because the target of these new movements was the Afro-American leadership, the latter 
began to respond to African issues in order to remain as the spokesman of the Afro-American 
community. What emerged was a clear evidence of a disorganised Afro-American community with 
discordant voices on issues relating to Africa; resulting in further marginalisation of Afro- 
Americans as influential factors in the Africa policy of incumbent administrations. Two events 
symbolised this weakness of Afro-Americans. One was their failure to effectively pressure the 
Johnson administration into adopting a tougher stance against Rhodesia during that country’s 
illegal declaration of independence in 1965. Second was their failure to strongly argue in Congress 
for the termination of South Africa’s sugar allocation during the Nixon administration in 1971.
Even by the second half of the seventies when some changes in perception with respect to 
the role of Afro-Americans’ toward Africa policy had taken place, Afro-Americans were unable to 
have durable influence. For example, the sacrificing of Afro-American preferences over Southern 
Africa by the Carter administration, to save its political skin, was a reflection of the organisational 
incompetence of Afro-Americans in their failure to generate public support for Africa policies 
unfavourable to minority regimes.
(iv) Events in South Africa: All along, South Africa had been presented to the American 
public by its US sympathisers, as a reliable ally against communism. The intensity of the Cold 
War; the desire of American administrations to accept friendship from any quarters as part of the 
strategy to isolate communism and the Soviet Union; and above all Pretoria’s mastery of self­
promotion as the last bastion against communism in the region, all worked in favour of South 
Africa. The effect of these was that South Africa was able to suppress internal dissent without 
much outcry from American administrations and the public for fear of weakening Pretoria’s anti­
communist resolve.
Prior to the emergence of FSAM, earlier Afro-American efforts proved too poorly 
organised and coordinated to dispel the “positive” attributes of South Africa. Things began to fall 
apart from September 1983 when South Africa exploded threatening civil order. After years of
suppression, the non-whites of South Africa began what became an uncontainable protest against 
both apartheid and the government’s attempt at sustaining it through reform. The intensity of the 
unrest and the media attention it attracted meant Americans had to take notice of it. That was the 
point FSAM emerged.
These four variables as determinants of Afro-American influence produced three scenarios 
over the 1945-88 period. First, whenever Cold War protagonists such as Truman, Eisenhower and 
Nixon acceded to the presidency, globalists wielded total influence in the foreign policy making 
process. This when combined with public apathy to issues relating to Africa and Afro-Americans’ 
organisational weaknesses produced from the executive arm a Southern Africa policy favourable to 
minority and colonial regimes - the Cold War allies in the region.
The second scenario was that when non-globalists like John Kennedy and Jimmy Carter 
emerged on the scene, the concerns of liberals coupled with changes at Afro-Americans’ leadership 
level produced policy responses from the executive arm unfavourable to South Africa and other 
minority administrations. Such unfavourable policies to the Cold War allies in the region however 
had limited life span and effectiveness when confronted by opposition from right-wing critics.
The third scenario was that a globalist president formulated a pro-South Africa Cold War 
prone Southern Africa policy, but a combination of public mobilisation brought about by Afro- 
American organisational strength induced Congressional concern leading to the passage of anti- 
South Africa legislation, thus, by-passing the president’s original policy.
The third is applicable to FSAM which accounted for its success while its predecessors 
oscillated between scenarios one and two resulting in their failures. FSAM embarked on a well- 
trodden path littered with past failures at worst, and at best qualified and brief successes, but it 
succeeded because it learnt from its predecessors and struggled to create or take advantage of 
favourable conditions. Otherwise with a “globalist” president and a policy that specifically 
incorporated the cooperation of Pretoria, FSAM would have gone down the way of its 
predecessors.
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Sources of information and organisation of study.
This study has used both primary and secondary sources of information. Primary material 
came in the form of Congressional activities and official pronouncements by the executive arm of 
government, but more material came from the Congressional sources than the latter.
Two reasons accounted for this. First, major policy initiatives are the prerogative of the 
executive as opposed to Congress. Since Africa was low in the scale of priority of the executive 
arm, not much was directed at the continent except as part of the globalist approach to the Cold 
War. Public apathy to issues relating to Africa eased the path of the executive in this respect.
Secondly, no Afro-American has been given the mandate to an executive arm of
government, hence those who would have deemed Africa to be important have never acceded to the 
presidency. Where Afro-Americans had their impact was in or on Congress and that was why there 
were more information from Congressional sources than from the executive. In most cases, policy 
directions toward Africa were revealed in Congressional hearings initiated by Afro-Americans and 
their White liberal supporters.
Information from Congressional and executive sources would therefore not be enough to 
enable one to examine the effect of FSAM over the Reagan administration’s Southern Africa 
policy, nor would one be able to acquaint oneself with Afro-American frustrations that led to the 
emergence of FSAM. It is here that secondary sources of information became useful. Whatever 
deficiencies from those sources were made up for by eye-witness accounts in Newspapers and 
television documentaries.
This study is organised in seven main chapters. The first discusses the early principles 
underlining US government policy toward Africa following the World Wars and the early interest, 
attachment to and efforts of Afro-Americans to improve the predicament of the peoples of colonial 
Africa. The finding was that while there was harmony between the Roosevelt administration and 
Afro-Americans on the need to terminate colonial rule, there were differences in emphasis. To the 
administration, colonial territories deserved independence because the rivalries between imperial 
powers arising therefrom, posed a threat to global peace. By contrast Afro-Americans had a long 
standing commitment to Africa as their ancestral homeland, therefore they pursued the issue on a 
“kith and kin” basis.
Chapter Two focuses on the position of the Truman administration toward decolonisation in 
Africa. The finding was a reflection of scenario one in the schema analysed above. Truman was a 
“globalist” president who pursued Cold War oriented foreign policy to which all Americans must 
subscribe. Public indifference to Africa policy coupled with support for official policy position by 
the Afro-American leadership enabled the administration to adopt a policy position favourable to 
Africa’s colonial and minority administrations. The same factors account for the lack of influence 
of Afro-Americans on Africa policy despite Truman’s sympathy to their demands in the domestic 
field.
Chapter Three discusses the Africa policies of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations 
in relation to Afro-Americans’ role as an interested party capable of bringing influence to bear. The
Chapter clearly reveals how differing ideological inclination of leaders under different 
circumstances can produce different scenarios under our schema. During the tenure of Eisenhower, 
the administration’s pursuit of Cold War imperatives coupled with the absence of a contrary 
opinion from the public resulted in scenario one. But when Kennedy acceded to the presidency, the 
pivotal role of Afro-Americans in his election and the ascendancy of liberals in the administration 
coupled with a clear vision of Afro-Americans about their role in the formulation of Africa policy, 
resulted in the adoption of a Southern Africa policy clearly unfavourable to South Africa and 
Portugal. But this was brief and had limited effect because the administration failed to pursue its 
policy in order to stem criticism from right-wing opponents. Kennedy’s presidency was therefore a 
reflection of scenario two.
Chapter Four examines the ability of Afro-Americans to influence the direction of US 
policy toward Africa in the post-Kennedy era. Two case studies were used. One was the unilateral 
declaration of independence in Rhodesia in 1965; and the other was the battle to terminate South 
Africa’s sugar allocation in Congress in 1971. During the first (UDI), the Johnson administration 
had relapsed into conservatism as epitomised by its reluctance to embrace the civil rights or African 
policy of its predecessor. This situation coupled with organisational weaknesses of Afro-American 
leadership and a polarised Afro-American community produced a replication of scenario one. The 
same was true of the sugar allocation issue.
Chapter Five is a continuation of the last chapter except that from 1971, Afro-Americans 
had become more assertive and forceful in their demand to have a say in the formulation of Africa 
policy. The emergence of the “Thursday Group” and the the meeting in Puerto Rico by 27 Afro- 
Americans on the need to form a political party of their own which would forcefully address Africa 
policy were cases in point. The outcome of these efforts was that the Democratic Party took notice 
and responded by writing a Southern Africa policy into the party’s manifesto for the 1972 election 
- the first time in the history of the party when such distinct recognition was accorded an African 
issue. When Jimmy Carter won the election in 1976 on the basis of support from Afro-Americans, 
his non-globalist instincts combined with the strength of Afro-Americans to produce a Southern 
Africa policy unfavourable to the region’s minority regimes. But like Kennedy’s this was limited as 
the administration later reversed itself in order to counter criticism from opponents. Chapter Five 
therefore produced scenario two.
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Chapter Six is an examination of the Reagan administration’s commitment to globalism in 
Southern Africa in a policy dubbed “constructive engagement”. This policy virtually ignored 
apartheid in South Africa and rather committed itself to friendship with Pretoria in an effort to expel 
“communist” forces in Angola. Nor could Afro-Americans exert influence because of the 
inclination of the administration. But the eruption of violence in South Africa in late 1983 and 
Reagan’s re-election in November 1984 galvanised the Afro-American lobby, TransAffica, to 
launch FSAM. The tactics and strategies of FSAM are the subject matter of Chapter Seven. With 
the efficient use of public mobilisation against “constructive engagement” by FSAM, Congress 
became concerned resulting in the passage of anti-South Africa legislation over and above the head 
of the President, thus producing scenario three.
The conclusion reflects on the success of FSAM by reiterating the significance of this 
success in the context of past failures by Afro-Americans. It extends the discussion of FSAM’s 
significance by considering the broader impact of its success on the policies pursued by the 
European Community and by a number of national governments in the late 1980s
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CHAPTER ONE
PATTERNS OF UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN AFRICA PRIOR TO 1948.
The essence of this chapter is to analyse American interest, at government level, in
pr.er 40 ,f -
Africa , and dtfvw^World War II . and to contrast it with the Afro-American
interest in the continent to determine whether or not there was convergence of interests. This 
will give an insight into the pattern of interest about Africa prevalent in the US prior to the 
establishment of the UN and what role the US played with respect to the status of Africa.
Consequently, this chapter analyses two issues: (i) early principles underlining US 
government policy toward Africa; (ii) Afro-Americans’ early interests, attachment to and their 
efforts to improve the predicament of the African continent as a colony of European powers. It 
then concludes with an identification of similarities or otherwise in the nature of interests of 
both the US government and America’s African community towards Africa.
(i) The early principles of US government policy towards Africa:
To speak of reasons for the emergence of a FS AM in the United States presupposes that 
the latter plays an active role in the African scene. This needs careful analysis to identify the
Sri
pattern of that role and its rationale in the continent. Since this section dwellsjB an era in which 
most of Africa was under colonial rule, emphasis will be on America’s initiative on the colonial 
question.
Africa featured first in the agenda of the United States government as a colonial 
territory, hence, a subject for the self determination principle which constituted part of 
Woodrow Wilson’s 14 points for global peace. Whatever interests the United States had as 
regards the need for self determination of people evaporated however with that country’s 
relapse into isolationism following Congress’ refusal of America’s membership of the League
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of Nations.
While Germany’s use of submarine warfare and the Zimmerman note encouraging 
Mexico to attack the United States brought the latter out of an earlier isolationism, the idea of 
permanently remaining on the World stage as an actor with the European powers was an issue 
^which law makers in Washington adamantly opposed. It was this that scuppered Wilson’s 
vision of the post 1914-18 war World, and brought about the parting of ways between conflict 
prone Europe and isolationist United states at the level of international organisation.
Although commercial transactions between European countries and the United States 
continued unabated throughout the isolationist period, the more so as the Europeans were 
indebted to the former in the form of loans and war materials, there was no attempt at a joint 
action between them with a view to revamping the League. Whatever private murmuring there 
was by individuals in Congress and the administration about the need for America’s 
involvement in the tottering League was necessitated by the United States’ predicament, as 
opposed to either a genuine desire to jettison isolationism or to press ahead with the self 
determination issue on a global basis.
For by 1929, the United States had begun to suffer under the yoke of economic 
depression, so much so that between October 1931 and October 1932 - just a space of twelve 
months - unemployment jumped 60.3 per cent from 6,800,000 to 10,900,000.[1]
Involvement in the League was seen as a means to gaining access to an enlarged market with an 
outlet for American produce. Franklin Roosevelt himself, though far from being a supporter of 
America’s entry into the League favoured the idea of an enlarged market for American produce. 
But such was the distaste for involvement in anything European in the United States that all the 
prospective candidates for the Democratic Party nomination in the 1932 presidential election, 
including Franklin Roosevelt and Newton Baker, had to publicly reverse their position on the 
issue. Their Republican opponents would have had a field day, as they had done with earlier 
candidates, portraying them as disciples of Woodrow Wilson who would meddle in European 
affairs with consequential economic and human damage to the American people. [2]
Needless to say such charges had a debilitating effect on the Democratic Party as 
evidenced by the string of defeats which it suffered at the hands of the Republican Party after 
the exit of Woodrow Wilson. This was broken by Roosevelt’s victory in 1932 on the 
expectation that he would rescue the country from economic ruin in the same way in which he
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had New York as governor.
The issue of the predicament of dependent peoples came into sharp focus in 
Washington following a meeting which President Roosevelt had with Churchill in August 
1940. The meeting ended with an eight point declaration which later came to be known as the 
Atlantic Charter, comprising issues that impinged upon the entire World. But the third point, 
which spoke of the inalienable right of all peoples to choose the form of government under 
which they would live, [3] directly affected the colonial peoples under subjugation by the 
imperial powers.
Like President Wilson’s fourteen points of the 1914-18 war, the Atlantic Charter was 
seen by seasoned nationalists in Asia - where the British had broken every promise for 
independence - and budding nationalists from continental Africa alike as a nail in the coffin of 
colonialism. The possibility that the Atlantic Charter might be a repeat of the abortive self 
determination principle of Woodrow Wilson fame was nullified by events which moved in 
favour of the nationalists.
One such event was the fact that these eight points were endorsed on January 1,1942 
by 26 nations as the nucleus of the principles of a future international organisation. In addition, 
unlike Wilson who set off for Europe to usher in the peace of his dreams without considering 
the possibility of hostility from the legislative arm, Roosevelt stayed at home to pile up the 
pressure on Congress and the populace at large. This pressure took the form of convincing 
public opinion and Congress of the undesirability of leaving global peace to the devices of 
imperial Europe. On July 23,1942 Roosevelt’s Secretary of State, Cordell Hull argued the 
need for the creation of “some international agency ...which can ...by force if necessary 
...keep the peace among nations in the future”[4] Such advocacy was a clear recognition of the 
factors that led to the failure of the League. Chief of these was the League’s attempt to ensure 
global peace by collective security without the necessary means of enforcement.
Implications of United States new initiative on colonialism
Since it was a United States president who in his meeting with an imperial power had 
in concert with the latter come out with a declaration on self determination., the colonial peoples
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had every cause to be optimistic, especially as the events in Congress seemed to be in their 
favour.
The British however had great difficulties in understanding Roosevelt’s position on 
colonialism. So much so that the British authorities had to reduce themselves to the position of 
determining the administration’s position by gauging the tides and currents of an extremely 
mobile phenomenon like public opinion in the United States.[5] The justification for such an 
alarming degree of confusion on the part of the British administration was that President 
Roosevelt had given contradictory signal on colonialism by “favouring” on one breath the 
restoration of France’s colonial possessions and on the other, by advancing the idea of an 
international trusteeship for territories ill-equipped for immediate independence.
The claim that there was a contradiction in America’s position on colonialism was 
absurd for the simple reason that it was the American president who was repeatedly at 
loggerheads with Churchill over the colony of India. When the British took advantage of the 
polarisation in India to stall on the independence issue on the pretext that the British 
government would not shirk its responsibilities by abandoning colonial people to an uncertain 
future, it was Roosevelt who advised the Prime Minister to establish a broad based interim 
indigenous government. Such a government if established along the pattern of America’s early 
independence era would in the president’s opinion dissipate the animosity and disunity among 
the fifth’ Kies> following the prolonged period of struggle against British rule. [6] The United 
States’ interest in the independence struggle in India was a testimony to her stance on the issue 
of colonialism and called into question the idea of Washington’s support for restoration of the 
empire of an extremely weak European country like France that had repeatedly failed to fend 
off attacks from a neighbouring Germany.
With respect to the idea of an international trusteeship, there is no denying the fact that 
President Roosevelt and the intellectuals surrounding him such as Professor Arthur N. 
Flolcombe and Rupert Emerson mooted the idea. But this was neither intended to confuse 
imperial powers nor carve a place for the United States under the colonial sun. There were two 
reasons for this. First, the United States needed an expanded market for her produce. Such an 
idea was a function of the depression of the early 1930s and the need for such an enlarged 
market was taken care of by article eight of the Atlantic Charter. This article spoke of the need 
for an open door policy in the international commercial domain. The idea of American
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participation in such an international trusteeship was partly to gain unfettered access to greater 
market facilities.
Secondly, the idea of an international trusteeship was America’s reaction to the 
mockery which imperial Europe and Japan had made of the League’s mandate. In spite of 
Woodrow Wilson’s fourteen points and the conspicuous importance attached to the self 
determination principle, empire hungry Europeans and pseudo-imperialists such as Japan, 
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa actually turned up at Versailles with a shopping list of 
colonial peoples to possess. Before long the mandated territories they received from the League 
had been added to their colonial stock. America’s intention to become a member of such a 
would-be international trusteeship would militate against such wholesale looting of colonial 
peoples.
The United States was therefore determined that such territories should be administered 
by international trusteeship until they were prepared to govern themselves instead of falling 
prey to an imperialist power. There is therefore nothing to suggest that there was ambiguity on 
the part of the United States administration on the issue of the right of self determination of the 
colonial peoples. That Britain was not sure of Washington’s stance on the issue was a self 
inflicted confusion emanating from a determination not to let go of colonial peoples.
(ii) Early historical analysis of Afro-Americans interest on Africa.
The position of the Roosevelt administration on colonial issue raises a number of 
pertinent questions, notably how harmonious was it with the position of Afro-Americans on 
the issue? This therefore calls for an analysis of early Afro-American interest in Africa
The issue of identification with Africa by America’s African population is as old as the 
slave trade itself. The first serious and organised attempt at identification with Africa occurred 
from 1788 following the emergence of “Negro Unions” in various parts with the stated 
objective of repatriating willing Afro-Americans to the ancestral homeland. This was not 
brought about by a longing to retrace their steps the way they came. Rather it was an organised 
response to a number of catastrophes which had befallen them. First and foremost was their 
anger at the lumping together of freed (Manumission) slaves and serving slaves with the 
attendant curtailment of freedom associated with bondage. Such a situation arose because the
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predominant white population would not recognise their former slaves as their equals.[7]
Second was the haggling and bargaining over the status of Afro-Americans which took 
place during the 1787 constitution drafting conference for the new sovereign state, following 
the end of the war of independence. Southern delegates, unwilling to dispense with slavery on 
account of the economic advantages inherent in it wanted to count slaves for the purpose of 
representation. Northern delegates sensing the prospect of being overwhelmed numerically by 
the slave swollen South should slaves be counted refused to give in. In the end, America’s 
Diaspora Europeans made their peace at the expense of the Afro-Americans: the South allowed 
slaves to be counted as three-fifth of human beings for the purpose of representation in 
exchange for postponement of the abolition of slave trade to a date not later than 1808.[8] The 
enormity of this decision to the Afro-Americans can be appreciated when one realised that even 
as late as 1900,92 per cent of the Afro-American population of 8, 833,994 still lived in the 
South. Unlike Whites very few of whom were slaves, 90 per cent of Afro-Americans were 
slaves. [9]
This realisation that there was nothing for the Afro-American in a country which could 
not guarantee the freedom of all its citizens convinced Afro-Americans of their bleak future. 
This conviction was further buttressed by the lawlessness of the Ku Klux Klan with the tacit 
support of the responsible organs of the state in the South. The back to Africa option of the 
“Negro Unions” therefore became a more attractive choice to responsible Afro-Americans than 
resorting to the pre-independence tactics of insurrection that had plagued the American colonies 
between 1687 and 1770.[10]
As the disenchantment with the American system grew, so did the rise of Afro- 
American romanticism with Africa as a promised land. Although there was no exact figure of 
the number of Afro-Americans who resettled in Africa as the figure was quite often confused 
with those who accepted emigration under the auspices of the white-Americans sponsored 
Colonisation Society, the back to Africa option successfully built a strong and effective 
African consciousness in the minds of Afro-Americans. [11] So much so that between 1892 
and 1914, Bishop Henry McNeal Turner of the African Methodist Episcopal Church proffered 
it as a solution to the race problem, following America’s post civil war failure to rescue Afro- 
Americans from civil rights erosion and mob violence, in spite of their contribution to the war 
efforts during the civil war. For example, in 1892, while 162 Afro-Americans were lynched in
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the South, only 69 European-Americans fell victims to the same fate.[12]
Such a grim ratio in favour of the predominant population group when seen on the basis 
that only some twenty per cent of the population in the South were Afro-Americans highlights 
the problem confronting the minority race. It also conferred respectability upon the Bishop’s 
observation that not only was the US “the worst and meanest country”, but there was “nothing 
for the Negro to attain unto” in the “barbarous condition of the United States and the low order 
of civilisation which controls its institutions.”[13]
He was not without critics. Both Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. Du Bois favoured 
Afro-Americans’ assistance to Africa but they wanted their people to remain in the US and find 
solutions to their predicament. Washington ceaselessly stated in numerous conferences that the 
Afro-American owed a duty to assist in Africa’s advancement because unlike the United States, 
Africa was his ancestral homeland. It was at one of such conferences at the Gammon 
Theological Seminary in Atlanta in 1895 that he led delegates in expressing their disgust at the 
pillaging of the Congo by King Leopold of Belgium without consideration for the welfare of 
the indigenous population. Washington was the Deputy-President of the Congo Reformed 
Society, a position he used in no small measure to lobby the administration of Theodore 
Roosevelt to bring influence to bear on Belgium to improve the condition of the indigenous 
population of the Congo. He played no less a role on issues relating to Liberia and even went 
as far as calling a conference on the Negroid race in 1912. It was in that conference in what 
read like a valedictory speech that he entrusted colonial Africa to the charge of Afro-Americans 
with the specific request that they play a pioneering role in training Africans in teaching and the 
vocational fields - a path he had already begun by dispatching volunteer students of Tuskegee 
to various parts of Africa to assist in vocational enterprise.[14]
The emergence of the Afro-Caribbean Marcus Garvey on the American scene between 
1918 and 1923 to advocate the same back to Africa option coupled with Dr. Du Bois’ efforts in 
organising a total of six Pan-African Congresses to bring together continental and Diaspora 
Africans to press for Africa’s emancipation were eloquent testimonies to the importance of the 
continent to Afro-Americans.
Born in Jamaica in 1887, Marcus Garvey arrived in the US in 1916 and established the 
Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) with the objective of effecting the 
repatriation of Diaspora Africans to freedom in the ancestral homeland. This objective was, no
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doubt, inspired by the predicament of the African race in the New World but its significance lay 
in the strategy and tactics adopted by Garvey. He instilled racial pride and racial consciousness 
in the Diaspora African who, he argued, should count himself lucky for being the descendant 
of a noble race:
“When Europe was inhabited by a race of cannibals, a race of savages, naked men, 
heathens and pagans, Africa was peopled with a race of cultured black men, who were 
masters in art, science and literature; men who were cultured and refined; men, who it 
was said, were like the gods. Even the great poets of old sang in beautiful sonnets of 
the delight it afforded the gods to be in companionship with the Ethiopians..Negroes, 
teach your children they are direct descendants of the greatest and proudest race ever 
peopled the earth..”[15]
To attract that past greatness, the New World African must have confidence in himself 
and in his ability: “Why, then, should we lose hope? Black men you were once great; you shall 
be great again; Lose not courage, lose not faith, go forward. The thing to do is to get 
organised”. He returned to the same theme time and again as it were to drive home his point: 
“Up you mighty race, you can accomplish what you will... ” And why not, after all “down the 
line of history we come, Black, courtly, courageous and handsome. No fear have we today of 
any great man From Napoleon back to Genghis Khan.”[16]
This pattern of eulogising everything African especially their “glorious past” was no 
doubt designed to instil confidence in the Diaspora African with a view to giving him a sense of 
self-respect. But in the process, Garvey actually gave Africa to the New World Africans. He 
told them that they were Africans and that it was only in Africa that they were certain to find the 
peace of mind: “Men and women of the Negro race, rouse ye in the name of your posterity, 
summon your every sense, collect your every faculty, thrust the scales from your eyes and be 
converted to the cause of Negro advancement and dignity; Negro power and sovereignty;
Negro freedom and integrity; thereby becoming the giants of your own destiny! Your posterity 
is crying out for you”. In case Europeans did not know that Africa belonged to Africans 
irrespective of their places of abode, Garvey spoke not as a leader of Diaspora Africans, but as 
an African. He saw no difference between one set of Africans and the others provided they all 
had the Negroid blood in their veins:
“We do not desire what has belonged to others, though others have always sought to 
deprive us of that which belonged to us....If Europe is for the Europeans, then Africa 
shall be for the black peoples of the world. We say it; we mean it....The other races
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have countries of their own and it is time for the 400,000,000 Negroes to claim Africa 
for themselves..The Negroes of the world say, “We are striking homewards towards 
Africa to make her the big black Republic”....what is the barrier? The barrier is the 
white man...who now dominates Africa that it is to his interest to clear out of Africa 
now, because we are coming not as in the time of Father Abraham, 200,000 strong, but 
we are coming 400,000,000 strong, and we mean to retake every square inch of the 
12,000,000 square miles of African territory belonging to us by right divine..” [17]
His strategy for ensuring that the New World Africans claimed the Africa that rightfully 
belonged to them was for them to be economically independent. Thus, commercial enterprises 
ranging from a maritime company - the Black Star Line - to hat making factories were 
established.
Although Garvey never set foot on Africa, his contribution went beyond mere 
development of interest in Africa. He made Africa not just the ancestral homeland but one that 
truly belonged to the New World African and which must be reclaimed by him. In the process, 
it was the grassroots as opposed to the elites that yearned for the Garvey solution to the 
predicament of the race. The UNIA therefore all but saw itself an embryonic indigenous 
African government in exile.
On the other hand, Du Bois wanted New World Africans to contribute to the 
improvement and freedom of continental Africans. Perhaps he opposed Marcus Garvey more 
strenuously than he did Bishop McNeal Turner because of the former’s apparent success as a 
race leader with a solution to the problems of the race. Du Bois’ efforts were therefore geared 
toward the liberation of Africans in the ancestral homeland. One visible effort in this direction 
was the persuasive power he brought to bear on Afro-Americans’ to enlist in the US armed 
forces following World War 1. This was at a time when the Afro-American had no stake in the 
United States because of the prevailing racially motivated caste system in the country. It was 
Du Bois who used his editorship of the Crisis to establish a symbiotic relationship between 
Afro-Americans physical support for Allied victory in the war and an improvement in race 
relations at home and freedom for Africans in the ancestral homeland. He was influenced by 
Woodrow Wilson’s 14 points especially the central plank which advocated self determination of 
peoples. It was chiefly on this basis that Du Bois set sail for Versailles, not so much to seek a 
solution to the race problem in the US but, to argue Africa’s case at the conference. [18]
Du Bois’ idealism clearly failed him on the two issues that made him support the allied 
cause. On the issue of civil rights, the Afro-American who took part in the war returned not
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just to the bad old racist society but one whose racism had been intensified by Woodrow 
Wilson. Unlike the prewar era when segregation was virtually non-existence in federal offices, 
political exigency made Wilson to pacify the Southern voters by extending a purely Southern 
phenomenon to federal institutions. With it came an hardening of attitude on the part of the 
predominant population as the returning Afro-American soldiers and an influx of Southern 
Afro-Americans now competed for scarce housing facilities and jobs with the Whites. The 
result was that the racial tensions between Afro-Americans and white Americans in the South 
now became a national feature. The increase in rioting in 1919 (christened “Red Summer”) was 
an eloquent testimony to the failure of Du Bois’ strategy even for a reprieve of the Afro- 
American hopelessness in the American system much less the achievement of equality with the 
predominant race. Equally, he came away empty-handed on the issue of Africa’s emancipation 
not for lack of trying, but because of the overwhelming presence of imperialists at the 
conference as earlier noted.[19]
Despite these strategic differences between Du Bois and Marcus Garvey their common 
interest in seeing the freedom of Africa should not be underestimated.
The fact that Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 raised an uproar among Afro- 
Americans [20] and no doubt contributed to their response for enlistment in the American 
Armed Forces in the 1938-45 war - in spite of the lack of improvement in their status - was a 
testament to their interest in Africa. It was this interest that continued to sustain the enthusiasm 
of Du Bois as evidenced by the 1945 Pan-African Congress in Manchester in which in his own 
words:
“Africa was for the first time adequately represented. From the Gold Coast came 
Nkrumah....With him was Ashire Nikoi of the Cocoa Farmers Co-operation. From 
Kenya was Jomo Kenyatta; from Nigeria Chief Coker; from the West Indies came a 
number of trade union leaders; from South Africa the writer, Peter Abrahams acted as 
publicity director while George Padmore was general-director. It was interesting to 
learn that from the original Pan-African Congress the idea had spread so that nearly 
every African province now had its national congress.... There are now national 
congresses in South Africa, Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Tanganyika and Angola.”[21]
No one doubts the fact that local conditions created the impetus for the independence 
movement in Africa, but the Diaspora Africans especially the Afro-Americans were the first to 
decry those conditions at the international level. It was perhaps in recognition of this effort on
20
the part of Diaspora Africans that some early revolts against colonial rule were sustained by the 
possibility of a helping hand by Afro-Americans across the Atlantic. Some of these were the 
revolt in colonial Nyasaland led by American trained John Chilembe during which it was 
prophesied that Afro-Americans would arrive in aircraft to bomb Europeans out of then- 
country. This was also true of the religious uprising in Kimbangu in the Congo in the 1920s 
and an insurrection in Madagascar in 1947 in which the prospect of a rescue by Afro- 
Americans helped to sustain the natives in their endeavour. Indeed the Madagascar insurrection 
was spectacular in this regards because rumour circulated that Afro-Americans, armed to the 
teeth, had already landed to overwhelm the Europeans. The influence of these unfounded 
rumours was so effective that colonial authorities in parts of Africa thought it wise to suspect, 
in some cases accuse and censure missionaries of African descent in their jurisdiction for 
spreading subversive messages.[22]
In this respect, Dr. Du Bois was not simply boasting in saying that it was Diaspora 
Africans who pioneered and spearheaded the cause of Africa’s emancipation until the 
emergence of continental Africans in the 1940s to continue the struggle in earnest to fruition. 
Several of the Africans who emerged to lead their states to independence in the 1950s and 60s 
were participants at the Manchester Congress of 1945 who became restless thereafter and went 
back home to confront colonial rule. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya 
were conspicuous in this regard. The inspirational nature of the Manchester conference was 
acknowledged by no less a participant than Nkrumah in the following words:
“Although this conference was the fifth [ Du Bois insisted it should be the sixth] of its 
kind that had taken place, it was quite distinct and different in tone, outlook and 
ideology from the four that had preceded it...As the preponderance of members 
attending the conference were African, its ideology became African nationalism - a 
revolt by African nationalism against colonialism, racialism and imperialism in 
Africa...And it was this Fifth Pan African Congress that provided the outlet for African 
nationalism and brought about the awakening of African political consciousness. It 
became, in fact, a mass movement of Africa for the Africans.”[23]
In this respect, Afro-Americans, if their interest in Africa had not waned, were bound to 
be elated by the interest which President Roosevelt was showing on the colonial question, the 
more so as he had the support of Congress. Whether or not Afro-Americans continued their 
attachment to Africa after the Roosevelt’s presidency will become clear from the support they
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gave to continental Africans in their struggle against colonial rule.
Conclusion.
The pattern of interest in Africa between the administration of Roosevelt and Afro- 
Americans (including Afro-Caribbeans domiciled in the US) evinced a number of interesting 
features. Afro-Americans had shown a continuing interest in Africa and a long standing 
commitment to that continent. Hence they approached the issue from a kith and kin basis. By 
contrast, Africa featured in the calculation of the administration because of the recognition that 
colonial rivalry constituted two evils: a destabilising factor in the international scene, and a 
threat to global peace. The administration’s effort was therefore geared towards the termination 
of colonial rule in the interest of international peace, but there was no uniform pattern for 
pressing the United Kingdom and France to décolonisé. This however, need not be seen as the 
basis for the confusion of the United Kingdom government on the issue of decolonisation. 
Prime Minister Churchill had no intention of presiding over the liquidation of the British 
empire. [24]
W i- m
The similarity, thoughdifferences of emphasis, on the issue of decolonisation between 
Afro-Americans and the Roosevelt administration raises a number of questions. How did 
subsequent United States governments pursue the self determination policy inherited from the 
Roosevelt administration with respect to Africa? How active and emphatic were the Afro- 
Americans on the issue of Africa’s independence? The answer to these questions therefore calls 
for an analysis of United States role on decolonisation in Africa with particular emphasis on 
issues appertaining to race in three stages: (1) Harry Truman’s to Nixon/Ford administrations’ 
policies; (2) the policy of Jimmy Carter’s administration; (3) the Reagan Presidency and the 
Afro-American role in each of these periods.
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UNITED STATES POLICY IN AFRICA: THE TRUMAN ERA
The analysis in Chapter One has shown that not only were Afro-Americans interested in 
the well-being of Africans but that the efforts of the Roosevelt administration toward 
decolonisation was a step in the right direction when viewed from the perspective of Afro- 
Americans. The essence of this chapter is therefore to determine what the Truman 
administration represented: did the Truman administration play an independent role by pressing 
for decolonisation in a pattern different from its predecessor? Did it integrate US policy toward 
Europe with that of Africa? If so which was subservient to the other and was Africa deemed 
important? Was there any thought to the Afro-Americans in the administration’s pursuit of its 
policy toward Africa?
Consequently, this chapter is divided into two sections: (i) an analysis of the factors that 
determined the administration’s policy towards decolonisation and their effect on the Africa 
policy being pursued by the administration; (ii) specific analysis of the administration’s attitude 
toward the evolvement of a government dedicated to the policy of apartheid in South Africa as a 
barometer for determining the importance attached to Africa by the administration. These two 
sections are being analysed with the Afro-American factor in mind by contrasting the 
administration’s attitude toward Africa with the attitude for other countries with vocal ethnic 
minorities in the US.
(a) The basis for US policy toward decolonisation.
In analysing factors that determine the administration’s policy toward decolonisation, 
the central question is, was there continuity from the Roosevelt administration? Were there 
factors that brought about changes; if so how did they affect the administration^ attitude toward 
decolonisation in Africa?
While America’s determination for global peace crystallised into the formation of the
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United Nations in 1945 with the trusteeship council as one of its main organs, Washington’s 
resolve to put its anti-colonial stance into action coincided with the emergence of what was 
perceived as an ideological menace in the international scene.
Both the Soviet Union and the United States were allies against the Axis powers, but 
the termination of hostilities ushered in a frost in their relations. This hostility had been 
smouldering since the autumn of 1944 following the refusal of Soviet authorities to support a 
joint Anglo-American assistance to the Polish uprisings against Nazi occupation. American and 
British officials contend that the Soviets refusal was consequent upon their realisation that the 
Polish underground master-minding the resistance was sympathetic to the British-based Polish 
government in exile. The Soviet intention therefore was to allow the Nazis to flush out then- 
potential adversaries in Poland.
America’s own Ambassador to Moscow, Averel Harriman and the Military Attache 
there General John Deane, not only held this view as an article of faith, but went as far as 
preparing their government for possible confrontation with the Soviet Union over the Polish 
issue. This triggered a band wagon effect which Under-Secretary of State Joseph Grew, the 
Pentagon and the Assistant Secretary of State for European, Asian and African Affairs, James 
Dunn joined. [1]
This was brought about by the fact that these officials had one thing in common, 
namely, the fear of being accused of negligence in the event of another Pearl Harbor like attack. 
Japan’s surprise attack on the American base in the Pacific and the acrimony it generated 
between General Short and Admiral Kimmel of the Pacific Command and the administration, 
amidst public outcry, meant officials were careful to avoid a repetition. No one wanted to be 
caught unawares, and none wanted to take responsibility for another catastrophe. So much so 
that Ambassador Harriman’s possibly exaggerated notion of Soviet expansionist tendency in 
Eastern Europe jolted the newly sworn-in President Harry Truman to issue a warning of dire 
consequences to Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov. Meanwhile, Under-Secretary Grew’s crude 
analysis of Soviet expansionist tendency as a means of power projection - based on no 
objective criterion beyond what emanated from Ambassador Harriman - made the 
administration m  accord priority attention to the needs of the Pentagon.
Truman’s position in taking the issue too seriously was understandable. As a Senator, 
he was a key player in the Pearl Harbor debacle. It was he who, in an attempt to exonerate his 
master President Roosevelt of negligence, published an article in the influential Colliers
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Magazine in August 1944. In it, he placed the blame for the Pearl Harbor disaster entirely on 
the shoulders of the Pacific Command. Attributing the story to a source he referred to as 
authentic information, the Senator inferred that there was a break down in communication 
between the two commanders - Admiral Kimmel and General Short because they were not on 
speaking terms. Hence there was no coordination between their various commands.[2]
There was hardly an iota of truth in the Senator’s article as the official inquiry later 
exonerated the two officers. What was indisputable was that President Roosevelt was under 
fire from Congress on grounds that the administration did not only refuse to supply the 
required equipment to defend the fleet, but that even some of the vital weapons were 
withdrawn prior to the attack. This latter accusation aroused suspicion as to whether the 
administration deliberately baited the Japanese as a pretext to enter the war in order to save its 
friend, Winston Churchill, whose country had been disgraced by Japan in the Far-East and 
was virtually unable to defend its cities against German air raids. [3]
Senator Truman’s enthusiasm in pointing accusing fingers at the military was brought 
about by the tension emanating from the Presidential campaign of 1944 in which the 
Democratic Party of which he was the Vice-Presidential candidate, was on the defensive. 
Truman was therefore in no position to treat the alleged Soviet wrong doing with levity, hence, 
the alarm which Ambassador Harriman triggered reverberated in both the White House and the 
Pentagon with intensity. Military chiefs now developed the desire to acquire bases all over the 
world, with attendant bloated budgets, with a view to defending adequately the United States 
from an impending Soviet attack. The fact that the State Department lent credibility to the 
Ambassador’s story eased the difficulties the Pentagon would have encountered under normal 
circumstances. Not that the Pentagon did not have misgivings about the allegation, but the truth 
was that Pearl Harbor was still fresh in the minds of Americans.
So concerned was the US that before the end of the war in 1945, officials had 
articulated a vision of the post war world in which the Soviet Union was seen “as the greatest 
threat to the United States in the foreseeable future. United States policy should continually 
give consideration to our immediate capabilities for supporting our policies by arms if the 
occasion should demand.”[4]
It also meant the shielding of vital security related information from the Soviets in spite 
of the fact that they were allied with the Americans in the struggle to defeat Nazism. 
Washington’s refusal to share the atom bomb secret with Moscow and the attempt by the
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administration to discourage the physicists of the Manhattan group involved in the project from 
going public with their work should be seen in this light. Hitler was the immediate enemy but 
the Soviet Union was the potential one. [5]
It was therefore not surprising that the United States chose to drop an atom bomb on 
an already defeated Japan that was merely holding out in anticipation of a favourable treatment 
for the Emperor. Policy makers in Washington reckoned that to continue with conventional 
warfare would lead to a Soviet foothold in the area beyond the Soviet borders. This would 
complicate matters for the American vision of the post-war World, the more so as Moscow had 
resumed its own attack against Japan. It was therefore imperative that Japan should abruptly be 
deprived of the will to continue the war.
Surprisingly, the enemy syndrome was not a one-sided affair, although one must 
confess that this study has had greater access to American sources than Soviet. The Soviet 
Union saw the United States not as a permanent ally but one of convenience necessitated by the 
need to preserve the territorial integrity of the country. When Truman revealed to Stalin 
America’s ability to develop an atom bomb at their meeting at Potsdam in 1945, with a view to 
extracting concessions from the Soviet leader about the situation in Eastern Europe, Stalin was 
highly composed on the surface. He did not show emotion because his intelligence service had 
given him a detailed account of the American technological breakthrough. What was behind 
that silence however, was an alarming degree of fear at the slow pace of the Soviet’s own 
atomic programme. According to Stalin’s interpreter at Potsdam, supported by the then 
Ambassador to the US, Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet leadership was alarmed, not in terms of 
prestige, but that the Soviet Union would be the likely target of America’s atomic might. This 
perceived threat was heightened by the dropping of the bomb on Japanese cities on grounds 
that the Soviet Union would be next. Such was the threat perception that Stalin personally 
called in the leader of the Soviet team of physicists on the atom programme to expedite action 
before the American leadership gave the green light for the destruction of the Soviet Union.[6] 
As the Soviet authorities attempted to subjugate Iran to add to its East European 
dominion while simultaneously showing interest on Greece and Turkey, Washington became 
alarmed. With Prime Minister Churchill’s call in March 1946 for the establishment of a joint 
Anglo-American effort to forestall the emergence of the Soviet Union as another aggressive 
Germany, the American leader stepped in to call the Soviet bluff by introducing the ‘Truman 
doctrine”, aimed at assisting countries fighting off communist encroachment. It was this
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doctrine that crystallised into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949. NATO 
was both a military and an ideological bloc against the Soviet Union and communism. Its 
members shared a common hatred and threat from the communist ideology.
Under the circumstances, the Truman administration became preoccupied with “rolling 
back communism, so much so that issues such as the termination of colonial rule became a 
casualty to the anti-communist imperative especially as nationalism in parts of Asia was 
communist-led. Emphasis was on forestalling communist encroachment beyond Eastern 
Europe. Beyond its refusal to the French demand to extend NATO’s commitment to 
Mediterranean Africa where France had considerable settler interests, the United States 
considered the iniquities of colonial rule as marginal. It was not that the United States was 
repudiating the essence of self determination. Rather, officials in Washington were no longer 
sure of the urgency of the issue. All that was urgent enough to merit immediate attention was 
complaint about the communist menace. In this respect and at this period, Africa was largely 
excluded from the contagion. Washington’s attention was therefore focused on releasing 
Eastern Europe from the clutches of communism and insulating other countries from being 
infected than in clamouring for freedom in the African continent.
Moreover, the African countries were under the guardianship of America’s European 
allies in NATO. It was better to dominate them under western influence than to release them 
into the unknown and probably the embrace of communism. The United States which under 
Franklin Roosevelt spoke eloquently against colonialism began to doubt the wisdom of this 
cause of action with respect to Africa’s emancipation during the Truman Presidency.
What took place was that the Truman administration began to mince words on the 
independence issue by arguing that immediate independence for African countries could create 
weak states susceptible to communist take over. Such a development, according to the 
argument, would weaken NATO in a bipolar world in which a country was either for the West 
or the adversary, namely, the Soviet Union and communism. No effort was therefore expended 
towards encouraging independence in Africa whose potential allegiance and ability to withstand 
the lure of communism could not be guaranteed. [7]
Such ambivalence on the part of the Truman administration offered European colonial 
masters a fairly free hand in determining the pace of decolonisation. The situation was 
compounded by the presence of settler populations in some of the colonial territories. This 
accounted for the differences in the pattern in which independence was granted. While Britain
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conceded the inevitability of independence to her West African colonies in response to 
nationalist pressure, it could not do the same in East and Southern Africa. The reason being 
that these areas had a sizable settler population and a high level of British investment. Though 
South Africa which Britain granted independence in 1910 under settler government was 
undoubtedly the African jewel in the British crown, other colonies like the Northern and 
Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland where the British toyed with the idea of a federation for ten 
years also harboured British investments.
One could not say the same of the West African colonies whose unfriendly terrain, 
lack of European settlers and limited British investments beyond a source of raw materials, 
made independence a non-contentious issue after 1950.
Britain's predicament in East and Southern Africa were a replica of France’s dilemma 
in the African continent. While France was prepared to grant independence to her West African 
territories, she could not do the same in Algeria because of the immigrant community. Portugal 
was in a different category as her colonies were said to be an extension of the metropolis itself, 
hence, independence was not on the Portuguese agenda.
Because there was no external pressure upon the European countries, no African 
country except the Italian territory of Libya received independence at the zenith of the Cold 
War. Libya’s independence itself was not only a Cold War imperative, but threw an insight into 
the working of the ideological divide.
At the inception of the UN, the organisation was unsure whether to turn over the 
territory to the trusteeship council or to turn it over to a European country for preparation for 
self government. The former was not encouraging in view of the track record of the British and 
the French in gobbling up territories handed over to them by the League as a sacred trust. What 
jolted the UN into immediate action was the fact that the USSR offered herself as a possible 
candidate for trusteeship purpose.
That was too much for the United States. Administration officials who earlier spoke of 
the benefit that would accrue to Western Europe in its post war rehabilitation effort by 
maintaining temporary suzerainty over Libya now turned round to thrust independence upon 
Tripoli instead of allowing Moscow to set foot on Africa and complicate matters.[8] So that 
unlike the Algerians who fought yard by yard for their independence, Libya was granted 
independence just to thwart Soviet intrusion.
Such an exclusively ideological interest meant two things to the African continent, (a)
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The refusal of the European colonial masters to décolonisé across the board, (b) Washington’s 
uncaring attitude to issues appertaining to race in the continent.
(a) State of decolonisation
About a decade after the formal formation of NATO, the Subsaharan African continent 
consisted almost exclusively of European colonies with the exception of Ethiopia and Liberia. 
In South Africa, Britain had earlier granted independence under White rule without adequate 
protection for the African population. Although Britain and France later gave an undertaking to 
décolonisé some of their colonies, Portugal hardly spoke of independence for her colonial 
territories of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. These three European colonial powers 
were members of NATO, hence under the protective umbrella thrown over their heads by the 
United States.
As a result, they were susceptible to pressure to décolonisé had the United States 
chosen to wield influence in that direction. But this was not the preoccupation of the Truman 
administration as African independence had nothing to do with rolling back communism. 
Hence, the issue of granting independence to African states was left to the calculations of the 
colonial powers.
That these European colonial powers were susceptible to Washington’s influence need 
not be a contentious issue. France and Britain would have been overwhelmed by the Axis 
powers had the United States withheld support from them. Indeed, for almost five years 
France ceased to be a sovereign country independent of Berlin. In addition the end of the war 
brought another problem to the European countries, namely, the fear of communism. 
Churchill’s anti-communist appeal to the US was symptomatic of the weakness and impotence 
of continental Europeans to confront any adversary on their own. Washington’s position of a 
saviour was amplified at the formation of NATO when as earlier noted, it successfully vetoed 
France’s request to extend NATO’s line of defence beyond the North Atlantic. France had on 
her side the support of heavyweight European empire builders like Britain, Holland and 
Belgium. Yet, the American refusal prevailed and the organisation was precluded from the
responsibility of defending colonial interests. [9]
It therefore makes sense to argue that, had the Americans predicated the extension of
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the security shield to the Europeans on the latter terminating their colonial burden by granting 
independence to those colonies under them, it is doubtful if they would not have agreed in view 
of their fear of the dangerous consequences of communist take-over of their countries (perhaps 
except Britain where the Communist Party was not all that powerful).
(b) United States low-keved approach to Africa.
On the second and more important issue of America’s uncaring disposition toward 
non-Cold War issues, one has to take a look at the attitude of Washington to the advent of 
Nationalist Party rule in South Africa in 1948.
At the 1948 elections in South Africa, the US predicted a landslide for Boer war leader 
and statesman General Jan Smuts over his opponents including Dr. D.F. Malan of the 
“purified” Nationalist Party (NP), whom they regarded as a xenophobic extremist. Such a 
prediction emanated purely from America’s perception of the combatants as opposed to events 
in South Africa itself.
Smuts was an able lieutenant of Boer war leader Louis Botha - the first Prime Minister 
of independent South Africa. These two leaders not only favoured rapprochement between 
Britons and Boers after the Anglo-Boer war of 1899-1902, but they were moderates and 
supporters of South Africa’s membership of the Commonwealth. They were also instrumental 
to South Africa’s entry into the 1914-18 war on the part of the allied powers, a gesture that 
repeated itself under Smuts at the outbreak of the 1939-45 war in spite of intense opposition 
from extremist Afrikaners in both cases. To crown it all, it must be said that at the Versailles 
conference, Smuts received international acclaim for his role in the formulation of the mandate 
system.
For a one-time cabinet minister like D.F. Malan, whose only credential was the 
articulation of a jingoistic nationalism, to stand for an election against an incumbent 
government of Jan Smuts was to the Americans akin to pressing a self-destruct button. They 
gave him no chance of upsetting the political situation. Such was their confidence in their 
assessment of the South African political scene that on the eve of the election, American 
embassy officials in Pretoria not only spoke about the inevitability of Smuts triumph but that 
Malan’s Nationalists had recognised the folly of pitting themselves against a titan of the Prime 
Minister’s calibre.[10]
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But did the Americans make this prediction on the basis of their perception as opposed 
to the feelings of the South African electorate? One can only provide an answer by looking at 
the rationale of the Nationalist Party manifesto and its relationship with those who possessed 
the ballot.
The impetus for the National Party manifesto.
Neither a detailed analysis of the factors that gave rise to the emergence of the NP nor 
the divisions among Afrikaners on how to go forward nor the contradictions of their 
nationalism belong here. But suffice it to say that part of the contradictions had much to do 
with the following: differing perceptions about unity among the white community ( Britons and 
Afrikaners); relations between South Africa and Britain especially the former’s membership of 
the Commonwealth; and above all, how to rescue the Afrikaners from economic weakness and 
redress the monopoly of the civil service by the Anglo-South Africans.
Those who were aggrieved that much was not being done to uplift the Afrikaners found 
a platform in the National Party when it came to office in 1924 under Prime Minister J.B.M. 
Hertzog. That this was the party of the aggrieved was attested to by the speed with which the 
government moved to rehabilitate disadvantaged Afrikaners: not only was the civilised labour 
policy introduced in 1924 but the Industrial Conciliation (IC) Act - a juridical constraint on the 
advancement of Africans at the work-place - was intensified in 1926. The Native Service 
Contract Act of 1932 and the abolition of the African Cape franchise in 1936 were all designed 
to rescue the Afrikaners from being overwhelmed by other races. [11]
Things began to fall apart when Hertzog started to talk the language of Jan Smuts - a 
Boer “renegade” - by seeking cooperation among the whites, among others, with a view to 
forming a united front against the other races. When Hertzog went as far as forming a coalition 
United Party (UP) government with Smuts in 1933, that was too much for the Afrikaner 
purists. Dr. D.F. Malan resigned and led other extremists to establish the “purified” National 
Party (NP) ostensibly to dramatise the adulterated nature of the other NP once led by an 
extremist nationalist - Hertzog. That Smuts ruled South Africa again from 1939-1948 had 
much to do with the rivalry in the extremist nationalist camp.
But this in itself might have been responsible for the nature of the campaign for the
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1948 election. Sandwiched between a moderate Smuts and Hertzog’s rump nationalist party, 
Malan s NP ran a racist campaign taking the incumbent administration to task for alleged 
relaxation of apartheid. Thus it set itself:
...the task of preserving and safeguarding the racial identity of the white population of 
the country, of likewise preserving and safeguarding the identity of the indigenous 
people as separate racial groups, with opportunities to develop into self-governing 
national units; of fostering the inculcation of national consciousness, self esteem and 
mutual regard among the various races of the country”. [12]
This policy goal of the Nationalists was self explanatory, namely, intensification of the 
segregationist policy which was first set in motion by the 1913 Land Act and subsequently 
relaxed by the Smuts administration in the 1940s. In other words what the party was saying 
was that no amount of economic imperative should interfere with the racial segregationist 
concept. In presenting this manifesto, the party passionately appealed to the white electorate to 
realise that the “choice before us is one of two divergent courses: either that of integration, 
which would in the long run amount to national suicide on the part of whites; or that of 
apartheid”. This was the central plank of the National Party which was further elaborated in the 
following terms:
(a) “In general terms, our policy envisages segregating the most important ethnic groups 
and sub-groups in their own areas where every group would be enabled to develop into a self- 
sufficient unit.”
(b) “We endorse the general principle of territorial segregation of the Bantu and the Whites.”
(c) “The Bantu in the urban area should be regarded as migratory citizens not entitled to 
political or social rights equal to those of the whites. The process of détribalisation should be 
arrested.”
(d) “The interests and employment prospects of the white workers in the white areas will be 
protected.’!  13]
By coming out with this type of manifesto, the NP were saying loud and clear that 
they had something for every white: the process of desegregation which the incumbent 
government had overlooked in deference to corporate interests would be rolled back, their 
employment prospect would be protected and they would be insulated from the suicidal course
of integration.
The Americans might have had genuine reasons for dismissing Malan’s party. The 
thrust of the manifesto showed that it was an ethnic as opposed to a national party. This meant
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that it could not receive the confidence of the British South Africans who had a major stake in 
the economy. They after all were not averse to the creation of a favourable climate for 
extraction of profit even if that meant relaxation of apartheid. Mobility of labour without undue 
restriction on the basis of race was a step in the right direction which the NP were eager to 
assault.
Secondly it could well be that the Americans realised that Malan’s party was long on 
rhetoric but short on strategy for generating wealth. Otherwise it could not have neglected the 
economic imperative of desegregation at the work-place.This meant that the party had not even 
gained access to or had completely neglected the findings of the Fagan report of 1940/41 which 
convinced the Smuts’ government of the need to accede to corporate demand for relaxation of 
the colour bar and repeal of the pass law in order to continue to generate wealth.[14] A 
manifesto aimed at restricting generation of wealth such as the NP’s would lead to a collapse of 
the economy because investors would take their capital elsewhere. This factor in particular 
helped to convince the Americans that Malan was incapable of ruling and that his party’s 
apartheid manifesto was not feasible. [15]
The Americans were wrong. Malan targeted the 51 per cent of the all white electorate 
who were Afrikaners. By inundating them with rhetoric about the perfidy of renegade Boer 
politicians who preferred the symbols of empire to Republican status and accusing them of 
relaxing the colour bar in order to reduce “poor whites” to “sub-barbaric” level [16], Malan’s 
party was in effect speaking the minds of the disaffected Boers. The bulk of the Afrikaners 
whom Malan’s party targeted were rural based. It was their emotions that the Nationalists 
tinkered with and precipitated an upset in South Africa’s political history by toppling Smuts. It 
won 70 seats to Smuts’ 65, thus forming the first “purified” NP government with the help of 
nine seats from other Afrikaner splinter groups.
In sum therefore, one can say America’s erroneous analysis and predictions of the 
1948 election was based purely on criteria peculiar to the American political scene as opposed 
to South Africa’s. The need to look at South Africa from that country’s point of view was
completely ignored.[17]
It remains to answer the question, how did the Americans react to the National Party
victory in view of its apartheid programme?
I Ini ted States reaction to the new development in South Africa.
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As expected, Malan s victory was a shock to the American government, the business 
class and Afro-Americans alike. While the latter under the auspices of the National Association 
for the Advancement of the Coloured Peoples (NAACP) called on the administration to exert 
influence to forestall any attempt by Malan - whom it equated with Hitler - to implement his 
race programme, religious and conscientious liberals called for suspension of American 
business activities until the fall of the government. As for the administration, it was as skeptical 
as the groups mentioned above about the ability of the new administration in Pretoria to 
govern, a feeling reinforced by Carnegie Endowment’s Whitney Shepardson’s report on his 
return from South Africa. He went there on a fact finding mission for the Council on Foreign 
Relations and returned to write a report in which he confirmed all that was said about the 
“purified” NP before it came to office. Shepardson saw Malan’s government as a temporary 
aberration on the political scene because it did not have a broad based support and had alienated 
the British South Africans whose control of the economy would enable them strangle the 
government very soon.[18]
What was baffling was the fact that in the midst of all this, the American Embassy 
officials who had earlier incorrectly predicted Smuts victory, now turned round to endorse the 
regime. It did so by persuading investors to continue their business ventures on grounds that 
the regime’s apartheid policy, as Pretoria had argued, would benefit all the races in the 
country.[19]
This development, coming as it did from American officials on the ground, might 
have rescued the infant regime from a psychological blow which would have resulted from 
American withdrawal of business interests, irrespective of the fact that Britain was the major 
investor. It could have signalled the end because both the British South Africans, the business 
community and the defeated UP were unanimous in their perception of the NP as being unfit 
to govern. The irony of the situation was that in 1949 the very apartheid programme, which the 
US embassy officials endorsed, erupted in strikes, boycotts and civil disobedience by the non­
whites culminating in the Defiance Campaign of 1952.[20]
The American officials were again wrong in their endorsement of apartheid as a viable 
instrument of racial harmony. If their previous incorrect prediction of the election was based on 
criteria unfamiliar to the South African scene, the endorsement of the apartheid programme
37
defied logic and common sense. Surely, the regime had not done anything to convince anyone 
of the viability of its programme to receive an endorsement. To say the least it was 
uncharacteristic of the diplomatic officials of a great power to do so.
The motivating factor for the action may never be known. But within The United 
States the ANC tactics in South Africa evoked a response from civil rights groups across the 
races and others of ecumenical persuasion including the Reverend George Houser, leading to 
the formation of a South African Resistance” in 1952, out of which emerged the American 
Committee on Africa (ACOA) a year later. [21] Not only was this effort ignored, but the United 
States became the main backer of South Africa in the UN whenever the regime’s racial policy 
came up for discussion in the General Assembly. This was done by emphasising the 
supremacy of the charter provision of non-interference in domestic affairs of member states 
over and above other provisions. Racial discrimination was argued to be an affair within the 
domestic jurisdiction of sovereign states alone. This ploy was put into good effect in December 
1952 when the Truman administration abstained on a General Assembly resolution calling on 
the South African government to mend its ways in its racial policy. The fact that the same UN 
charter upheld human rights and obliged member states to refrain from discriminating against 
people on account of their race, religion or sex was immaterial to Washington. But the US had 
supported earlier motions unfavourable to Pretoria on the issue of treatment of South Africans 
of oriental descent during the Smuts’ era. [22]
The question is, why the support for Pretoria at this time by a founding member of the 
UN which should be expected to upheld the integrity of the organisation?
The reason is not far fetched. The US and the USSR were still locked in their Cold 
War. As a result, the last thing the administration and its West European allies wanted was to 
spurn friendship from any quarter. The regime in Pretoria had demonstrated its reliability as a 
possible friend of the anti-communist camp by contributing an air crew to NATO’s effort 
during the Berlin blockade in 1949. This gesture was repeated a year later during the Korean 
war with an unsolicited contribution of a fighter squadron. To the Americans, such visible 
manifestations of reliability in a war against the communist menace outweighed whatever short 
comings of the government in Pretoria in the implementation of its domestic policy. It was this 
that was responsible for the US re-interpretation of the provisions of the charter to shield South 
Africa’s wrong doing from the watchful eyes of the world body.
It meant that by taking the side of Pretoria in a policy which victimised those with
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whom America s own Africans felt ancestral affinity, the Truman administration was 
impervious to the feelings of both continental and Diaspora Africans. This is in contrast to US 
attitude to Israel and Poland which also had substantive sympathetic population living in the 
country. Poles and Jews had exerted influence on the basis of two essential factors they 
possessed. One was electoral and the other was a lobbying apparatus. These two yardsticks 
ought to be the means for measuring the capability or otherwise of Afro-Americans in this area. 
In other words, how electorally influential were the Afro-Americans and which lobbying 
apparatus did they have to bring influence to bear?
Following the coordination of efforts between the US and USSR as allies in the 1939- 
45 war, President Roosevelt all but conceded the whole of Eastern Europe as Soviet sphere of 
influence. Only the 1944 Presidential election, in which the Democrats were facing a two­
pronged attack over Pearl Harbor and concessions to communist USSR in Eastern Europe, 
restrained the administration from endorsing the Kremlin. The Republican attack on the East 
European issue was designed to lure the Polish-Americans and by implication the Irish Catholic 
votes from their traditional Democratic Party. This would offer the Republicans a realistic 
chance of defeating the incumbent administration. The rationale for this strategy was predicated 
on the fact that much as the Poles abhorred Nazism, they were no more receptive to 
surrendering their independence to communist Russia. Moreover Catholicism - the national 
religion of both Poland and Ireland - equates communism with atheism.
Since Catholicism spanned both Poland and Ireland, the Republicans felt they could 
kill two birds with one stone by consistently attacking the Democrats on Poland. This could be 
done by creating a wedge between the Democratic Party and the Polish and Irish emigres.
There were five million Polish emigres in the US, and the Republicans had every cause to vie 
for their attention as Charles Rozmarek, the leader of the Chicago Polish community had begun 
mobilising his people for pressure group purposes under the Polish-American Congress. The 
objective was to lobby policy makers for the restoration of Poland to its prewar independent 
status.
The prospect of the Republicans inheriting so many members of a disaffected ethnic 
minority was too much to accept, the more so as the Republican Party had opened a strong 
attack on alleged abandonment of American Catholics occasioned by the presence of 
communist sympathisers in the Democratic Party.[23] This was an indirect way of attacking the 
President who was the most prominent Democrat to favour Soviet supremacy in Eastern
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Europe. Needless to say that the prospect of losing the Polish votes and those of their Irish 
Catholic sympathisers made Roosevelt change strategy by talking tough about communist 
designs in Poland, all of which helped to make not only communism into the most hated 
ideology in the US, but also ethnic concerns into vote winning issues.
If the Poles and Catholics established their credentials as forces to reckon with in 
elections in the Franklin Roosevelt era, Jews exerted their own clout in the Harry Truman 
Presidency. All along, Jews as an under-class had cast their lot with the Democratic Party, a 
bond reinforced by the fact that it was a Democratic President Roosevelt who led America into 
the 1939-45 war. A defeat of Nazi-Germany had the prospect of rescuing Jews from the state 
organised pogrom against them in Germany and Italy. For this purpose the Jews were solidly 
behind the Democratic Party.
The parting of ways threatened after the war under the Truman’s Presidency. As a 
Senator of considerable experience before resuming his apprenticeship under President 
Roosevelt as a running mate in the 1944 election, Truman was adequately schooled in the art of 
government and diplomacy. Although he was not averse to the idea of the creation of a separate 
Zionist state out of Palestine, the President was confident of the ability of the mandate power - 
Britain - to resolve the issue amicably between the two ethnic groups, Arabs and Jews. It made 
sense because after all the Balfour Declaration of November 1917 pledged itself to a Jewish 
homeland in Palestine without abridging the civil rights of the Arab Palestinians. [24] 
Apparently, Truman’s view about British impartiality was not the opinion of American-Jews 
who saw Britain’s role as nothing more than an impediment to their dream of an independent 
homeland in Palestine. From synagogues across the country, most especially in New York, a 
Jewish lobby (local committees of the American Zionist Emergency Council - AZEC) had 
sprung up, well funded through the generosity of organisations of Jewish businessmen like the 
Sonneborn Institute, to wage war against British occupation of Palestine.
Two issues made Truman take adequate notice of the concerns of American Jews. 
First, the Republicans groping for an issue to overturn the string of defeats they had suffered 
since the emergence of Roosevelt in 1932 were poised to capitalise on Jewish dissatisfaction. 
With the Republicans eager to establish an anti-communist credential in the minds of Poles and 
Catholics, the last thing the Democrats wanted was to hand over an additional accolade of
champions of Zionism to them.
Second and more importantly, was the influence of Jews in New York and its
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potential disastrous consequences should they transfer allegiance to the rival party. This could 
trigger a band wagon effect as the Democratic Party had been dependent on a coalition of 
labour-liberal and ethnic minorities to ensure victory at the poll since Roosevelt. The 
Presidential election was scheduled for 1948, but the Congressional one was in 1946 while the 
municipal one was even nearer.
With these in mind, Democratic Party stalwarts, some of whom openly confessed their 
ignorance about the Palestinian issue overnight, not only become the champions of Zionism out 
of political expediency [25] but pressed Truman to do the same in order to save their political 
skins. This urgency was in part necessitated by the fact that Dewey, the Republican flag bearer, 
had already embarked on the offensive by trumpeting his consistency in supporting Jewish 
rights to a separate homeland in Palestine. The pressure brought to bear on the President was 
truly reflected by John Snetsinger:
“Truman, who was annoyed by the incessant Zionist efforts to obtain his endorsement, 
bluntly replied to Wagner ( Senator Robert Wagner of New York,): “I know of no 
pressure except the pressure of the Jews, which has always been extensive and 
continuous.”[26]
The President’s by-pass of diplomatic channels to request Britain to allow immediate passage 
of a hundred thousand Jews to Palestine, at an American Jewish festival - Yom Kippur - in 
October 1946, should be seen in the light of responding to an avalanche of pressure being 
brought to bear by a combination of Jews and politicians eager for Jewish votes. The Jewish 
homeland issue had become the second most important foreign policy issue outside 
communism to which politicians fell over each other with a view to reaping political benefits.
This also meant acquiescence on clandestine gun running and fund raising operations 
(mostly by the Sonneborn Institute and a host of dummy corporations such as the Machinery 
Processing and Converting Company established to purchase weapons from the War Assets 
Administration and other unknown sources) to support Jewish terrorists in their sabotage 
activities against Britain on the ground in Palestine. No American officials especially the Justice 
Department wanted the risk of bringing to trial Jews engaged in such activities and the 
consequences of being an impediment to a Jewish homeland. US uncharacteristic near-silence 
on the assassination in Palestine of Count Folk Bemadotte, the President of the Swedish Red 
Cross, by Jewish terrorists while on a UN assignment, should be seen in thi> ight.
With the 1948 Presidential election looming, Truman threw caution to the wind and
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openly blackmailed Britain by predicating congressional passage of the Marshall Plan on the 
creation of an independent Jewish state. This was contrary to the advice of his diplomats on the 
ground in Palestine. On May 14,1948, apparently unable to convince the US and Jews of the 
desirability of orderly transition, and eager for the relief from the Marshall Plan, Britain 
abandoned Palestine without handing over power to anyone. Truman recognised the state of 
Israel within eleven minutes of the illegal declaration of independence by Jewish partisans. The 
President’s explanation for this travesty of international norms was that he had a Jewish
constituency in an election year. [27]
If Poles and Jews had exerted influence on American policies on issues relating to 
their ancestral homelands (assuming Israel is a homeland to Jews), what would one say of 
Afro-Americans in the light of Truman’s policy in South Africa?
To speak of electoral influence presupposes the universality of electoral rights in the 
US. This was far from the truth. The issue of inequality of the races and the consequential 
denial of franchise to some on account of race is well documented.[28] Afro-Americans’ 
franchise was confined to the North while in the South, they were largely unable to register to 
vote. This meant that their votes were of marginal importance. Afro-Americans’ political 
irrelevance was brought home by the storm of protest from Southern Democrats following 
President Truman’s appeal for a limited franchise for them in the South, which he later 
followed up in a civil rights bill to Congress in 1948. Congressman Cox of Georgia 
(Democrat) articulated the anger of the South when he complained: “Harlem is wielding more 
influence with the administration than the entire white South.”[29] Such efforts, irrespective of 
the electoral price, were a function of the President’s own moral standards as opposed to either 
electoral blackmail or exertion of influence by Afro-Americans. It was this adherence to moral 
standards that made the President use his prerogative of office (after his civil rights bill had 
failed in Congiess) to end segregation in the military, barred discrimination in federal offices 
and compelled federal contractors to adopt a fair employment policy. Although he won the 
1948 election, it was not without losing four key Southern states and a flight of some
Southerners - the Dixiecrats.
On the strength of the above, it is therefore safe to conclude that unlike Jews and 
Poles who had a reservoir of votes to dangle before office seekers, Afro-Americans were not 
electorally equipped to strike a quid pro quo bargain as a means of influencing America s 
African policy.
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In the absence of electoral clout, the issue of a lobbying apparatus becomes entirely 
academic. The absence of votes either to exchange or to trade in for a particular course of 
foreign policy formulation and implementation meant resort to symbolic gesture and appeal to 
public opinion. The formation of the “South African Resistance” was one such effort to draw 
public attention to the situation in South Africa.
Unfortunately, unlike the plight of the Jews and the Poles which evoked public 
sympathy and considerable attention from the Republican Party, the situation in South Africa 
could not evoke a similar response. This could not be explained in terms of economics as 
America’s total trade with the whole of Southern Africa in 1948 stood at a paltry $648 million.
It is not substantial when compared with America’s total foreign trade of $20 billion.[30]
Under the circumstances, it would be logical to see the indifference of the American 
public to the situation in South Africa in the light of the predicament of Afro-Americans within 
the US especially in the South. Nothing attests to this more than the fact that the Republican 
Party casts its lot with the Southern Democrats in opposing the extension of franchise to Afro- 
Americans. This was so because the issue was not popular with the American populace and 
there was nothing to be gained by the Republican Party in backing a losing horse. This position 
was quite different from the stand of the party on the Polish-Catholic and Jewish issues which 
received public backing.
This in itself might have increased Afro-Americans’ feeling of low esteem and 
helplessness about the situation in South Africa, especially when seen in the light of the 
electoral influence being wielded by other ethnic minorities with less population than them. 
Such low esteem was bound to be heightened by the fact that the importance attached to these 
ethnic minorities was not only reflected in the substantial assistance their ancestral homelands 
received from the American government, but that even Pretoria in spite of apartheid was a 
recipient of American aid. For example, the total gross value of aid which Israel and Poland 
received from the US government throughout the war to the post war year 1950 stood at $48 
million and $465 million respectively. By comparison Egypt’s $20 million, Ethiopia’s $8 
million and Liberia’s $21 million would highlight to Afro-Americans the limited importance US 
administrations attached to Africa. Israel did not exist as a sovereign state prior to 1948. Yet 
between her coming into being and 1950, the amount of aid Israel received from Washington 
was greater than that of either Egypt, Liberia or war-torn Ethiopia. These were the only non­
settler ruled African countries which were able to register on Washington’s foreign aid
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package. To add salt to the wound, Pretoria received $95 million dollars during the period. [31]
Afro-Americans were bound to believe and righdy so that this was to enable Pretoria to 
implement apartheid for which it had already received a pat on the back from American 
diplomats.
Conclusion.
One can therefore draw the conclusion that the Truman administration had no 
compelling interests in Africa as a whole let alone the South, beyond an ideological one. 
Whenever there was a conflict between any other issue and the anti-communist stance, the latter 
prevailed. This position was reinforced by the fact that the administration had neither the public 
opinion nor the electoral pressure to compel it to do otherwise. In other words, it meant the 
non-existence of African-Americans as wielders of influence.
In this respect, unlike Roosevelt who attempted to play an independent role by pressing 
for decolonisation, Truman saw US-African policy as subservient to its European policy. This 
meant that globalists shaped Africa policy. The handling of Africa policy by the European desk 
was no doubt inspired by the limited importance the administration attached to Africa as a 
continent independent of the colonial powers.
It therefore follows that the Truman administration left an anti-communist legacy as a 
determinant of American policy in Africa. To understand how subsequent administrations 
adhered to this policy determinant, one has to analyse their policies in the area.
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CHAPTER THRFF
WASHINGTON’S SOUTH AFRICA POLICY 1952-63.
In the previous chapter, it was argued that opposition to communism was the primary 
determinant of America’s policy in the whole of Africa, in the absence of domestic pressure. 
The regime in Pretoria had wormed its way into the hearts'of officials in Washington by 
expressing affinity with the struggle against communism in concrete terms. For this, Pretoria 
was able to count on the paternalistic protection of the US and allies.
The issue being addressed in this chapter is, to what extent did Truman’s successors 
adhere to the pattern he established, bearing in mind the fact that he had a domestic audience 
unreceptive to issues relating to Africa as well as a politically handicapped Afro-American 
community. It is important to take such issues into consideration because one is trying to 
identify the factors which gave rise to an effective Afro-American pressure on South Africa 
from 1984.
The essence of dwelling on such early history is to show whether this pattern (what 
Truman established) recurs throughout the post-war period and its role in later events. In this 
respect, two questions are central to the analysis. Was there continuity in the pattern of 
American policy determinants as pioneered by Truman and were the conditions, namely public 
apathy and Afro-American powerlessness, constant?
US African Policy in the Eisenhower Years.
When General Dwight Eisenhower took over the Presidency in 1953, he inherited not 
only the apparent need to look at Africa on the basis of a Cold War imperative, but he also 
brought into office his own peculiarly lukewarm attitude to Africa. This was a tendency to be
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oblivious to and disdainful of the aspirations of both continental Africans and his own African 
community.
At the continental level, Eisenhower’s emergence coincided with a period of rising 
expectations occasioned by an upsurge in nationalism. One might excuse Washington for not 
encouraging African nationalism as Africa was regarded as Europe’s area of influence. What 
one could not justify however, was America’s orchestrated campaign to talk Africans out of 
independence.
The reason was America’s perception of the predatory habit of communism and its 
readiness to pounce on newly emerging states. This also implied supporting the regime in 
Pretoria which in spite of apartheid had not only exhibited its capacity to withstand 
communism, but had demonstrated the zeal and determination to take the war into the enemy’s 
camp if need be.
It was against this background that the US obstructed the 1953 Human Rights 
Convention for fear that Pretoria’s apartheid policy would be its focus of attack, thereby 
weakening an anti-communist regime. Otherwise apart from glaring racialism in the South and 
a subtler version in the form of segregated housing in the North, Washington had no concrete 
human rights violations of its own to cause it to fear the outcome of the commission’s 
deliberations. The administration’s obstruction, coming as it did after President Eisenhower 
had endorsed the Geneva conference by chastising, in his personal message to it, “totalitarian 
governments” for their “disregard of human rights”, thereby fuelling “instability and discontent 
in the world”, [1] showed the hypocrisy between words and deed. One might also add that it 
shows the primacy of America’s national interests of fighting communism over any other 
consideration.
The South African government which the US was eager to protect had made many 
enemies within the UN, which commissioned the conference, over its relationship with its non- 
European population. This preceded the Eisenhower administration, and focused on the 
extension of discrimination against Asian South Africans.
In 1946 the Smuts’ administration passed the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian 
Representation Act. This law was not different in its effect from that on Africans of the Land 
Act of 1913 and the termination of the Cape franchise in 1936. The 1946 Act was designed to 
strip Asiatic South Africans of direct Parliamentary representation, save in Natal’s provincial
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council, and to confine their land and property owning rights to restricted zones.
That there was opposition from the Asian community was not entirely unexpected, but 
what came as more of a surprise was the fact that this piece of legislation could introduce an 
international dimension into South Africa’s treatment of its non-white population. The South 
African Indian Congress (SAIC) which spearheaded the opposition to the law called for direct 
Indian intervention not only to impose sanctions against the South African government but to 
withdraw her High Commissioner in Pretoria and refer the matter to the UN. [2]
India did exactly that and thus heralded a voting pattern in the UN in which the Afro- 
Asian-communist states pitted themselves against the US, Britain and the older Commonwealth 
states in the General Assembly. The bone of contention being the right of the UN to discuss the 
issue without interfering in the domestic affairs of South Africa as advocated by the Afro- 
Asian-communist states.
With the civil disobedience campaign of 1949 in response to the Nationalist victory a 
year earlier, Pretoria’s human rights violations became a permanent feature of UN General 
Assembly debates. So much so that in 1950, the Assembly brushed aside Western 
protestations of the domestic jurisdiction clause (Article 2:7) to pass a resolution equating racial 
segregation with racial discrimination. The implication of this was that segregation along racial 
lines was a violation of human rights, and the Assembly explicitly called upon the South 
African government to refrain from passing into law the Group Areas Act.[3]
The US quest to sabotage the UN human rights initiative to protect South Africa was 
the handiwork of none other than Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, whose 
obsession with the evil of communism had made him a firm supporter of colonial and settler 
rule in Africa as well as an opponent of independence and non-alignment. As far as he was 
concerned, non-alignment was “immoral”, “shortsighted” and bad for the Western defence 
against communism and by implication for the peace of the globe, because it was tantamount to 
taking sides with the adversary in a bipolar world in which one could not be neutral. [4] This 
same harsh judgment was reserved for the non-whites engaged in the civil disobedience 
campaign in South Africa. Africa’s colonial masters were not neutral but allies of the US, as 
were the minority administrations, which made their continuous subjugation of Africans more 
acceptable to the administration than releasing them into the warm embrace of communism. 
President Eisenhower’s condemnation of African nationalism and the quest for independence
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as resembling a torrent overrunning everything in its path, including, frequently, the best 
interests of those concerned”, [5] should be seen in this light.
It meant that as far as the Americans were concerned, nationalism and non-alignment 
were twin evils which constitute an impediment to their anti-communist crusade. Such a 
position no doubt was inspired by the US strategy of alliance formation and securing base 
facilities abroad as twin pillars of containment of communism. Neither formation of alliances 
nor provision of base facilities could materialise without local consent. But by expressing a 
preference for a noncommittal stance in the Cold War, the African countries were invariably 
throwing into doubt the administration’s battle plan for countering communism. Hence to 
Dulles, neutralism was an elemental phase of communism with no prospect of resisting the 
temptation to graduate into full-fledge communist status. Equally bad was non-alignment’s 
concomitant by-product of quest for freedom which the Secretary of State claimed would “not 
produce independence but only transition to a captivity far worse than dependence.”[6]
Under the circumstances, granting of independence to African states and 
encouragement of majority rule became an unpalatable and undesirable threat to global peace as 
envisioned by the US. South Africa was not in this category as the regime was pro-US in the 
battle against communism. Hence, its anti-communist credentials were enough mitigating 
circumstances for any short-coming in its domestic policy. This was the reasoning behind the 
administration’s support of the Pretoria regime irrespective of the grumbling of Afro- 
Americans, African nationalists and liberal journalists and writers in the US. [7] Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs Joseph Satterwaite minced no words when in March 
1960 he asked the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations what it would profit the US to 
embark upon collision course over apartheid with a worthy anti-communist ally: “U.S. 
capability of influencing directly a situation of this nature in a foreign country is limited...The 
Department doubts the propriety of requiring American businesses operating abroad to violate 
laws of the country where they are located or to go out of business. The problem arises as to 
what one government can do to counter racialism in another country with which it maintains 
diplomatic relations and whose foreign policy at least strongly support the U.S. in over-riding
issues of our times...”[8]
Such a stance was in harmony with the views expressed publicly a year latter by 
Eisenhower’s one-time Ambassador to South Africa Philip Crowe, after he left office.[9]
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Eisenhower’s congratulatory message to South Africa’s Ambassador to the US on his 
country s role in strengthening the free world through industrialisation and the assurances “that 
we share with you the desire that the traditional ties of friendship and understanding between 
us should be strengthened and maintained to our mutual benefit”[10] proved beyond doubt that 
the administration had cast its lot with a Pro-West administration in Pretoria. Such an 
endorsement from the highest quarters of the American administration no doubt brought two 
direct benefits to Pretoria. First, it conferred a clean bill of business health which carried 
greater investment opportunities from which the government could obtain the revenue to 
implement apartheid policy. Both the US Embassy in Pretoria and the Department of 
Commerce took a direct hand in promoting South Africa as an investment location. The 
Embassy printed pamphlets to guide would-be investors while the Commerce Department 
educated investors about the country. The race to give the British a run for their position on the 
top of the investment league table in South Africa began in the Eisenhower’s presidency. 
Secondly, the President’s endorsement of the regime could not have failed to influence the 
decision of the eleven US Banks in their announcement of a $40 million revolving loan to 
South Africa in 1959.[11]
But by supporting racial supremacy and colonialism on the basis of fear of 
communism, the Eisenhower administration became at best a mere spectator of and at worst an 
inhibiting factor in Africa’s quest for independence. The administration’s failure to nudge the 
European colonial powers to decolonise in the manner in which its predecessor successfully 
twisted the arm of Britain to pave the way for the independence of Israel as aforementioned, is 
sufficient evidence of Washington’s spectator role in the independence struggle. By its voting 
pattern in the UN on issues relating to decolonisation [12] and by evoking the spectre of 
communist take-over of newly independent African states as evidenced in the pronouncements 
of Eisenhower. Foster Dulles and Assistant Secretary of State George Allen, Washington 
deliberately impeded and undermined the independence struggle to the chagrin of its population
of African ancestry.[13]
Such a policy stance no doubt was at an enormous cost in African distrust and ill will 
as well as of considerable dissatisfaction to Afro-Americans whose status did not experience 
any improvement despite such actions as the use of federal troops to protect Afro-American 
school children in Little Rock, Arkansas in 1957. Those African nationalists were in no way a
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product of communism, but were thoroughly schooled and tutored in western democratic ideals 
and institutions. Their aspiration was to direct their energies to the upliftment of their peoples 
without being encumbered by a Cold War whose origin had nothing to do with them.
In this respect, US support of a UN General Assembly vote on October 30,1958 
requesdng Pretoria to repudiate its apartheid policy should be attributed to a tendency to 
ameliorate the administration’s anti-African image and placate the emerging nations. It was 
probably at the insistence of Vice-President Richard Nixon, who had an eye on the Afro- 
American votes should he run for the presidency in 1960, as opposed to being a genuine 
departure from tradition. Nothing attests to this more than the fact that the following year, the 
administration consolidated a 1957 bilateral agreement on atomic energy it had with Pretoria 
with a joint naval exercise involving the US and South Africa in conjunction with Africa’s 
colonial powers - France, Britain and Portugal. Such an exercise, coupled with regular US 
naval visits at a time when the the victims of apartheid were looking to the international 
community for moral pressure on Pretoria to introduce reforms, indicated the side the US was^t w 
in the struggle against settler minority rule, and independence. That such fraternity with the 
regime would confer a certificate of respectability upon the latter while demoralising the victims 
of apartheid need not be debatable in view of the fact that Pretoria made public a NASA 
tracking stations agreement it signed with the US in September 1960 to rehabilitate its image 
and forestall the flight of investors following the Sharpeville massacre of March 1960.[14]
In sum, therefore, there was hardly any difference between the Truman and the 
Eisenhower administrations in their relations with South Africa in particular and Africa in 
general, in spite of the fact that Eisenhower’s had the benefit of intelligence reports on Pretoria. 
The only explanation for this evident hostility to African nationalism and inability to understand 
African irritation at settler and colonial rule, while being supportive of the very settler and 
colonial rulers, was that it was the administration’s world-wide response to what it perceived 
as the communist menace. This was a carry-over from the Truman administration. America’s 
interests in Indo-China even prior to the outright involvement in the 1960s, the involvement in 
Korea as well as the refusal to allow mainland China to replace Taiwan in the Security Council 
prior to the 1970s were eloquent testimonies to Washington’s tendency to throw its weight 
behind a reliable - anti-communist - status quo power. This is US classic counter-poise to the 
spread of communism.
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The administration s sincerity in its supoort for the African status quo particularly in 
Southern Africa need not be in doubt. But what is surprising' y is the disinclination to support 
rapid transfer of power to nationalist parties supportive of links with the West. African 
agitators were nationalists as opposed to being communists. There was nothing concrete to 
indicate to Washington that popular indigenous governments would be the disciples of 
communism.
Why didn t the administration explore the possibility of popular regimes in place of the 
unpopular settler and colonial ones as the bulwark against communism?
There are two major explanations. First, Washington had very limited knowledge of 
Africa and lacked a coherent policy for the continent. It had no historical connection beyond 
Liberia and as a homeland for Afro-Americans, which meant absolutely nothing as the Afro- 
Americans themselves were not considered important in the US. Whatever opinion Washington 
had about Africa emanated to a large extent from the very perpetrators of colonial and settler 
rule. Mention had earlier been made about how the US predicted the outcome of the 1948 
election in South Africa on the basis of their knowledge of Jan Smuts whom they met and were 
impressed with at the establishment of the League and the UN respectively. It meant that they 
were completely divorced from the views and aspirations of the indigenous Africans. Needless 
to say that it was not until 1958 that the US State Department had an autonomous Bureau for 
African Affairs; even then its first head, Joseph Satterwaite was a specialist in European 
Affairs. Ghana’s independence in 1957 awoke the US to the necessity for an African Bureau.
Second and more important is the fact that the policy of the Eisenhower administration 
on issues relating to Africa was too rigid. This itself could be explained by the fact that it was a 
duplication of the administration’s general strategy for combating communism all over the 
world. It was not adaptable to local conditions because its formulators had only a thorough 
grasp of the Euro-American-Far Eastern world vision without a corresponding knowledge of 
Africa and parts of Asia. Or Africa was not even considered important. The result was that 
what worked in Berlin and Korea encountered hostility in Africa. India’s outspoken opposition 
to racial and colonial issues in the UN against the US stance attests to dissatisfaction as well in 
parts of Asia outside Washington’s nuclear umbrella and military commitment.
Therefore, it makes sense to say that the unpopularity of the Eisenhower 
administration’s Africa policy stemmed from two factors: its globalist orientation and ignorance
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about the continent and its people.
The analysis on the pattern of Eisenhower’s Africa policy raises a fundam en tal 
question: would it have been different had the Afro-Americans possessed effective voting 
rights across the country? The justification for this question is based on the fact that the 
administration had no separate Africa policy beyond the general policy for containing 
communism irrespective of the location, which in this case, was evidently unsuitable to the 
African theatre. One might infer that this in itself might have been due to the powerlessness of 
Afro-Americans who unlike the Poles or the Jews lacked electoral clout. As a result they could 
not make the abominable nature of apartheid the comer stone of the administration’s South 
Africa “policy”. This by implication meant failure to place the matter in the public domain to 
attract the sympathy which the Poles and the Jews had over communist rule in Poland and the 
creation of a Jewish state in Palestine.
If this inference was correct, then, two salient ingredients were missing. These were 
the absence of Afro-American influence at the corridors of power in Washington and of public 
concern over the effect of apartheid on its victims.
Three events seemed to symbolise the fulfilment of these two conditions in the 1960s: 
(a) the victory of Democratic John F. Kennedy over incumbent Vice-President Richard Nixon 
of the Republican Party at the Presidential election in 1960; (b) the eruption of violence in the 
Congo six days after independence from Belgium in 1960; (c) Kennedy s effort to pay the 
political debt he owed his electors.
(a) Kennedy and the election.
With respect to the first issue, namely, the emergence of John Kennedy at the White 
House, was a dramatic event in the sense that the odds against the Democratic candidate
Kennedy and Africa.
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appeared insurmountable on the following grounds: (i) he was a Catholic; (ii) he belonged to 
the liberal wing of the Democratic Party; (iii) he did not have a monopoly of favouring 
independence and racial equality in Africa and civil rights at home.
Without losing the trend of the argument, each of these merit a brief analysis if 
possible in outline to elucidate their relevance.
(i) The Catholic factor: The US may have been a secular state with constitutional guarantees for 
freedom of worship, but this did not mean the absence of religious bigotry. At times such 
bigotry spilled-over into the political domain. This was particularly true of Alfred. E. Smith 
who won the 1928 Democratic ticket. But he was humiliated in the presidential election to the 
extent that even traditional Democratic states turned against him largely on account of his 
religion. Catholics constituted 16 per cent of the population at that time and that were the only 
guaranteed constituency of the candidate. Senator John Kennedy’s failure to secure the Vice- 
Presidential nomination of the Democratic ticket in 1956 might have been inspired by antipathy 
to Catholicism. The dramatic manner in which Kennedy lost his lead in the contest spoke a lot 
about the difficulties the Senator could face in the future. For example, while at one point, 
Kennedy was in a strong position in the contest for the Vice-Presidential candidature with 648 
out of 6861/2 votes required for nomination, the delegates quickly switched their votes to 
Kennedy’s closest Protestant rival, Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee. In the end, not only 
did the latter walk away with the nomination but Kennedy’s votes actually dropped to 589, 
thus, fuelling rumours about the Catholic connections. [15]
Opposition to his candidature in 1960 was so fierce and intense that by April, in the 
heat of the primaries, it became evident that Kennedy had to do something about his religion 
were he to avoid the fate of Alfred E. Smith. Not only were the votes polarised along 
denominational line as in the Wisconsin primaries, but that the same trend had manifested itself 
in straw polls in West Virginia where there was preference for Senator Hubert Humphrey on 
no other grounds than the electors detestation of a Catholic as a flag bearer. Considering the 
limited number of Catholics in relation to Protestants, Kennedy realised that he would be hurt 
more than Humphrey. This realisation brought about his speech to the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors in Washington in April 1960 in which he took them to task for focusing the 
campaign on his religion. As if to prove beyond doubt where he stood on the issue, he told
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them:
_Tt erTeTls only one legitimate question underlying all the rest: would you, as President 
of the United States, be responsive in any way to ecclesiastical pressures or obligations 
in any kind that might in any fashion influence or interfere with your conduct of that 
office in the national interest? I have answered that question many times. My answer 
was ....and still is...no.”[16]
But this was hardly enough to satisfy the electorate especially after his victory in the primaries 
as a proliferation of anti-Catholic hate literature continued to dog his path. Once again, the 
candidate had to appear to state his case to the public at large, this time through the venue of the 
Greater Ministerial Association in Houston on September 12,1960 that he was a nominee of 
the Democratic Party as opposed to the Catholic faith. He declared:
I believe in an America where the separation of church and state is absolute...where 
no Catholic prelate would tell the President (should he be a catholic) how to 
act ”[17]
This might have been the only occasion in recent times when an American presidential hopeful 
had »9 all but clenounce his denomination to pacify a resentful electorate.
(ii) The Liberal Connection: Added to Kennedy’s Catholic denomination was the liberal label 
pinned on him in an era when liberalism had acquired a bad reputation. In the wake of an 
alleged presence of communist sympathisers in key positions following the 1948 testimonies of 
Elizabeth Bently and Whitaker Chambers coupled with the Alger Hiss case and the resultant 
hysteria, liberalism was still in 1960 easily portrayed as co-terminous with communism. One 
must emphasise that this was mostly the stock in trade of the Republican Party whenever they 
faced a crisis. For example, on October 6,1958 the party held a meeting at the White House at 
the end of which they came out with a document warning voters of the likely effect of a 
Democratic majority in the forth-coming Congressional election. This the document said would 
lead the US “to go down the left lane which leads inseparably to socialism.”[18]
In reality, this was a panic response to the following Republican woes: (i) the victory 
of Democratic William Proxmire in the Wisconsin senate election of August 1957 brought 
about by the death of the famous Republican Senator Joseph R. McCarthy; (ii) the re-election
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of Democratic Governor Robert Meyner of New Jersey with an increased bipartisan support in 
November 1957, signalling Republican hopelessness in that state; (iii) Democratic landslide 
victory in capturing the Governorship, a senate and two congressional seats in a traditional 
Republican Maine in the September 1958 elections; (iv) the inability of the Eisenhower 
administration to find a lasting solution to the problem in Formosa following the renewed 
shelling of Quemoy and Matsu. This coupled with Sputnik eroded voters confidence on the 
administration’s defence programme; (v) most damaging of all was the opposition of organised 
labour to the Republican “right to work” laws who in a show of strength had galvanised their 
members to vote against Republican candidates.[19]
In this respect, the communist or socialist slur was a last ditch attempt by the 
Republicans to hold on to an electoral life support machine amidst a Democratic landslide in the 
impending 1958 Congressional election. Needless to say that the success of such a linkage 
between socialism and liberalism in public minds was responsible for the hostility of Southern 
businessmen to candidate Kennedy’s pronouncements on minimum wage and monetary issues 
in the presidential election of 1960. Most businessmen from South Carolina, Mississippi and 
Texas were up in arms against the candidate on grounds that such heresies if translated in 
policy would amount to an introduction of centralised state control of the means of production. 
The drafting of the conservative Southern Democrat, Lyndon Johnson, to the ticket was a 
sagacious political act by the Kennedy camp to pacify big business and minimise the 
Democratic haemorrhage in the South.
Under the circumstances, the idea of being branded a liberal as Kennedy was, was 
fraught with electoral danger, the more so as Polish-Americans could not be relied upon, 
irrespective of Catholic solidarity, to support a candidate steeped in socialism - an interpretation 
Republicans had given to liberalism.
This in effect meant that the Democratic Party could no longer count on the undivided 
loyalty of the Catholics who constituted 22.8 per cent of the electorate in 1960. [20]
(iii) Support For Decolonisation: If liberalism had any benefit at the point in time, it was that it 
gave hope to Afro-Americans and their sympathisers in the sense that it could lead to civil 
rights at home and an understanding of the predicament of colonial peoples abroad. It could be 
beneficial to them at home because Afro-Americans were denied the full attributes of citizenship
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in the US. The Afro-Americans also stood to benefit from a translation of the same policy 
abroad because only in Africa were there significant areas of colonial and settler rule.
If liberalism entailed expression of sympathy for down-trodden peoples, then the 
problem was that Kennedy no longer had a monopoly of the liberal mantle in the presidential 
election of 1960. Unlike Eisenhower, the incumbent Vice-President Richard Nixon had begun 
to show signs of exasperation with the lack of sympathy for dependent peoples in quest for 
freedom. The Suez crisis of 1956 offered the Vice-President the opportunity to establish his 
sympathy for such a category of people in which he was single-handedly responsible for 
calling on France and Britain to decolonise. This was a stance he reinforced in 1957 when as 
head of the US delegation to Ghana’s independence celebrations he attacked colonialism and 
racial discrimination including that being practised in the United States as an impediment to the 
western effort against communism and called on his government to render economic assistance 
to newly independent countries. [21]
By so doing, Nixon had established his credentials as a President who would reach 
out to disaffected ethnic minorities. But unlike Kennedy, his liberalism was not such that could 
evoke the hostility of the conservative whites because genuine as it was, he was not a 
traditional liberal. His display of the new found liberal instinct in the electioneering campaign in 
1960 might have emanated from the awareness that however bereft the Afro-Americans were 
electorally, their votes could come handy in the Northern and Western industrial states of New 
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, Chicago and Detroit. These were 
the traditional balance of power states in the North and West in any closely fought contest as it 
turned out to be in 1960.
Richard Nixon had every cause to expect a slice of the Afro-American votes because 
like every voting group, they were not so permanently wedded to the Democratic Party as to 
ignore others who chose to address issues that directly affect them. After all, after the civil war, 
Afro-Americans were solidly Republican and only began to change allegiance from the 1920s 
due to the party’s insensitivity to civil rights issues.[22]
To the Democrats it meant a possible split of the minority votes in two directions - 
Polish and Afro-Americans. In such a volatile situation too close to call, a major event occurred 
to tilt the balance. In October 1960, Martin Luther King Jr., the civil rights leader of the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) was arrested in his home town of Atlanta
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for taking part in a sit-in protest. Though released at the intervention of a Kennedy supporter, 
Mayor William Hartsfield of Alabama, who saw political dividends for his candidate in the act, 
King was immediately re-arrested and sentenced to four months imprisonment by Judge Oscar 
Mitchell for breaking an earlier probation.
Too frightened to condemn the sentence for fear of alienating Southern votes, 
Kennedy made a phone call to the prisoner’s wife, Coretta King, to express his sympathy. 
That was all that it took to excite Afro-Americans, an excitement intensified by Kings’ release 
after serving only two days of his sentence apparently as a result of his lawyer’s efforts. Back 
in the Afro-American community, credit went to Kennedy, whose campaign team used it to 
good effect by distributing pamphlets to Afro-Americans outlining the candidate’s concern at 
the event and Coretta King’s gratitude, without a corresponding effort by candidate Nixon. 
This became an opportunity for stemming the tide of Nixon’s popularity among Afro- 
Americans. Even King’s father - a Baptist priest - confessed his preference for Nixon until 
Kennedy telephoned the family following the arrest of his son, which he declared with 
excitement:
“I will vote for him, even though I don’t want a Catholic. But I will take a Catholic or 
the devil himself if he will wipe the tears from my daughter in law-eyes. I’ve got a 
suitcase full of votes - my whole church - for you to give to Senator Kennedy”[23]
Martin Luther King Jr. himself had never been a fan of Kennedy. At the Democratic 
convention, he like most civil rights activists preferred the experienced Adlai Stevenson as a 
more able flag bearer. Failing this, King had expressed preference for Richard Nixon. But in 
his moment of tribulation, there was no Nixon for fear of infuriating the South. Kennedy tried. 
The result was that he did not only win the crucial states of Illinois, Michigan, Texas, South 
Carolina and Louisiana with the help of Afro-American votes but walked away with the 
presidency with one per cent lead over the Republican candidate.
For once, Afro-American votes though largely confined to a section of the country had 
proved decisive in an evenly matched electoral contest. Though probably a one off situation, it 
was enough to whet the appetite of the Afro-Americans and to focus attention on them as 
potential king-makers in contests where no candidate had preponderance over the other. How 
Kennedy responded to the aspirations of Afro-Americans will now be analysed.
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(b) The Congo crisis and the Kennedy Administration.
If Kennedy’s victory over Richard Nixon on the basis of Afro-American votes was 
the beginning of the end of lack of interests on causes being pursued by America’s own 
African community, the Congo crisis was equally important.
At the emergence of the Kennedy administration, Africa was becoming less remote to 
the American public. The independence of Ghana in 1957, the Sharpeville massacre of March 
1960 and above all, the Congo debacle helped to bring Africa nearer to the door steps of the 
American people.
Perhaps the most dramatic of these was the Congo crisis. The factors which gave rise 
to it have been properly documented. [24] In a nutshell, when the Congo became independent 
on July 1, 1960, not only was the country bereft of capable indigenous manpower, but the 
abrupt pattern of the handing over six months before the originally agreed date, meant the 
withdrawal of the institutional restraints on the various ethnic and linguistic groups. These 
groups were brought together and held under duress as in other European colonies, for 
administrative purpose.
Nearly a century of Belgian monarchical and colonial rule never unified the indigenous 
people into thinking of themselves as Congolese. Rather they identified themselves with their 
ethnic groups. The only semblance of unity they had among them was their hatred for colonial 
rule. Once that common denominator was eliminated their differences became glaring. For 
example, Joseph Kasavubu earned the presidency of the Congo on the basis of his party, the 
Association of the Bakongo for the Unification, Conservation and Expansion of the Kikongo 
Language (ABAKO), as opposed to either electoral popularity or ability to unite the country as 
a fatherly figure. ABAKO was a tribal organisation dedicated to the cause of the Kikongo to the 
exclusion of other Congolese. Similarly, the Confederation of Association of Katanga 
(CONAKAT) drew support from Katanga and perhaps as later event showed, some affinity 
with neighbouring South Kasai. Only Patrice Lumumba s Movement National Congolais could 
claim a semblance of broad based representation, but this was fragile as encapsulated by its 
inability to command anything nearer a majority in Parliament.
Because none of the indigenous parties had a broad based representation outside their
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ethnic base with the qualified exception of Lumumba, the central Congolese government was 
an amalgam of incompatible elements articulating their source of power, i.e, tribal origin. This 
was exacerbated by the ideological predilection of the combatants. Patrice Lumumba and his 
prominent supporters were Pan-Africanists, admirers of the Casablanca group and wanted 
close identification with neither the East nor West in foreign policy orientation. Because they 
were authentic African nationalists they wanted a strong Congo transcending ethnic loyalty. 
This one might interpret as a unitary state.
This was diametrically opposed to the position of the other key players in the 
government. By his antipathy to tribal loyalty without regards to their unpopularity on a 
national basis, Lumumba was in effect plotting to liquidate them politically and they loathed 
him for that. Instead, Kasavubu and Tshombe preferred a federal structure and close 
identification with the West.
The result was an absence of consensus politics among the parties that constituted the 
government. This meant disregard and disrespect for portfolios of office as the Prime Minister 
and the President jostled for the position of chief executive of the state. This later became 
glaring on two occasions when the drama had been played out. First, was the conflicting 
appeal of the President and the Prime Minister to different sources to repel the Belgian invasion 
and Tshombe’s secession- differences which also reflected their disagreement over the scope of 
assistance being sought.[25] The second instance was President Kasavubu’s announcement of 
the dismissal of the Prime Minister from office on September 5,1960 without seeking the 
approval of Parliament, apparently on recognition of himself as the repository of executive 
authority.
It therefore followed that instead of a government representing a state, what happened 
in the Congo was the emergence of conflicting and antagonistic centres of loyalty at the 
expense of the state.
This was too tempting for the Eisenhower administration to ignore. First there were 
factions among the combatants. Second, there was utter confusion, which earned the risk of 
communist intervention if not already present through surrogates, and hence the need for US 
involvement to keep communism at bay. This could be achieved with little manipulation 
through the UN. The US therefore joined the fray under the canopy of the UN whose peace 
keeping force it virtually single-handedly financed.
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That there were ideological differences (whether or not at the level of nationalism) 
meant to Washington that some would be anti-West. In this case, Prime Minister Lumumba and 
his associates with their non-alignment preference and friendliness with those Washington 
recognised as being radicals were immediately either affixed with the communist label or 
regarded as too prone to communist manipulation and infiltration, while President Kasavubu 
and his supporters were not only spared the wrath of Washington, but became the sole 
beneficiary of American patronage. It was such patronage that enabled the President to 
announce Lumumba’s dismissal as aforementioned without due consultation with his 
Parliament. The President had the support of US intelligence officer, Andrew Cordier, 
disguised as Washington’s representative in the UN peace keeping force in the Congo. This 
action which was undertaken with the knowledge of UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld 
received a glowing tribute from President Eisenhower in his speech to the General Assembly 
on September 22, 1960.[26]
It was therefore obvious that the US used its sponsorship of the UN effort in the 
Congo to achieve its aim of neutralising a repugnant ideology as opposed to responding to the 
Congolese request of assistance to repel rebellion and foreign invasion. This was further 
supported by the fact that the UN was rather more interested in ensuring cohesion, namely, 
eliminating “communists” in the Congolese government than in either repelling the Belgian 
expeditionary force or in assisting the central government to crush the rebellion. Needless to 
say that even after Cordier’s “coup” of eliminating Lumumba, the Eisenhower administration 
still failed to take decisive action to end the rebellion.
In this respect, Jackson’s finding that “anti-communism, however, was not the sole 
motivation of the incipient American policy. It was not ideology but rather economics which 
imposed the decisive influence”[27], appears less convincing. True at the point in time, the 
Congo was rich in minerals accounting for nearly a tenth of copper production, 50 per cent of 
cobalt and about 70 per cent of industrial diamonds outside the non-communist bloc. Such 
mineral production when weighed against the background that other metals like uranium, 
radium and zinc were also found in the country highlights its importance to an advanced 
economy. For example, cobalt was used in advanced technology especially in the manufacture 
of high grade alloy without which jet engines, gas turbines and rocket nozzles, all useful items 
in space technology would not have been produced.[28]
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But this in itself could not have made the Congo vital to the US unless one would say 
that the Congo had a monopoly of production of these items outside East Europe. The US was 
and still is not entirely bereft of these minerals. Any shortfall in these minerals could be 
compensated for with substitutes. It would even be easier for Washington to obtain a mineral 
like cobalt from Chile than from Africa. A testimony to the limited importance of the Congo 
was the fact that US direct investment at the time of the intervention was a paltry $12 million 
as opposed to Belgian $3.5 billion.[29]
If it was indeed true that Washington’s interest in the Congo was purely economic, 
then, why didn’t it align itself with Tshombe since most of these minerals were found in 
Katanga? The European allies were all behind Tshombe. The fact that this was not the case 
proved that America’s interest in the Congo was primarily ideological, i.e. to insulate the whole 
of the Congo from communism. Only a Congo with a strong central authority could do this as 
opposed to a fractious one which would make the units an easy prey to the ideological menace 
of the East.
Consequently at the emergence of Kennedy at the White House, informed Americans 
were very much aware of the situation in the Congo especially as the Congo lobby received the 
patronage of Republican Senator Thomas Dodd of Connecticut.[30]
(c) Kennedy’s attitude vis-a-vis the expectation of Afro-Americans.
When Kennedy acceded to the presidency in January 1961, he inherited three 
problems of particular concern to his Afro-American constituency. These were civil rights at 
home, apartheid in South Africa and anti-communist involvement in the Congo.
It remains to answer the question, how well did he tackle them?
i) The Civil Rights issue: The administration’s task in this area entails the conferment of 
citizenship and its attributes, namely, unfettered voting rights, upon Afro-Americans across the 
entire country. This is not to say that there weren’t Southern Afro-Americans who benefited 
from the Congressional Amendments between 1865 and 1870, but they were few and on the
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main, Afro Americans were unable to exercise their right to register and to vote in that part of 
the country.[31]
It was only in 1957, i.e, eighty-seven years after the 15th. Amendment and the 
Charles Sumner bill of 1870, that another civil rights bill reached Congress. This was sent by 
President Eisenhower, apparently not out of conviction, but probably out of sheer necessity to 
uphold the law following the Supreme Court’s pronouncement of segregation as a travesty of 
the constitution in 1954. There are two examples which prove that the president’s concern was 
with upholding the law as opposed to bringing relief to the largely disenfranchised Southern 
Afro-Americans. First, the most conspicuous plank of the bill, namely Title III dealt with 
conferment of powers upon the Attorney-General to desegregate schools, while in actual fact 
burying the salient issue of voting rights as if the administration did not know that segregation 
was brought about by the powerlessness of Afro-Americans.
Secondly, the President neither effectively lobbied nor placed the matter in the public 
domain with the full weight of his office. This could have been done by appealing directly to 
the public over the head of the law makers before their consideration of the bill, as a guarantee 
against rejection and filibuster. Because the President’s heart was not in the bill, he did nothing 
to salvage it from its guaranteed rejection in the Senate.[32]
In reality, the act of sending the bill to Congress without back-up support the way they 
did, makes one wonder if the key players in the administration were not merely indulging in 
mischief making with a view to compensating for their lack of interest on issues relating to civil 
rights. This becomes all the more plausible when one considers the fact that even the 
Commission on Civil Rights which the bill created was packed in such a way that Southern 
Democrats and conservative Republicans enjoyed an overwhelming preponderance. Giving 
their harmony of interests in their detestation of civil rights appertaining to Afro-Americans, it 
is no exaggeration to say that the Eisenhower administration neither meant nor anticipated an 
alteration in the existing political impotence of the Afro-Americans.
Of course, the fact that the civil rights section of the Justice Department was elevated 
to a Division need not be cited as indicative of the administration’s sincerity in the face of 
hostility from Congress. The truth of the matter was that this, as well as another civil rights 
initiative in 1960 conferring greater authority upon the Justice Department to ensure exercise of 
voting rights by Afro-Americans, were more conspicuous by their dormancy than would
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otherwise have been expected even by the standards of that administration on such issues. For 
example, the Attorney-General could bring an action in no more than ten cases for hampering 
Afro-American rights to vote, in spite of the fact that in Mississippi alone, authorities in no less 
than three-quarters (74 out of 82) of the counties deliberately impeded the right of qualified 
Afro-Americans to have their names in the voters register. The same situation repeated itself 
throughout the former Confederate states with variation in subterfuge, at times conniving either 
with employers of labour or the white supremacist organisation - the Ku Klux Klan - to 
intimidate Afro-Americans into abandoning their right to vote. So much so that there was no 
state in the South which registered more than 20 per cent of eligible Afro-Americans in the 
voter register.[33] The non-violent sit-in protests and the mushrooming of protest movements 
such as Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the Student Non-violent Coordinating 
Committee (SNCC) in 1960, in the wake of the Montgomery bus boycott of 1955/56 were 
indicative of the ineffectiveness of the efforts of the Eisenhower administration in the area of 
civil rights.
Admittedly, 1960 was not the 1920s, but Afro-Americans were with the exception of 
a negligible few unable to benefit from the franchise in the former confederate states. 
Kennedy’s presidency was one in which Afro-Americans expected remedies for their 
predicament as a just compensation for their electoral support. Past administrations had catered 
exclusively to the interest of the dominant population, but to Afro-Americans who had by 
chance found themselves in the position of king makers, Kennedy’s cautiousness in expressing 
a preference for limited attack against discrimination at the work place, housing and 
introduction of minimum wage by executive order was seen as a sell-out. Their preference was 
an enactment of a civil rights act which the President was not ready to risk given the likely 
coalition between Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans in opposing such an 
enterprise. Such a coalition was likely to defeat any counter-measure from the four Afro- 
American Congressmen and their likely supporters of liberal persuasion across the political 
spectrum. Moreover as a former Senator guilty of the sin of grandiose statements on civil rights 
issues on the floor of the Senate while being frugal with vote casting, the President was aware 
of the need to avoid excessive reliance on liberal Democrats on such issues.
It was this awareness that accounted for the testing of the Congressional mood in 
August 1962 - eighteen months after inauguration - with an innocuous bill outlawing the
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payment of poll-tax as a prerequisite for exercising franchise. This was easily accepted by both 
Republicans and Southern Democrats because its effect was minimal given the fact that it 
would be applicable in less than a half of the Southern states without much difference to the 
electoral pattern. The bulk of Afro-Americans who could not vote were those who were either 
being intimidated, victimised, or manipulated by state officials under real and imagined 
disqualification clauses. And they were numerous. Only an act could erase these impediments 
by bestowing on every citizen the right to exercise the franchise.
Consequently, to the enlightened Afro-Americans especially those in the civil rights 
movement, this bill was a breach of faith on the part of the executive branch. The President had 
reneged on the election promise “to obtain consideration of the civil rights bill by the Senate 
early next session that will implement the pledges of the Democratic platform”. These pledges 
adopted amidst opposition by Southern Democrats, included federal assistance to school 
districts that desegregated voluntarily, re-affirmation of the Federal Fair Employment Practices, 
and conferment of authority on Justice Department to institute action against any attempts by 
persons or institutions denying civil rights to any citizen.[34]
This was not a baseless accusation on the part of the civil rights activists. The election 
was hardly over when the President to be instructed Senator Joseph Clark and Congressman 
Emmanuel Celler, both accomplished liberals, to prepare legislation on civil rights. This they 
did diligently with the introduction of no less than six bills in Congress by May 1961 only to 
find the President publicly dissociating himself from their efforts.[35]
But in fairness to him, the President’s action was neither a loss of faith on civil rights 
causes nor a change of heart over his campaign promises. Rather, it was a recognition of the 
composition of Congress. On assuming the presidency, he came face to face with the stark 
reality of racism across the US. Sending legislation to Congress in 1961 would only 
antagonise it without any fruitful outcome except hostility to his other bills whose passage was 
dependent to a considerable extent on the support of the Southern legislators. This accounted 
for his withdrawal of support from the initiative of Senator Clark and Congressman Celler in 
preference to executive action. That this was what the President considered as a better strategy 
could be gleaned from his response to a reporters enquiry on civil rights: “we have been 
considering what steps could be taken in the field of expanding civil rights by executive action, 
and I am hopeful that we will shortly conclude that analysis and have some statement to make
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on it. It’s not completed as yet.”[36]
To the civil rights activists, the President was simply employing delaying tactics. But 
the opposition which the President encountered in 1962 in his attempt to terminate segregation 
in housing lent credence to the validity of his strategy of avoiding frontal attack against 
impediments to civil rights on the floor of Capitol Hill. Even Northern Democrats reputed for 
their bedrock of liberalism and more favourably disposed to termination of discrimination than 
Southern legislators broke rank to protest the President’s intention on grounds that the 
dominant white population in the North, feared the prospect of being swamped by Afro- 
Americans in their housing estates.[37]
This was their understanding of the likely outcome of any executive order being issued 
by the President to blacklist financial institutions engaged in providing segregated housing 
schemes. Such an opposition from the predominant population was bound to affect the 
President’s attempt to end segregation in housing - in his campaign word - “with a stroke of the 
pen.” The President’s difficulties were compounded by the readiness of the Republican Party 
to capitalise on the administration’s possible alienation of the North in an era when even a 
minor swing in votes could alter the likely result of an election.
This proposal had all that it required to alienate the predominant population because the 
National Association of Home Builders also joined the fray in the summer of 1962 by 
announcing the result of a purported survey it carried out among its members. According to the 
result, an executive action on housing would hurt the housing industry by militating against 
expansion with considerable decline in America’s gross national product.[38]
Although this result was later refuted, it never diminished the views of Home Builders 
that they stood to be hurt by any executive order on housing.
The President therefore had to weigh the feelings of Home Builders and Northern and 
Southern segregationists against the injustices being meted out to Afro-Americans. These were 
the factors to be taken into consideration because although at the 1960 convention, the 
Democratic Party platform recognised the housing industry as a purveyor of discrimination in 
the North, the President’s move was triggered by the findings of the Civil Rights 
Commission.[39] Not only did the Commission confirmed what was already in the public 
domain but concluded that segregation in housing was as much responsible for Afro-American 
inequality in the North as disenfranchisement was to them in the South. Equally important was
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the prospect of massive unemployment which could result from possible contraction of the 
housing industry should the prediction of the Builders Association materialise. Because these 
competing interests and factors had to be satisfied, the scope of the executive action had to be 
narrowed down to cover only public housing scheme and without retrospective effect, thereby 
insulating the private financial institutions. [40]
This result as expected was met with dissatisfaction from Afro-Americans on grounds 
that their own interest had been sacrificed on an issue in which they were only seeking redress 
as opposed to privileges. In some quarters, there was outright infuriation without regard to the 
President’s difficulties in trying to pacify diverse constituents. Such infuriation augmented by 
months of dashed high hopes arising from the dearth of legislation on civil rights, presented the 
traditional protest movements such as NAACP and SCLC with the massive problem of how to 
hold their restive supporters. The freedom rides from May 1961 protesting segregation at bus 
terminals and consequential violence in Montgomery and other cities of Alabama; the debacle 
over Meredith’s admission into the University of Mississippi in September 1962; the mass 
demonstrations - not without unrest - which began in Birmingham in April 1963 culminating in 
a march on Washington later in the year, were all the outcome of Afro-American dissatisfaction 
at what they saw as the slow pace of civil rights reforms. [41]
Consequently, one can only surmise that the Kennedy presidency was one in which 
Afro-Americans expected salvation in the domain of civil rights. What they got was a 
responsive and sincere Chief of State who knew their heart beat but whose hands were tied 
from resolving their problem by a mere “stroke of the pen”. This accounted for the 
considerable praise with which his Afro-American critics tempered their criticisms of the 
President’s achievements on civil rights. For example, in spite of being one of his fiercest 
critics for failing to send a civil rights legislation to Congress, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., paid 
tribute to the administration’s “energetic young men” who “had reached out more creatively.... 
conceived and launched some imaginative and bold forays.” At the President’s assassination, 
King gave credit to him for his “ability to respond to creative pressure...He frankly 
acknowledged that he was responding to mass demands and did so because he thought it was 
right to do so. This is the secret of the deep affection he evoked. He was responsive, sensitive, 
humble before the people, and bold on their behalf.” This was in harmony with the views of 
NAACP’s Roy Wilkins who although felt disappointed at the administration’s non-legislative
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approach to civil rights, nonetheless, lavished praise on the President for his concern for the 
predicament of Afro-Americans. [42]
One might doubt the popularity of the views of these establishment prone civil rights 
leaders in the wider Afro-American community bearing in mind their past failure to extract 
concessions on civil rights issues from previous administrations. But Charles Evers, a latter 
day protest leader thrust into the lime light following the assassination of his brother, Medgar 
Evers of the Mississippi chapter of NAACP by a white supremacist in May 1963, echoed the 
same view about the administration. In saying of the President’s brother, Attorney-General 
Robert Kennedy: “He has done more for us personally than any other public official. Had it not 
been for him, there would have been many more murders and many more beatings than we 
have had in Mississippi in the last four years. Mr. Kennedy did more to help us get our rights 
as first class citizens than all other US Attomeys-General put together.”[43]
From these voices of the people’s opinion leaders, one can conclude that the issue was 
not that of not being responsive to the Afro-American wing of the President’s electors, but that 
of the degree of responsiveness. This in itself was a novelty in an American presidency in the 
period in which disdain for Afro-American demands was the rule rather than the exception.
ii) The administration’s attitude to the situation in the Congo. South Africa and the 
Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique:
(a) As regards the Congo, one has seen that the decision to intervene to preempt 
communist involvement was taken by the out-going Eisenhower administration. The Kennedy 
administration inherited not only an unstable Congo as the centre was no more stronger than 
the pre-UN involvement, but also a mounting chorus of support for Katangese secession in the 
US. By 1961, these supporters had formed the American Committee for Aid to Katanga 
Freedom Fighters to pressure the Kennedy administration into abandoning its policy of a united 
Congo with a view to ensuring Katanga’s independence. Consisting of a coalition of investors 
with immediate and potential mineral interests in Katanga, anti-communists, conservative 
Republicans and Southern racists, their aim as contained in their paid advertisement in the New 
York Times of December 14,1961 was to cultivate public support for Katanga, protest UN 
policy in the Congo and the use of US materials in operation against the rebels. [44]
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This committee was helped by the propaganda material sent out daily by the Katanga 
publicity office in New York, under a professional Belgian public relations consultant, Michael 
Struelens. In its numerous and quite often unsolicited press releases, the publicity office 
eulogised the secessionist leader, Moise Tshombe as anti-communist, pro-West and capitalist 
oriented, determined to protect Westerners and their interests. [45] These claims were 
strenuously refuted by some Afro-Americans and other liberals across the racial divide who 
favoured a strong central authority as did the administration. But in an America used to anti­
communist hysteria, the Committee for Aid to Katanga occupied a higher ground in the 
competition for public support.
This situation posed two major problems to Afro-Americans. First, because 
communism had been injected into the issue, Afro-Americans were divided in their support for 
and against Katanga. For example, the pro-Katanga lobby was headed by an Afro-American, 
Dr. Max Yergan, a former communist turned its most fervent persecutor. He like others of his 
race were there with Southern racists because of their hatred for communism. This meant that 
Afro-Americans would have to fight each other at a time when their energies could better be 
utilised in the struggle for civil rights. Second, was the realisation that unlike other Americans 
who could stay in the safety of their country to argue the merits or otherwise of Katangese 
secession, the Congolese who were suffering on the ground were the “kith and kin” of Afro- 
Americans. Speaking with discordant voices would therefore rob Afro-Americans of the 
opportunity to influence the US policy response to the crisis, thereby prolonging the suffering 
of the Congolese.
This realisation led A. Philip Randolph, President of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car 
Porters to convene a three day meeting at Columbia University, New York from November 22, 
1961 on “The Role of the American Negro Community in US Policy Toward Africa.”[46] It 
was attended by no less than 100 Afro-Americans representing labour, women and civil 
organisations. As the theme suggested, this conference discussed the immediate problems of 
instability in the Congo where a strong centre was favoured, and racism in South Africa. It 
called on the administration to support their position on these issues. This was instrumental in 
Under-Secretary of State George W. Ball’s statement in Los Angeles on December 19,1961 in 
which he announced the administration’s support for the central Congolese government in the 
fight against secession. [47] Although more meetings followed out of which emerged in New
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York in November 1962, the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa (ANLCA) as 
the Afro-American voice on the situation in the Congo, they had since the first conference 
neutralised the pressure being mounted on the Kennedy administration by the Katanga 
lobby. [48]
The administration’s ability to withstand pressure for disentanglement from the Congo 
could not have been achieved without Afro-Americans’ effort to speak with one voice on the 
issue. It was this voice that enabled the administration to see off its inherited problem of 
secession in the Congo as exemplified by the collapse of the Katangese rebellion in January
1963. In this respect, when Washington’s UN Representative, Adlai Stevenson told the Sub- 
Committee on International Organisation Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
on March 13,1963, that the administration’s policy in the Congo as indeed other African states 
was “to help create states, safe from external aggression or subversion”,[49] he was indeed 
trumpeting the government’s success in an area where its predecessor failed. Such success was 
brought about by the administration’s response to Afro-American concern in an area they 
considered important.
(b) As regards South Africa, the administration was on the whole spared intense 
lobbying by Afro-Americans at this time, except resolutions calling for support for the 
liberation movements. Two factors were responsible for their considering lobbying as an 
unnecessary course of action, (i) The Kennedy administration was post-Sharpeville in the 
sense that it came into office at a time when the outcry over the massacre of African protesters 
by the South African Police in March 1960 had abated. Emphasis was focused more on the 
Congo where there was a war on the ground. Moreover, the Kennedy administration had 
embarked upon the process of pursuing civil rights at home, thus Afro-Americans had no cause 
to expect such an administration to do the opposite in its foreign policy, (ii) The US 
representative at the UN, Adlai Stevenson and the Secretary of State for African affairs,
Chester Bowles as well as his Deputy, Mennen-Williams were officials with whom Afro- 
Americans could feel at home. It should be recalled that Bowles was the liberal intellectual who 
was a 'pm in the flesh of past administrations for their failure to take a tough stand against 
apartheid because of fear of communism. An avowed supporter of decolonisation and African 
nationalism, he was Kennedy’s foreign policy adviser during the campaign, and as such could 
have been instrumental to the candidate’s emphasis on Africa. By Arthur Schlesinger s
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calculation, the candidate mentioned Africa 479 times during the 1960 presidential 
campaign. [50] Mennen-Williams and Stevenson had similar credentials and had both spoken 
out quite frequently on issues relating to Africa’s decolonisation and civil rights in the US. 
Mennen-Williams was thrust into the limelight in this direction when as Governor of Michigan, 
he took part at an “African Freedom Day” rally in New York in 1959, during which he called 
on the US to take a leading role in the fight against apartheid. [51]
There were certain actions which the administration took at the international scene to 
justify Afro-Americans’ confidence in the officials. Elected at a time of growing African 
disquiet at America’s stance over African nationalism and the presence of minority and colonial 
administrations in the continent, the Kennedy administration found itself at the centre of 
growing African demands for stern action against the regime in Pretoria. Their favoured action 
was US imposition of sanctions against Pretoria. To the US, this meant embarking upon a 
collision course with a trustworthy anti-communist ally with whom it also had military 
cooperation. The administration could ill afford this in view of the intensity of the Cold War. 
South Africa had demonstrated her steadfastness as an ally by announcing during the 1960 
presidential election, her intention to offer base facilities to the US for the installation of missile 
tracking and telecommunication devices.[52]
The choice before the administration was either to appease the African states from 
whom Washington had very little to gain in the light of their non-alignment policy or cast its lot 
with a trustworthy Pretoria. Realism could have dictated taking sides with the authorities in 
Pretoria, but Mennen Williams, Stevenson and Bowles had no illusion as to where US long­
term interest laid. Writing to Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, in 1961, Bowles minced no words 
when he told him: “There are few who doubt that the Republic of South Africa will blow up in 
due course. When this occurs will we be able to say that we took every step or practical 
measure to prevent or temper the holocaust?”[53]
The issue is not the accuracy of Bowles’ forecast, but the importance being attached to 
something which previous administrations would have dismissed with a mere wave of the 
hand. That at the point in time, the General Assembly had at the instigation of the African states 
passed a resolution requesting member states to sever diplomatic relations with South Africa is 
immaterial as the US as indeed every other developed country had responded to international 
issues on the basis of its national interest. But this was a situation in which officials of liberal
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persuasion in the administration were interpreting US interest in terms of keeping South Africa 
at an arms length. Consequently, it came as no surprise that Bowles’ urging for action against 
South Africa evoked a responsive chord from like-minded officials in the administration. It was 
Mennen Williams who recommended imposition of arms embargo as a form of action against 
Pretoria while Stevenson worked assiduously to sway the President with the argument that “It 
seems clear that we are approaching a decisive situation from which the Africans will draw 
conclusions about the long-run nature of our policies.”[54]
US arms shipment to Pretoria may have been as little as $2 million, as Coker estimates. 
The important issue is however that in spite of the opposition of the Secretary of Defence 
Robert McNamara, Secretary Of State Dean Rusk, C.I.A. Director John McCone, and 
Waldemar Campbell of the State Department about possible damage to US security interests, 
especially the 1962 agreement to sell arms to Pretoria in exchange for the establishment of a 
military tracking station, the administration did unilaterally impose an arms embargo against 
South Africa in August 1963.[55]
That this remarkable feat (at some cost to the US) was achieved by the administration 
showed the wisdom of Afro-Americans in showing restraint toward lobbying the 
administration over South Africa. There were officials with liberal inclination who were 
fighting their comers in the administration and capable of ensuring pressure was put on 
Pretoria to institute reforms.
(c) With respect to the Portuguese colonies, unlike the Congo and South Africa which 
were inherited problems, the Kennedy administration was forced to articulate a policy 
following the eruption of rebellion in Angola and Mozambique in 1961/62.
Being a liberal himself, Kennedy’s efforts to pressure Portugal to décolonisé were 
hampered by that country’s use of the Azores bases to blackmail the administration. In 
addition, Portugal was a member of NATO. Under normal circumstances, the prospect of 
losing the bases and embarking upon conflict with a NATO member would have been sufficient 
to force the administration into abandoning any abstract notion about African freedom it might 
have had. But not this administration in which supporters of African emancipation were 
involved at the level of policy formulation.
The administration’s exasperation with Portugal on the issue made it attach importance 
to the liberation war effort as a legitimate means of easing Portugal out of Africa. The result of
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this was that the Kennedy administration took a hand in secretly financing Roberto Holden’s 
Uniao das Populacoes de Angola (UPA) and Eduardo Mondlane’s Frente de Libertacao de 
Mocambique (FRELIMO).[56] The administration followed up such support of the 
independence struggle in the Portuguese colonies by voting in favour of UN General Assembly 
resolutions on April 13, and in June 1961, both highly critical of Portugal’s refusal to 
décolonisé. This was not without opposition from the European specialists and the Defence 
analyst in the Departments of State and Defence. [57]
This is not to say that it was smooth sailing for the liberals in the administration. For 
example, the pro-African policy of the administration took a jolt when Portugal launched her 
own campaign for the support of the American public by dangling the Azores bases and an 
alleged communist connection with the liberation movements. The public criticism arising 
therefrom confused the administration as to what should be the way forward.[58] Yet, by June 
1961, Bowles had commissioned a report on Portugal’s colonialism in Africa, which 
recommended among others: soliciting the assistance of the Vatican, Brazil and France to talk 
Lisbon out of Africa; closure of the Azores bases to deprive Portugal of a potent instrument of 
blackmail; US termination of arms sales to Lisbon as well as its outright expulsion from 
NATO. The report was taken seriously by the President and only the intensification of the Cold 
War in Europe and Latin America that made the administration to favour diplomatic pressure to 
what under the circumstances had seemed the drastic recommendations of the report. [59]
In this respect, ANLCA’s resolution of 1962 calling on the US to increase support to 
the liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique should be seen as Afro-Americans 
recognition of the efforts of the liberals in the administration for pursuing causes favourable to 
their interest. Such an administration deserved to be spared intense criticism (despite 
occasional liaison with Pretoria which Washington claimed it needed to influence change in 
South Africa.)
In sum, the President’s policies in the Congo, South Africa and the Portuguese 
colonies were parallel both to the general shift on western policy toward South Africa in 
particular, and to those on the domestic scene - marked by the ability to respond to needs with 
caution without alienating those who favoured the status quo. This was true of South Africa in 
particular and Congo in general.
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Conclusion.
This chapter set out to investigate whether or not there had been a departure in policy to 
the one pursued by the Truman administration in terms of content and the societal factors which 
made such a policy possible. While one did not see any visible changes during the Eisenhower 
tenure, the situation took a different turn with the emergence of the Kennedy administration. 
This was due mainly to the fact that unlike the previous administrations, Kennedy sought, 
obtained and rode to office with the support of Afro-Americans. The result of this was a 
fundamental alteration of the political landscape of the US in which an hitherto voiceless and 
powerless community not only began to make demands, but such demands were being 
responded to in earnest. A few examples will suffice. The Department of Justice which had on 
the main remained toothless on civil rights issues, successfully brought about desegregation of 
schools in Atlanta, New Orleans, Memphis and Dallas in 1961 - the first year of Kennedy’s 
tenure. In Virginia, where the local authorities sought to circumvent desegregation by closing 
down schools, the firmness of the Justice Department made them cave in. This “revolution” 
equally affected the domain of franchise and federal appointments. While between 1957 and 
1960, the Justice Department could bring only ten cases of violations of the right of qualified 
Afro-Americans to vote despite staggering numbers of examples, that same Justice Department 
under the Kennedy administration prosecuted 42 cases between 1961 and July 1963. On 
employment, the administration appointed five Afro-American life-time judges as opposed to 
the three it inherited. It went out of its way to recruit Afro-Americans into the civil service to 
combat their virtual extinction in that area, appointed them into Ambassadorial posts in Europe, 
an hitherto forbidden area to them, and the President personally engineered the founding of the 
Federal City Club in his first year of office to rival the Metropolitan Club in protest at its 
discrimination against Afro-Americans. [60]
The Kennedy presidency therefore marked a watershed in American politics by 
heralding an era in which Afro-Americans could influence what they could only bemoan 
previously. The fact that Afro-Americans made demands, regarded what was given to them as 
inadequate and made more demands was an eloquent testimony to their arrival alongside the
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Poles and the Jews who were there earlier. Whether this was an aberration or a permanent 
phenomenon will become clear in subsequent chapters.
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INFLUENCE OF AFRO-AMERICANS ON AFRICA POLICY OF POST-KENNEDY
ADMINISTRATIONS 1964-74.
The analysis of the pattern of US policy in Africa with particular reference to the Southern 
region has evinced a number of interesting features. One of these was that events in the 
international scene, i.e. the Cold War, were the primary determinant of Washington’s Africa policy. 
Intensification of tension between the power blocs automatically meant support for any friendly 
African government irrespective of any legitimacy crisis it was facing in the domestic scene. As a 
result, the regime in Pretoria took advantage of Washington’s anti-communist obsession to offer 
itself to the West as a bulwark against communism. This enabled it to earn Western respect and 
American patronage, in spite of its domestic problems occasioned by the adoption of apartheid as 
an official policy.
Second, part of Washington’s interest in Southern Africa was the undermining of real and 
imagined communist influence and aspirations. This accounted for the intervention in the Congo. 
America’s strategy in the sub-continent therefore was two pronged: support and reward for pro- 
West anti-communist regimes and officials at the expense of other considerations, and outright 
hostility with the possibility of liquidation for those regarded as non-conformists. The regime in 
South Africa was in the first category while Patrice Lumumba of the Congo was in the latter 
category. This therefore meant that America’s Africa policy was not only made outside the African 
continent, but was also largely determined by global events and considerations rather than events in 
the continent. The contradictory responses to the Sharpeville massacre of March 1960 between 
officials of the State Department on the one hand and on the other, Secretary of State Christian 
Herter and President Eisenhower illustrate this assertion. On that occasion, some high ranking 
officials in the State Department, obviously without the approval of the Secretary of State or the 
President, issued a statement condemning the killings, only for the President and his Secretary of
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State to publicly distance themselves from the statement^ 1]
Thirdly and perhaps the most poignant observation, was the fact that anti-communism as 
the major determinant of America’s Africa policy appeared to come to an end with the termination 
of the Eisenhower administration in January 1961. In the Kennedy era, anti-communism shared its 
preeminent position with America’s traditional values of liberty and justice as well as the attitudes 
of America’s own African community. Since these factors as co-determinants of US Africa policy 
were manifest in the policy of the Kennedy administration towards South Africa, Congo and the 
Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique, this chapter intends to analyse the impact of 
Afro-Americans upon the Africa policy of successive administrations from the demise of John 
Kennedy to the enforced resignation of Richard Nixon.
The justification for focusing attention in this area is based on our earlier observation that 
unlike the Poles and the Jews who had an electoral clout to trade-in for policy stance favourable to 
their ancestral homelands, the Afro-Americans, though conscious of their origin, were 
handicapped by their limited possession of the franchise across the country, brought about by low 
levels of voter registration, even exclusion from registration in some Southern counties. As a result 
they were powerless to exert the pressure on politicians to achieve the result which other ethnic 
groups had taken for granted.
If John Kennedy was elected on the basis of Afro-American support and if his 
administration responded positively to their demands within its limits as earlier indicated, this 
would signal an end to the traditional disdain of Afro-Americans’ demands by the executive arm. 
Thus we must now examine how far Afro-Americans were able to consolidate the flicker of 
influence they possessed under Kennedy.
Afro-Americans and Post Kennedy US-AfricaPolicy
When Vice-President Lyndon Johnson stepped into the shoes of John Kennedy in 1963, he 
inherited not only unresolved foreign policy problems in South Africa, Congo, Angola and
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Mozambique but also a bureaucratic conflict between Europeanists and Africanists in government 
on US stance over issues relating to those countries. While the Europeanists wanted the 
administration’s Africa policy to be governed by consideration for NATO’s well-being, the 
Africanists wanted Africa to be seen as an independent variable not tied to any apron string of 
European policy.
The Europeanists such as Satterthwaite (formerly of Africa Bureau, later US Ambassador 
to South Africa) argued as they had done under Kennedy, that any adverse action against a pro- 
West Pretoria on account of apartheid - a domestic affair - would lose that regime’s friendship to 
the West in an era in which the Soviet bloc was not only bent on destruction of the West, but was 
equally determined to transport revolutions abroad. Regimes like Pretoria therefore were too 
precious to toy with, and Satterthwaite called for a western guarantee of white perpetuity in power 
in South Africa in exchange for a limited African franchise, pegged on educational and property 
qualifications. In other words a return to the pre-1936 Cape franchise. Such a strong argument 
though a reflection of Satterthwaite’s anti-communist credentials, was partly designed to counter 
the representation of Africanists to the review committee of the NSC on Southern Africa in 
December 1963.
The Africanists’ case as presented by Mennen Williams had not gone as far as the demands 
of the students of the “Liberation Committee For Africa”, who were probably wholly or largely 
Afro-American and who in an open letter to President Kennedy in the New York Times of June 22, 
1961, called on the administration to sever relations with and impose sanctions against South 
Africa. [2]
Although this could have been the ultimate objective of some of the the Africanists in the 
administration as evidenced by the later conduct of Chester Bowles, they only suggested the 
discouragement of new US investments in South Africa as the administration’s portrayal of its 
abhorrence of apartheid. Two reasons were responsible for this. One was in recognition of the fact 
that the president had to fight the 1964 election in his own right as opposed to that of his 
predecessor. Hence he was vulnerable to possible attacks of softness on communism in Africa. 
Second, outright advocacy of an embargo on investments would not go down well with the 
business community in view of the “26 per cent return on their outlays which they realised in the 
South African investment scene in 1963.[3] A pointer in this direction had been occasioned by the
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refusal of American businessmen in Pretoria and Port Elizabeth to honour an invitation from their 
embassy to a multi-racial function - in contravention of apartheid regulation - to mark the 4th of 
July in 1963.[4] These factors necessitated the call for an embargo only on new investments.
As expected, when confronted with such conflicting suggestions, the administration 
borrowed a leaf from its predecessor by remaining completely silent on the issue. The result was 
the absence of the administration’s initiative on South Africa beyond the floor of the UN where it 
was extremely extravagant with words and occasional casting of votes in condemnation of 
apartheid, yet frugal when it came to declaring the South African phenomenon as a threat to World 
peace. All that was left of the administration’s South Africa policy was thus that bequeathed by its 
predecessor, i.e., the imposition of a mild arms embargo.
This phase of an impasse in the administration’s South Africa policy was when one would 
have expected Afro-Americans to bring their influence to bear if they had any. Instead it was the 
regime in Pretoria that decided not only to call the bluff of both Africanists and Afro-Americans, 
but also to throw its weight around. Realising that the Johnson administration was unable to make 
up its mind what to do with South Africa, the regime in Pretoria immediately set out to challenge 
the arms embargo. By January 1964, it had renewed its original request to buy armaments from the 
US munition giant - Lockheed.
Since these items were to be supplied by a US private sector firm, South Africa merely 
instigated and stood aside for Lockheed to battle it out with the administration. And with this 
resurfaced the predictable duel between Africanists and Europeanists in the administration. 
Lockheed’s argument of possible loss of contracts to European rivals such as Brequet Atlantique of 
France was not merely supported by the Departments of Defence and Commerce, but that support 
itself was enough to galvanise the Africanists into action. They countered Secretary of Commerce 
Luther Hodges’ concern over the possible effect on the balance of payments should South Africa 
look elsewhere for arms, with the well-trodden argument that approval of the sale would alienate 
Afro-Americans and liberals in the domestic scene, while attracting intense criticism from the Afro- 
Asian bloc in international forums. They were supported though for a different reason by the 
Secretaries of State and Defence ( Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara) on grounds that the weapons 
being sought which included anti-submanne planes were not necessary for South Africa s defence 
needs. And it was this argument that might have given the President the opportunity to veto the
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sale, as opposed to pressure from Afro-Americans since there was virtually none.[5]
In the midst of such raging battles between Africanists and Europeanists in the 
administration, very little input emanated from the Afro-Americans beyond ANLCA’S appeal to the 
President to show his abhorrence of apartheid by prohibiting future US investments in South 
Africa. This mild demand was not in keeping with the furore which the issue generated, and took 
place at a time when members of the African National Congress (ANC) arrested on treason charges 
were being sentenced to life imprisonment in South Africa. This should have been a propitious 
time to mount an effective lobby of law makers and the executive arm for stem action against a 
regime whose official policy of apartheid was a source of instability in a region in which the US 
did not want the communists to have a foothold. The Afro-American response was also not 
adequate to counter the impact of a combination of South Africa’s propaganda network and the 
pro-Pretoria stance of corporate interests. [6]
The latter’s stance was motivated by a desire to protect their commercial activities which 
might suffer should disinvestment become a government policy. At face value this would give the 
impression that South Africa was vital to the US business community. Yet this could hardly be so 
in view of the actual level of direct investments, income accruing therefrom and imports and 
exports as outlined in Tables 1,2 and 3. US direct investments in Africa did not rise above four 
per cent of the value of total global investment, of which South Africa could manage only but a 
little above one per cent, throughout the Johnson Presidency. The same was true in terms of 
income accruing from investments. Neither South Africa’s income receipts of less than two per 
cent on average nor Africa’s overall eight per cent as indicated in Table 1, could place them at a 
priority position in Washington’s ranking order of importance from the point of view of commerce. 
There was hardly any solace in the domain of imports and exports. It is however true that imports 
from South Africa included materials of importance to the US industrial machine. These include 
manganese, chromium and platinum group metals, whose economic and strategic importance to the 
US will feature in the analysis in Chapter Six.
More significant in influencing corporate attitudes to South Africa were its possession of a 
stable political leadership, and also an electorate steeped in an ideology conducive to free 
enterprise. Corporate interests fear instability and enforced public seizure of corporate property in 
the form of nationalisation. Hence it is the stability in South Africa that commends that regime to
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corporate concerns irrespective of the methods employed in securing that stability. It was therefore 
not surprising that American business were so enamoured by the South Africa regime that in a 
1968 survey, 60 per cent of them approve of the apartheid policy of the regime as a just solution to 
racial difficulties while 40 per cent went as far as expressing a preference for the regime were they 
entitled to the ballot. In the light of the reaction of American businessmen to the 4th of July 
celebration in 1963 as earlier indicated, neither this survey nor the revolving post-Sharpeville loan 
from the US consortium and the four million pound bail-out loan which the Deutsche Bank of 
Frankfurt raised from a syndicate in 1962 to stem the flow of currency out of the country over the 
incident, could come as a surprise.[7]
Why were Afro-Americans so silent? Two factors were significant: the effect of post-war 
reality on Afro-American leadership and the uni-dimensional nature of the American civil rights 
movement.
Afro-American identification with Africa experienced a transformation when in the inter­
war years of 1938-45, (US entered the war in the early 40s) a new leadership emerged as the 
spokesman of Afro-Americans. This leadership consisted of the commercial class who had 
achieved success through entrepreneurship.
In a capitalist society, these men not only received the recognition of white-Americans but 
also elbowed aside, the traditional but quite often not so wealthy protest leaders. These traditional 
leaders, most of whom owed their leadership to their intellectual capability which enabled them to 
protest the injustices of the American system, had overnight become irrelevant as spokesmen of the 
Afro-American community. Dr. Du Bois, the most popular casualty of this latest development was 
reduced to complaining bitterly:
“By the time the second World War opened, American Negro leadership was in the hands 
of a new Negro bourgeoisie and had left the hands of teachers, writers and social 
workers. Professional men joined this black bourgeoisie and the Negro began to follow 
white American display of conspicuous expenditure. This new leadership had no interest 
in Africa. It was aggressively American. The Pan-African movement lost almost all 
support. It was only bv mv hard efforts that the last Congress in Britain in 1945 got 
American Negro notice. After that all interest failed.”! 81
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That is the crux of the matter. The new Afro-American leadership was different in 
background and orientation. Because it was part of the respected segment of the society, it did not 
experience the frustration arising from non-realisation of the American dream, as its predecessors 
had. It made its mark in America and had imbibed the characteristics of individualism. Hence it 
was totally committed to America, and Africa became marginal and distant in their perspective. In 
addition, because the Afro-American leadership had a stake in the American system, it was 
committed to the preservation of the American society at all cost. Thus whatever that was perceived 
by the predominant race as a threat to the society was equally recognised by them as such. Since 
the end of the war coincided with a period of heightened obsession with the evil of communism, 
the affluent Afro-American leadership had no qualms in recognising this ideology as a global 
menace. The problem was that this awareness of the evil of communism coincided with the 
perception in US official circle of a link between communism and quest for independence in
Africa.
Africa thus became distant to the Afro-American leadership because they had no grievances 
against the system either to warrant looking to an ancestral homeland or to be unduly concerned 
with Africa’s emancipation. After all President Truman had addressed some of the issues of 
considerable importance to them such as the FEPC, racial integration of the armed forces and a 
commitment to termination of officially sanctioned racial discrimination, resulting in a legislative 
proposal to Congress in 1948 as aforementioned. Hence, there was a link between loyalty to 
America and the class and orientation of the Afro-American leadership, resulting in the latter's 
lukewarm attitude toward Africa’s struggle for emancipation.
Also significant was the nature of the main stream civil right movement. NAACP, the 
main civil rights organisation, was established as a response of liberal whites to the predicament of 
Afro-Americans. Their outrage at the intensity of lynching of Afro-Americans in Springfield, 
Illinois - the birth place of Abraham Lincoln - made them merge with Dr. Du Bois’ Niagara 
movement in 1909 to found the NAACP.
But it was an unequal partnership. Because the Niagara movement was virtually withering 
out of existence without being able to maintain even a headquarters, as a result of insufficiency of 
funds, NAACP was solely financed by the liberals. The result was that they also called the tune,
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hence NAACP’s focus was entirely on civil rights at home. The fact that NAACP occasionally 
spoke out against colonialism and even sent Du Bois to Versailles in 1919 to enable him argue 
Africa’s case was due to the influence of the man himself. His editorship of the organisation’s 
organ, the Crisis gave him a wide latitude to direct the attention of his readers to the situation in 
Africa without blurring the organisation’s focus of quest for civil rights at home.
While NAACP dominated the civil rights landscape and even received if not official 
approval then acquiescence, organisations like the African-American Institute (AAI); American 
Committee on Africa (ACOA), amongst others which emerged in the fifties, were in no way
different in terms of constituents and objective.[9]
The composition and the financing of NAACP meant that it was geared along the path
that could best achieve the goal of civil rights at home. To the liberals of NAACP in the late forties 
and early fifties, that meant unswerving support to the Democratic Party in order to strengthen its 
civil rights plank. That could not be achieved without supporting Truman’s foreign policy, the 
most popular and dearest to the administration’s heart being the containment policy. This explains 
Arthur Schlesinger Jr’s. statement to the NAACP convention of 1950 in which he drew an analogy 
between communism and slavery, on grounds that Afro-Americans had nothing to lose for 
supporting the containment policy because totalitarianism like slavery laid emphasis on the theory
of the master race. [10]
That the prewar Afro-American concern for African affairs might conflict with an 
unreserved support for official anti-communist policy was readily dismissed by liberal whites who 
irrespective of the reality of the situation in the South believe fervently in a common American 
citizenship. This began as early as 1947 when Charles I. Glicksberg used the forum o fPhylonto 
launch an attack on the renegade Afro-Americans who still harboured sentiments toward Africa. He 
warned them of the “retrogressive” nature of the “African craze”, and advised them to abandon the 
idea. Agitation on behalf of Africa should be the stock in trade of “Paul Robeson”. Like all devoted 
citizens, he urged every Afro-American “to regard himself primarily as an American, not a Negro;
an American, not a descendant of Africa.”[l 1]
Consequently Afro-Americans who perhaps on account of the hostility of the vast
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majority of Southern whites found the Glicksberg type of analysis unconvincing and continued to 
protest the likely effect of the Truman doctrine on Africa’s independence movements, were 
regarded by the mainstream civil rights movement as spoilers. In this respect, Du Bois was one 
and so was Paul Robeson.
In view of this, it was evident that the civil rights organisations of the period did not 
assume a multi-purpose function. They adhered mainly to the cause they emerged to champion, 
namely, the extension of civil rights to all Americans. The Afro-American leadership was perfectly 
satisfied with the focus of these organisations hence they were unable to take steps which could 
have brought about racial solidarity between Afro-Americans and continental Africans during the 
latter's struggle for independence. This explains the non-availability of an effective African 
constituency in the US to champion the cause of Africa outside the main stream civil rights 
movement until the late 1960’s.
The fact that Africa received any mention, however subdued, from the offspring of the 
inter-and post-war civil rights movement as epitomised by ANLCA’s activities during the Kennedy 
and Johnson administrations owed much to the efforts of a fringe organisation, the Council on 
African Affairs (CAA), in keeping alive Africa’s independence issue during the Roosevelt and 
Truman administrations. Consisting of non-mainstream Afro-Americans (‘Leftists’ in official and 
mainstream Afro-American jargon) such as Paul Robeson, Ralph. J. Bunche, Modecai W. 
Johnson and later W. Du Bois and Congressman Adam Clayton Powell Jr. as well as the liberal 
white-American scholar Raymond Leslie Buell, the organisation was founded in New York in 
1937 for three purposes: (i) to assist in Africa’s independence struggle irrespective of America’s 
official stance; (ii) to disseminate authentic information about Africa and its peoples as opposed to 
the biased information in vogue; (iii) and to influence the US government into adopting policies 
favourable to Africa’s interest.
In an effort to achieve the first objective, the CAA established contacts with Africa’s 
independence movements for the purpose of making financial donations. Nigerian, Kenyan and 
South African movements were on record as having benefited. As regards the objective of 
influencing US policy towards Africa, perhaps, the most spectacular achievements were the 
establishment of a separate, but short-lived Division of African Affairs by the administration in 
January 1944 and the dispatching of Afro-American experts to Liberia and Ethiopia by the State
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Department at the urging of the CAA. A strongly worded letter was also sent to the Roosevelt 
administration in March 1945 emphasising the need to take into account the welfare of the 
dependent African people in the establishment of the UN. They had in mind the necessity of 
pressuring European empire builders to relinquish control of their overseas possessions. [12] On 
the issue of publicising Africa’s cause in the US, the fact that the subscription paying membership 
of the CAA rose to two thousand with nearly a four-fold increase in budget from $11,000 to
to <,4 vi <■ *-l/'
$40,000 w&haa 1942 and 1946, attested to its success in this area.[13] Although Roosevelt’s 
succession by a Cold War warrior and subsequent intimidation of un-American organisations under 
which the CAA was categorised following its opposition to containment policy, as well as in­
fighting within itself led to its demise in 1955, it had by then built a realistic African consciousness 
in the minds of some Afro-American civil rights activists.
There may not be any ready evidence, but the fact that on December 10,1957 - barely two 
years after its demise - a “Day of Protest” took place in New York to draw attention to the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights with a view to focusing public attention on South Africa’s apartheid 
policy, must have owed much to the continuing influence of the CAA, in view of the tendency of 
the post-depression leaders to detach themselves from African affairs. The Afro-American 
participants, especially Martin Luther King Jr. of the SCLC, the joint leader of the demonstration, 
were more famous for their struggle for civil rights than building racial solidarity across national 
frontiers. But because the traditional focus of the post-depression civil rights movement in the US 
was domestic as opposed to one of racial solidarity with continental Africans as advocated by the 
defunct CAA, the effect of the civil rights message was modest. It also accounts for Martin Luther 
King’s failure to testify to the evil of apartheid before the UN Committee on Apartheid when an 
invitation was extended to him to do so in 1962. He had to decline the offer on the grounds that he 
was preparing for the march on Washington, but it is equally likely that he refused because 
primarily as an American civil rights leader, he only had a rudimentary idea of apartheid 
irrespective of occasional flamboyant statements on the issue. He was therefore unequal to the task 
of blending the evils of apartheid with his pulpit oratory - as he had frequently done on civil rights 
issues to rouse his audience. The Costa Rican Chairman of the Committee who had extended the 
invitation might have thought that the civil rights leader’s legendary oratory would boost the cause 
of the committee. [14]
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One can only attribute such perfunctory knowledge to the effect of the direction of the Afro- 
American leadership since the late 1930s. NAACP’s leader Roy Wilkins under-scored this, in the 
mid-1960s, when he spoke of the need to harness the abilities of Afro-Americans towards 
persuading the American government to aid the emerging peoples of Africa, while in the same 
breath he cautioned that “in developing this activity we should not relax our prime efforts to 
achieve our proper place in our own country....”[15]
The feeble response of Afro-Americans to the issue of the South African arms buying 
quest and the silence over the Johnson administration’s assistance to Pretoria’s nuclear project 
should thus be seen in the light of the primacy of civil rights at home over issues relating to racial 
solidarity across national frontiers. That ANLCA finally came to an end in 1967 was symptomatic 
of the fact that the mainstream civil rights movement was not equipped to fight a two-pronged war 
for civil rights at home as well as favourable US policy towards the continent of Africa.
It meant that Afro-Americans had neither a unified objective nor strategy on Africa and that 
the main stream civil rights movement could not be their sole representative in this regards. Hence 
in the mid-1960s, one saw the emergence of a diversity of organisations ranging from the Marxist 
oriented “Black Panthers” to the insurrection prone “Harlem Mau Mau” (youth in Harlem who 
preferred the Kenyan type of insurrection to the “bourgeois” civil rights movement of NAACP). 
Indeed, the eulogising of the “Mau Mau” insurrection and support for it was of long standing and 
went beyond the ghetto. Educated and elitist Afro-Americans like Paul Robeson as well as Afro- 
American newspapers railed at Britain for its unacceptable subjugation of continental Africans. 
“Mau Mau” was seen as a just struggle against British imperialism and colonialism. Others include 
the “African National Pioneer Movement”. [16] The logical outcome of this development was the 
transformation of a traditional hitherto largely inert and apathetic Afro-American community on 
African issues to one which took pride in its heritage and saw its future as intertwined with events 
in Africa.[17] Since most of Africa had already been promised independence, Southern Africa 
became their focus of attention. The mid-1960s therefore was a turning point in Afro-Americans’ 
identification with events in continental Africa.
But a fractious community in which mainstream civil right leaders like Wilkins were laying 
emphasis on civil rights at home while others (radicals) like Robeson were seeing a common 
destiny between continental and Diaspora Africans could not counter opponents in the corridors of
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power in Washington and exercise direct influence on the executive, unless they could speak with 
one voice. To find out whether or not there was an improvement in this respect, and to what extent 
they were able to exert influence on issues of importance to them, one can focus attention on two 
events in the period under study: (i) US reaction to UDI in Rhodesia in 1965; (ii) the sugar-import 
quota the US conceded to South Africa in 1971.
(i) US Reaction to UDI
Like Kennedy whose tenure coincided with the outbreak of hostilities against colonial rule 
in Portuguese Africa and so had to articulate a US response, Johnson was in office for barely a 
year when he was confronted by similar problem in Rhodesia.
In November 1965, Ian Smith of the Rhodesian Front (RF) government unilaterally 
declared the Crown colony independent of Britain. That alone could not have warranted American 
interest. Rhodesia was land-locked, hence did not provide port facilities to visiting US vessels and 
personnel. It neither played host to US military installations and related facilities nor was it capable 
of adopting a high profile anti-communist stance to dangle before Washington for which Pretoria 
was adept. On the economic front, although the US was importing Rhodesia’s chromium, the 
annual $40 million worth of two way-trade between the two made Rhodesia infinitesimal to the US 
in this respect.
By declaring itself independent, Rhodesia was calling into question the authority of the 
British Crown and the legitimacy of its rule beyond the British Isles. The internationalisation of the 
problem, however, arose from the fact that by declaring UDI, Rhodesia had also terminated an on­
going dispute with the British over the treatment of the majority African population. This did not 
augur well for the international community because of the possibility of armed struggle by the 
majority population as a means of liberating themselves from settler minority rule. To the US that 
meant instability and possibly a foothold for the “communists” in that part of the world. Mennen- 
Williams had this in mind when as early as 1962, he urged Secretary of State Dean Rusk to ensure 
that the administration brought to the attention of the British the need to refrain from abandoning 
the “rightless Africans” in Rhodesia to the mercy of the whites. Surprisingly, both the State 
Department and the NSC had concurred in their response to the stifling of African opposition by
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Rhodesia s Prime Minister Edgar Whitehead, when they protested at the series of negotiations 
which the British entered into with the minority white population of the colony in 1961 to exchange 
the never-used British veto on legislative matters for the granting of limited political rights to the 
non-whites.[18]
The Rhodesian issue affected Washington in more ways than one because the US was and 
is still a microcosm of the world. It has a vast population whose constituents can identify with 
many parts of the globe. Afro-Americans had after earlier vacillation identified themselves with 
developments in Africa in general and in particular the struggle in Southern Africa. Being a post- 
Kennedy event meant that Rhodesia’s UDI emerged at a time when Afro-Americans were not only 
increasingly vocal about the situation in the Southern States of their country but that they were 
ready to identify their predicament with issues of racial discrimination in their ancestral homeland. 
To them UDI was a reflection of the commonality of injustice being meted out to the African race 
by whites irrespective of geographical location.
It is not that Afro-Americans had any high opinions about British colonialism in Africa. 
Their antagonism towards the British over “Mau Mau” attests to that. But they realised that the 
potential loss of an all-be-it unused British veto over treatment of Africans in Rhodesia would be to 
relieve the white authorities of Rhodesia of the last obstacles in their drive for continued white rule. 
This was alarming to Afro-Americans, so much so that even the establishment prone NAACP was 
moved to adopt a strongly worded resolution two months after UDI in which it called on the 
Johnson administration to institute economic sanctions against Rhodesia. Although NAACP was 
not so generous over the use of American troops, ostensibly for fear of introducing super-power 
rivalry into the African continent, it supported American assistance to other countries which might 
intervene militarily to prevent the perpetuation of white rule in Rhodesia.[19]
This type of resolution was quite unexpected of NAACP especially since the departure of 
Du Bois as the editor of the Crisis. In an attempt to achieve its aim of civil rights at home NAACP 
had always embraced government policies on issues of this and on related nature; thus, its new 
position on Rhodesia might have been inspired by the mood of the non-main stream Afro- 
Americans.
However, since the various Afro-American organisations had virtually unanimously sent a 
message to the administration on an issue which they deemed important to them, it was incumbent
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on the government to weigh this demand in conjunction with an opposing view if any in the light 
of America s national interest. In this respect, without prejudice to the New York based American 
African Affairs Association, [20] it is worth pointing out that at the inception of UDI when Afro- 
Americans made their position known on the issue, there was no known organised and sustained 
contrary opinion in support of Ian Smith of Rhodesia, because all that Britain demanded was 
political rights for all Rhodesians. The complaint from the business community that they were 
being penalised in favour of the British who were still supplying oil to Rhodesia through South 
Africa and the Portuguese colonies, as well as the challenge to America’s observance of the UN 
embargoes against Salisbury by right wing elements in the US leading to the Byrd Amendment of 
1971, were post-1968 events. These developments owed much to the fact that UDI survived to that 
time. [21] In early 1966, the Rhodesian issue did not pose a moral dilemma to the administration of 
forcing that territory back to a colonial status. This of course meant that Washington had a moral 
argument in its favour had it the political will to attempt to undermine UDI.
Consequently, one would have expected the administration to have a fair wind in any 
punitive action it intended to take to remove the instability which UDI posed. This should be all the 
more so because the US was abreast of events in Rhodesia and had occasionally engaged in threats 
to discourage Salisbury from unilaterally declaring itself independent of Britain. For example, 
when Ian Smith toppled Winston Field for alleged weakness towards Britain over Africans’ 
political rights, Under-Secretary of State George Ball immediately alerted all the American 
Embassies in Africa and warned them of the consequences of UDI. He also called for a 
contingency plan for possible US response should London prove unequal to the task. In June 
1965, the US Representative in the UN Adlai Stevenson expressed the administration’s opposition 
to UDI in a statement to the Security Council. This was followed by a public proclamation by 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk later in the year, when he announced the administration’s support for 
London in predicating Rhodesia’s independence on majority rule. The administration, he affirmed, 
had no “intention to recognise an independent Rhodesian government which has declared its 
independence unilaterally and not acceptable to the majority of its people. [22]
As if the statements from the Under-Secretary and The UN Representative had not 
established where the administration stood on the issue, the Assistant Secretary of State, G. 
Mennen-Williams addressed the most forth-right statement to the aspiring rebels on June 15,1965,
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in order to make our position crystal clear, so there will be no misunderstandings”. He pledged 
America s unequivocal support for any action London might deem necessary to crush any rebellion 
in Rhodesia. While reiterating the administration’s belief that political, social and economic chaos 
would be attendant upon any UDI, the Assistant Secretary gave the British a blank cheque because 
“we believe wholeheartedly in the correctness and validity of the present British position and are 
prepared to support it to the extent requested.”[23]
These assurances of support to Britain over possible UDI in Rhodesia - something Britain 
should have been able to cope with if there was political will - may seem an attempt to kill a fly 
with a sledge hammer. But the principle is not flawed considering the main issue involved, namely, 
an attempt by minority whites to impose their will on the majority African population without due 
process, which carried seeds of instability. There were of course a number of precedents. In 1948 
President Truman had provided assistance to Turkey and Greece to overcome armed minorities 
with ideological predilection to Moscow. This was a precedent regardless of Ian Smith’s 
ideological inclination. Secondly the rationale for intervention in the Congo in the Eisenhower 
presidency was based on the calculation that instability would provide an avenue for communism 
to breed. Unjust as it was, at least from the point of view of the British, the Rhodesian Africans, 
the Afro-Americans and the American administration, UDI would not make Rhodesia more stable. 
In this respect, by its pronouncements on the Rhodesian affair, the administration was not only 
occupying the high moral ground, but in pledging the assistance to Britain, Washington was 
following tradition in assisting a country faced with an armed minority eager to impose its will 
upon the majority - the consequence of which, even by the assessment of the Africanists, could 
further communist interests in the area.
The question is, how did the administration use this moral high ground it created and 
occupied when UDI was finally declared? In other words, what were the US options to UDI and 
how did the administration respond?
The fact that all the officials of the administration concerned with foreign policy had spoken 
out against UDI meant that the Rhodesian authorities could not now proceed with their plan 
without being seen to have challenged both the Crown government and the US. That meant that 
Salisbury could have proceeded only when it had assessed its vulnerability to either a British or an 
American response or both.
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While the authorities in Salisbury could gamble on their British ancestry and the fact that 
the close contact between the Rhodesian whites and their families in mainland Britain would 
militate against a British armed expedition against them, they could not predict with any amount of 
accuracy America’s likely response. Being landlocked meant that Rhodesia could only maintain 
contact with the outside world either through the Portuguese colony of Mozambique or South 
Africa. But these countries themselves were not free from US leverage should they show undue 
interest in aiding the rebellious regime. For example, the US-Portugal war of words across the 
floor of the UN and in their various capitals over colonial rule, which came to a head during the 
Kennedy Presidency, was only called off when the Johnson administration came into being in
1964. Experts have since shown that the Johnson administration not only resumed economic and 
military aid to Lisbon, but that it took a hand in the execution of the later’s colonial war. [24] This 
therefore meant that Portugal would not be prepared to risk the new friendship with Washington 
by supporting Rhodesia should the White House take a position against it.
With respect to South Africa, its lack of enthusiasm for Rhodesia’s drive toward illegal 
independence and the caricature which the South African press made of Ian Smith, was precisely 
because it was not in Pretoria’s interest to have an international pariah at its door-step at a time 
when an understanding regime had emerged in Washington. Pretoria was angry with Ian Smith 
because should the international community use force to abort the rebellion, it would set a 
dangerous precedent for which South Africa would be the next target. The fact that South Africa’s 
Prime Minister Verwoerd later gave unreserved support to Rhodesia was precisely because the 
danger of an international action had receded since Washington did not give any convincing 
impression of possessing the stomach for a fight. [25]
Apart from putting pressure on Rhodesia through its neighbours, the authorities in 
Salisbury could not have been unaware of the fact that Washington had a stranglehold on the 
economy should it decide to saturate the international tobacco market with its reserves with a view 
to depressing its value. Rhodesia, whose economy was then based overwhelmingly on earnings 
from tobacco could not survive such a punitive measure from the US. The fact that Mennen- 
Williams suggested the tobacco option after UDI, was indicative of Washington’s awareness of its 
ability to knock sense into the rebellious regime in Salisbury should it have the political will to do 
so.
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Amidst such an overwhelming leverage, one is bound to ask, why is it that greater pressure 
was not brought to bear on Rhodesia throughout the duration of the Johnson administration in 
view of the flamboyant statements made on the eve of UDI?
In finding an answer, one has to bear in mind that like most administrations since the Cold 
War, Johnson s was not bereft of officials who saw foreign policy issues from the perspective of 
overcoming the hostile designs of communism. The problem as earlier indicated was that, as 
opposed to the regionalists, some took their anti-communism so far that not only were they not 
opened to lobbying but they also failed to address regional peculiarities in their foreign policy 
analyses. Because communism had emerged in the Soviet Union - a European power - which had 
gobbled up Eastern Europe while threatening other European countries, globalists see Europe as 
the frontline of the communist menace and as such, the continent should be assisted. By foreign 
policy orientation, these globalists are therefore quite often also referred to as Europeanists because 
of the Europe first approach. In this chapter, the regionalists who see African issues from the 
perspective of Africa are quite often referred to as Africanists.
While Secretary of State Dean Rusk was not permanently wedded to either the regionalist 
or the Europeanist perspective, one could not say the same of his subordinates. George Ball and 
Mennen-Williams were globalist and regionalist respectively which carried with it the usual duel 
expected of officials of opposing ideological inclinations. Nothing attests to this more than the 
difference in flamboyance between the statements of Mennen-Williams and Ball on the 
consequences of UDI. Not only were Mennen-Williams’ statements more emphatic in terms of 
America’s unequivocal support to Britain, but he gave the impression that the US was adequately 
prepared to deal ruthlessly with UDI as soon as it was declared. On the other hand, Ball’s 
statements were more subdued because the authorities in Rhodesia were not communists.
Ball went along with all the public rituals of declaring dire consequences that would follow 
UDI, but his heart was not in it. From the inception of the Africanists’ excitement about possible 
UDI, he was doubtful about the wisdom of American involvement because for him as with most 
globalists, Africa was not deemed important. He felt that the crushing of the rebellion, if it was 
worth doing, should be left to the British. In truth however, the argument of a British exclusive 
responsibility was a classic Europeanist ploy to buy time for the infant rebellious country . For as 
early as October 1962, the NSC had warned of the fact that the British had no strategy for
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Rhodesia in the event of UDI. This, coupled with a State Department analysis three months earlier, 
had recognised the possibility of an alliance between Southern African minority and colonial 
regimes, which would pit them against the Africans of these territories. The resultant effect of such 
a development, according to the analysis, would be violence which would augur well for the 
communists. [26]
There was nothing to indicate that the situation had altered in 1965. Indeed the British were 
still as bereft of a master-plan for dealing with UDI as they were three years earlier. The 
Europeanists knew that since 1964, Prime Minister Harold Wilson had had a rough passage with a 
slim majority in Parliament which militated against a risk taking venture like a tough stand against a 
rebellious Rhodesia. Hence, their undue enthusiasm about placing Rhodesia in the domain of an 
handicapped British government, simply because they did not believe that a rebellious Rhodesia 
posed a threat to the anti-communist war of the West. If anything they preferred unfettered support 
to trustworthy regimes like Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal which could not only constitute a 
counter-poise to any communist incursion from the independent African states but would most 
certainly frustrate any communist designs in the region. The West was better off with them than 
working towards the downfall of Rhodesia which would constitute a prelude to the demise of 
South Africa and the Portuguese colonies.[27]
In advocating America’s extrication from if not outright neutrality in the Rhodesian debacle, 
Ball as the spokesman of the Europeanists in the administration armed himself with an iron-cast 
defence: that of America’s heavy involvement in Vietnam which could tax the patience of Congress 
should an additional obligation be undertaken in the colony of a Britain unsympathetic to the 
American war-effort. Britain was still trading with North Vietnam.
Needless to say the Europeanists used that argument to good effect against the 
counterattack from the Africanists that Washington’s direct involvement would prevent an 
holocaust in Rhodesia. Not only did the Europeanists ridicule this argument as a ploy by 
Africanists to recover lost ground in South Africa and the Portuguese territories since the demise of 
the Kennedy administration, but the fact that they had the ear of the President was attested to by 
their victory over the Africanists in May 1965. At that time, the President accepted the argument of 
the Europeanists and vetoed a proposal for American assistance in the form of the building of a 
Tan-Zam rail line to link Zambia to Tanzania with a view to enabling land-locked Zambia to become
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independent of the Rhodesian route as an outlet to the sea. Rhodesia had an effective 
communication network with the Portuguese ports in Mozambique through which Zambia moved 
her copper to the outside world. In taking this action, the President was ignoring the warning of 
the NSC that refusal to assist Lusaka would compel the Zambian government to turn to communist 
China - a repetition of the mistake which the Eisenhower administration made in Egypt. The 
proposal had earlier been ridiculed by the Europeanists in the State Department as $500 million 
down the drain and for which they evoked the spectre of Congressional refusal in view of 
commitments in Vietnam.[28] It was therefore not surprising when the administration agreed to 
provide aid worth a mere half a million dollars to Zambia in December 1965 in response to the 
severe economic consequences which the country faced arising from UDI. The promise was made 
after repeated appeals, and its paltry nature in comparison with the magnitude of the problem was a 
response to the Europeanists opinion that Zambia was a British problem.
In taking such low-keyed action in relation to the Rhodesian problem, the President was 
not only alienating the committed Africanists in his administration but he was also showing disdain 
towards Afro-Americans. Unlike South Africa in 1964, the Afro-Americans in the Democratic 
Party had spoken with one voice on the need to bring down the rebellion in Rhodesia. They did not 
call for any unorthodox means for this. Sanctions were within the legal right of the US if only the 
political will was there.
Faced with the administration’s reluctance to take realistic action against Rhodesia, Afro- 
American organisations offered four arguments as to why sanctions should be imposed on 
Rhodesia: (i) the need for the US to adhere to legality which precluded cooperation with an illegal 
regime; (ii) the need to adhere to the principle of majority rule which the Rhodesian authorities had 
violated; (iii) the need to stand behind the victims of discrimination in Rhodesia, who in any case 
might one day overcome their oppressors, hence the need for the US to invest goodwill with a 
view to securing access to chrome supplies there; (iv) the need to ensure friendly relations with the 
independent African countries.[29] They argued that UDI could collapse if the administration were 
to exert pressure on Rhodesia through imposition of effective sanctions. To drive home their point, 
they entered into a series of exchanges with the White House without being able to change the 
mind of the administration. It is therefore correct to say that the objective of Afro-Americans and 
allies with respect to Rhodesia was defeated by the Johnson administration rather than their right
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wing opponents who were not as effective in the public domain as they later turned out to be 
during the tenure of Johnson’s successor.
Any feelings of betrayal and irrelevance on the part of Afro-Americans could not have 
been mitigated by the air lift operation which the administration undertook in January 1966 to 
rescue Zambia from the effect of UDI because that decision - a turn around from an earlier position 
- was a direct result of a meeting which the President had with an embattled Prime Minister Harold 
Wilson on December 16,1965. The latter was torn between a joint opposition by the Conservative 
Party and business community to any action against their “kith and kin” in Rhodesia and at the 
opposite spectrum, the members of the Commonwealth who wanted nothing short of an effective 
action by Her Majesty’s Government to bring down a rebellion against the Crown. It was therefore 
the President’s effort to throw a lifeline to a NATO partner whose government was placed in a 
position of facing either the devil or the rough rude sea as opposed to an action taken in deference
to either Afro-Americans or Africanists in his administration.[30] The fact that the rescue went
ahead when the President wanted was further testimony to the bankruptcy of the weapon of 
Congressional rebellion with which the Europeanists armed themselves to dismiss any pro-African 
proposal from the Africanists.
That the President was true to his Southern conservative background was responsible in 
no small measure for the series of victories the Europeanists scored against the Africanists over 
UDI. For example, in October 1965 after they had both threatened Rhodesia over UDI, Ball 
successfully used the predictable argument of America’s heavy involvement in Vietnam, to 
neutralise a suggestion by Williams of the need to deprive Rhodesia of foreign exchange earnings 
from tobacco. The administration’s refusal to give consideration to this option had broken the 
Africanists like Mennen-Williams. All along they regarded this option as the weapon of last resort 
to compel Ian Smith to go to the negotiating table with the British government. But the failure 
meant not only loss of momentum, but a drift from day to day without any visible means of 
influencing an administration bent on following the advice of its Europeanist elements of the need 
to refrain from taking centre-stage in Britain’s “war” in Rhodesia. Mennen-Williams’ exit in 1966 
could not have come as a surprise even though the frustration of the Africanists in the 
administration was not publicly given as the reason.
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Such an alarming degree of disunity and possible alienation of one faction within the 
administration could not have been lost on Rhodesia in view of the close cooperation it maintained 
with South Africa and Portugal. Both had information offices and lobbying apparatuses as well as 
good intelligence networks in the US. Moreover on November 2,1965, the Post Dispatch of St. 
Louis ran an article outlining in detail not only the differences of opinion but the diametrically 
opposed views of both Williams and Ball on how to respond to UDI. The article so reflected the 
true situation in the administration that Noer concluded rightly that “the story created even more 
distrust of the Africanists in the government. It likely helped defeat Williams’ idea of a clear 
statement of U.S. intentions. Instead, the State Department issued a vague release that “hailed” 
Wilson’s efforts to avert “a tragic confrontation” in Rhodesia, denounced any UDI....The 
announcement made no mention of sanctions, embargoes, aid to Zambia, or any other specific
actions suggested by the Africanists.”[31]
Further proof that the administration undermined its own publicly presented purpose in 
Rhodesia emanated from its reaction to UDI once it was declared. Fearing that the Africanists 
might limp back to a position of influence, Ball immediately sought their impotence if not 
permanent demise by manipulating by remote control the activities of the crisis committee convened 
in the wake of Smith’s declaration of independence. This he did by nominating and having 
appointed as chairman of the committee a right wing New York attorney called William Rogers 
with a view to curbing the zeal of the Africanists to recommend punitive measures against the 
illegal regime in Salisbury. This committee was constituted in such a way that in the event of a
deadlock, the chairman had the deciding vote. [32]
In this respect, the administration’s feeble response of a halt to a rarely solicited sale of 
arms and related materials, suspension of financial transactions and the demand that Rhodesian 
travellers carry British travel documents, as well as the handing over of Rhodesian assets to Britain 
need not be seen as an attempt to appease the Africanists, but rather as a design by the Europeanists 
to ensure that the rebellion did not collapse. This was so because in taking these measures the 
administration had rejected the imposition of more punitive sanctions, in line with what Ball had 
always advocated. The most the administration did in that respect, between December 1965 and 
March 1966, was to appeal to US firms involved in business transaction with Rhodesia to observe
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a voluntary ban on the importation of Rhodesian chrome, asbestos, lithium and tobacco, while 
agreeing to suspension of sugar imports for 1966 as the government’s price for combating 
UDI. [33]
None of these was effective in forcing Ian Smith to the negotiating table, nor were they 
supposed to be, because the administration had made no secret of the fact that it expected Britain to 
bear the task of bringing down the rebellion however incapacitated its government might be. As a 
result, instead of collapsing, Rhodesia waxed stronger, not only to outlive the administration but 
also to be able to withstand the sanctions belatedly announced by the President in 1967 and 1968 at 
the urging of the British. For example, US private investments in Rhodesia which stood at $65 
million in 1965 as earlier indicated, dropped by a paltry 12 per cent to $57 million in 1970. Yet 
Union Carbide and Foote Mineral which accounted for some $50 million worth of the investments 
were unwilling to bear such minor losses as evidenced by the events in Congress over the issue as 
aforementioned.
Such belated action posed no threat to Salisbury simply because at the time that the infant 
regime was vulnerable, it had sympathisers like George Ball at high places in Washington. The 
Afro-Americans who were so concerned about the situation in Rhodesia on account of its effect on 
the Africans were bereft of influential sympathisers in the Johnson administration. Rather their 
concern was left unattended to effectively by a Democrat government in which they could rightly 
have hoped to have had a stake. What followed it was an hostile Republican administration 
sympathetic to UDI under which Afro-Americans and allies had to fight a series of losing battles 
against a rejuvenated pro-Rhodesia lobby.
(ii) The 1971 Sugar Allocation to South Africa.
The US produces no more than 60 per cent of its sugar requirements. For this purpose, the 
original Sugar Act of 1934, later replaced by the 1948 Sugar Act, authorised the government to 
import the difference between consumption and production from countries friendly to the US. This 
is the criterion for supplying the commodity. The responsibility for extending the Act depending on
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the domestic production situation as determined by the executive arm was vested upon Congress. 
Under the existing 1965 extension, South Africa was among the friendly countries and supplied 
60,003 tons, 1.25 per cent of the total external purchase.[34] In 1971, the White House was in no 
mood to ask Congress for further extension of the existing Act and only did so reluctantly in view 
of an impending renewal of international agreements, hence the need to have the authority to 
respond to any eventuality. But in doing so, the Department of Agriculture did not ask for any 
changes, which meant the continuous inclusion of South Africa as a supplier.
To discuss the role of Afro-Americans in the South African sugar allocation as a means of 
examining their role as wielders of influence presupposes that they played an active role. But in 
that year, it was doubtful if the Afro-Americans’ led civil rights organisations (NAACP, CORE and 
SCLC) were equipped to mount another pro-Africa campaign against a Republican administration 
following their failure to influence the direction of the Democratic administration of Lyndon 
Johnson over UDI. Their failure to protest loudly at a review of Southern African policy carried 
out by the Nixon administration was a pointer in that direction. President Nixon personally gave 
the job of the policy review to the National Security Council (NSC), thereby bypassing the 
Department of State where there were Africanists. [35] This called for protest from the recognised 
leadership of Afro-Americans’ interest because the exercise entailed either the elimination of input 
from knowledgeable sources within the relevant bureaucracies (in order to avoid bureaucratic 
infighting that regularly results in compromises) or it was designed to preclude any semblance of 
influence of interest groups in the formulation of Africa policy. [36]
This failure to react on the part of the Afro-American leadership was linked to the 
conflicting perception between it and the grass-roots as to where to draw the line on Afro- 
Americans external interest. Wilkins for one had never hidden his preference for civil rights and 
equal treatment at home as the primary objective of Afro-Americans as opposed to some of his 
followers who saw a symbiotic relationship between the struggle for equal treatment at home and 
the struggle for freedom by continental Africans, especially in the Southern part as aforementioned, 
hence both should be addressed with the same degree of vigour. This is not to say that it was the 
only area of disagreement between the Afro-American leadership and the rank and file. Mention 
has earlier been made of their disagreement over strategy for achieving even civil rights at home. 
However, if'the confusion over Afro-American involvement in the struggle in Africa contributed to
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the failure vigorously to oppose the policy review process, then the outcome of the exercise helped 
in no small measure to create a challenge to the legitimacy of the recognised Afro-American 
leadership.
The “NSC report - NSSM 39 of 1969” - came up with five options for US policy in 
Southern Africa three of which involved some form of engagement with South Africa.[37] This 
report was thus unfavourable to the cause of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa and perhaps 
helped to bring about the spate of new Afro-American organisations speaking on behalf of the 
community. Such a development was not entirely unexpected, for it had been simmering since the 
demonstrations of 1966 against Chase Manhattan Bank for its loans to South Africa. Those were 
spearheaded not by NAACP or CORE, but by another multi-racial civil rights movement, ACOA, 
in concert with the World Student Christian Federation. Out of this effort emerged the Committee 
of Conscience Against Apartheid. [38] But since this was a single purpose ad-hoc organisation to 
put pressure on Banks to declare a moratorium if not outright rejection of loan applications from 
South Africa, it meant that the dissatisfaction with the direction of the leadership of the older civil 
rights organisations still remained and thus, the need for more permanent organisations not only to 
ensure an Afro-American presence in the formulation of Africa policy but to help in building an 
informed and durable constituency for Africa. New organisations were also needed to use a 
different approach from the establishment-prone leaders to promote the interest of the Afro- 
American community within the American society. Passage of civil rights legislation had not 
rescued the Afro-American from the bottom of the economic scale. Executive action was still 
needed to redress the imbalance. The emergence of new organisations in the late 1960s and early 
1970s was therefore not entirely surprising. Among these new organisations were the Committee 
of Concerned Blacks, National Black Political Association, the Southern African Liberation 
Support Committee, the Washington Task Force on African Affairs and in the law making body, 
the Congressional Black Caucus.The membership of each of these organisations was more at home 
with the anti-establishment credentials of Malcolm X, Stokely Carmichael and to some extent 
Representative Charles Diggs Jr.- especially when he later became the spokesman of Afro- 
Americans’ concern for Africa as exemplified by the numerous hearings on US policy toward 
Africa which he held as chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa - than the mainstream and 
perhaps stalled and exhausted leadership of Wilkins and others. [39]
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Since these organisations emerged not necessarily to complement the efforts of NAACP, 
CORE and SCLC but to do a better job of what was evidently badly done, it meant that they were 
not only on collision course with the older movements but collectively, they lacked a common 
organisational and coherent strategy for confronting an issue of interest to their cause. For 
example, while the strategy of the Black Caucus was to lobby fellow members of Congress, the 
Liberation Committee was espousing a blend of Marxism that interpreted the struggle for equality 
both in the US and Southern Africa in terms of the inherently heinous nature of capitalism. To the 
older civil right movements, that meant the use of a strategy of tremendous increase in rhetoric 
against the target to fend off the challenge from the new organisations in order to remain at the 
forefront of the Afro-American cause. In this respect, while the Black Caucus was on the right 
path, one could not say the same of the fractious civil rights movement outside Congress whose 
duty ought to have been to convert the American public to their cause by weight of argument. 
Rhetoric and the use of Marxists-influenced jargon were more of an handicap than an instrument of 
persuasion in a conservative and capitalist US.
This was the situation when the South African sugar issues emerged. But that in itself 
meant there was no coordination between Afro-Americans and supporters of their cause in 
Congress and in the wider civil rights movement. Lack of a common strategy also meant the 
absence of a common pool of resources, resulting in the non-availability of an effective 
organisational base to facilitate the directing of resources to where they were best needed. That is if 
there were any resources. Under such circumstances, Afro-Americans could hardly be in a position 
to sell to the American public the essence of their opposition to the renewal of South Africa’s sugar 
quota. Otherwise they had a case: by virtue of the wage structure brought about by direct 
government interference in the labour market relegates African workers to the status of forced 
labour. This was a contravention of American law, a point which Congressman Diggs Jr. 
repeatedly argued without being able to influence the thinking of the executive on the issue. Also, 
because the US provided a guaranteed market by virtue of its 40 per cent import dependence for 
which it paid $290 million to $342 million annually, any producing state favoured enough to merit 
America’s allocation had therefore been insulated from the vagaries of the market place such as 
depression in price associated with over-production. [40] It is perhaps on this basis that the law 
specified that the allocation should go exclusively to friendly countries. If South Africa was
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friendly enough to be given a quota, then that gesture was a tacit approval of the political system, 
namely, apartheid. This factor more than the forced labour strengthened the position of the anti- 
South Africa allocation.
For this to be effective, the message must be lucid and direct to the target: in this case, 
Congress and the American public. Congress had the authority to terminate the South African 
allocation while the American public could bring pressure to bear on the law-makers to act in a 
particular way in deference to their electorate. Afro-Americans had been armed with the issue but 
their response was grossly deficient in terms of presentation because they lacked the organisational 
structure to give weight to the issue so as to achieve the desired result.
True, ACOA embarked upon a campaign of lobbying the law-makers. For example, it 
asked anti-apartheid supporters to write to their Congressional representatives, and lobbied the 
assistants of those Congressmen directly connected with the Agricultural Committee of the House 
and the Finance Committee in the Senate - the relevant organs in which the issue was to be 
decided. In doing this it solicited and received the support of other anti-apartheid organisations like 
the Churches, the American Friends Service Committee and even the powerful United Auto 
Workers. [41] But there was no one to address the American public, which could exert pressure by 
sheer weight of numbers. Rather, while ACOA’s message was clear to the law-makers, the 
American public was offered a garbled message of different voices from different civil rights 
organisations with emphasis on different reasons as to why South Africa did not deserve the sugar 
allocation. The inequities of capitalism to both Afro-Americans and victims of apartheid in South 
Africa were hardly a serious argument capable of achieving the desired results. Steven Metz’s 
observation is a clear indictment of the inability of the civil rights movement to carry the public 
along in the quest to deprive South Africa of what they felt the country did not deserve:
“There was little media coverage of the issue: in a press conference held by Kennedy just 
before the floor vote of July 21, there were no representatives from the New York Times, 
the Washington Post, Time, Newsweek, ABC, or NBC.... the NAACP took a public 
stand in opposition to the quota, but spent little effort on public mobilization. Also, there 
often was poor coordination among the various elements of the anti-apartheid movement 
which were involved.”[42]
This unenviable situation when compared to the forces arrayed against Afro-Americans and
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allies in their battle to terminate the South African allocation could enable one to almost predict the 
outcome. Support for South Africa’s retention of the sugar quota was spear-headed by the South 
African government operating under the canopy of South African Sugar Association (SASA), the 
South African Foundation and American businessmen with investment interest in South Africa. 
These were forces that had operated in the US on behalf of South Africa for a long time. Their 
single objective was to make South Africa’s domestic policy palatable in the US. The prominent 
role of the South African Foundation in this respect has been noted earlier. Their present task was 
to forestall an event capable of snowballing into an avalanche. Cancellation of the sugar allocation 
could offer opponents of US-South Africa relations, not least the Afro-American dominated civil 
rights movement, a precedent and a platform to attack South Africa’s relations with the US. On this 
basis, the pro-South African forces were there to ensure that South Africa retained its allocation of 
the sugar supply with a view to stemming a possible domino effect. Added to the advantages of 
possessing a single objective were the availability of facilities such as the South African Embassy 
and ancillary institutions like the South African Information offices to coordinate the activities of 
the pro-South African forces.This endowed them with a unified command structure for efficient 
management of their campaign.
The pro-South Africa lobby could also count on support within the Nixon administration 
for two reasons. First, business interest was as avid an opponent of communism as the average 
American of 1971. The Republican Party had by nature and temperament been the sanctuary of big 
business, hence the earlier furore over the Eximbank issue during the Ford administration. This 
common anti-communist objective between the party and business always led them to support 
causes favourable to their stance. The support which the pro-Katanga lobby - an amalgam of anti­
communist and pro-business sentiment - received from Republican Party machine was a case in 
point. Amongst its supporters then were former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and Richard 
Nixon himself. If they supported the pro-Katanga cause because of communism and the interests 
of the business sector in the war-tom former Belgian territory, there was no reason to suppose that 
the same degree of support would not be forth-coming from an administration headed by Nixon 
himself. This was all the more so in view of the fact that the remnants of the pro-Katanga lobby 
immediately cast their lot with South Africa when the sugar allocation issue erupted in 1971. One 
might add as well that those liberals who were calling for the termination of the allocation to South
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Africa were not strictly speaking the natural constituents of the Republican Party. True there were 
some Republicans with liberal inclinations such as Senator Javits of New York, but the bulk of 
those clamouring for action against South Africa were Democratic Party stalwarts and others with 
left of centre ideological inclination. Afro-Americans’ in particular had bolted the Republican Party 
in droves. A Republican administration was therefore bound to have sympathy for the pro-South 
Africa forces which include right-wing anti-communists and the business class.
Secondly and perhaps more important was the fact that the incumbent administration 
included officials who had had commercial transactions with the Southern African region prior to 
their new engagement. For example, the President’s adviser on Corporate Affairs, Peter Flanigan, 
had had long standing business ventures in South Africa, while Kenneth Rush who served the 
administration in various capacities from Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, Deputy 
Secretary of Defence and of State respectively was plucked from Union Carbide of the Byrd 
Amendment fame.[43] If Southern Africa was good enough for them to have commercial 
transactions with prior to their new positions, it would be naive to expect them to be anti-South 
Africa in the administration.
Added to the presence of sympathisers in the administration and the strategic and 
organisational advantages was the fact that the pro-South Africa forces allocated functions and 
executed them efficiently. For example, unlike their opponents who assumed the role of Jack of all 
trade and ended up mastering none, the pro-South Africa forces hired the services of the New York 
firm of Casey, Lane and Mittendorf to handle the professional task of presenting SASA’s case to 
Congress, while the emotive ethical issue was left to the resurgent pro-Katanga lobby to fight it out 
with the civil rights organisations at the bar of public opinion.
It may well be true that South Africa engaged in corrupt practises as evidenced by the civil 
suit which the Justice Department filed against SASA in 1977 for giving expensive gifts to law­
makers during the sugar allocation debacle. [44] But the disparity in presentation and the factual 
content of the submission of the opposing factions both in Congress and to the public at large 
evidently weighed heavily in favour of the pro-South Africa forces. All that the anti-South Africa 
allocation rested their case on was to appeal to the ethical and moral impulses of the American 
public. This came out clearly in Senator Kennedy’s argument in favour of termination of the South 
African quota when he asked legislators whether it was right to continue a subsidy to a nation
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whose basic policies are at war with the most important values of mankind.”[45]
This lesson in morality did not square with the issue at stake, namely the nutritional well­
being of the American people. Sugar consumption was deemed important enough to the palate of 
the American people to necessitate a regular supply, enforced by law. On this basis, the argument 
of the anti-South Africa forces was that the Americans should put at risk their supplies of sugar. 
Yet, the message was not vividly put across to the American people. Rather the message of the 
opposing pro-Katanga lobby and the allies, the American Southern African Council (ASAC) in 
trumpeting the virtues of South Africa as the bastion of free enterprise, democracy, stability, anti­
communism and strategic location amidst an increasing Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean, was 
more attuned to the American values than unsubstantiated moral argument. [46] The right wing 
lobby further argued that to accept the anti-South African request for cancellation of the sugar quota 
and possibly future severance of governmental and commercial relations with South Africa was 
tantamount to two things: first, an inability to recognise and encourage South Africa’s effort to find 
solution to racial problems - in the form then of a policy of granting independence to ‘African 
homelands’, notably Transkei - an area in which the US was hardly qualified to criticise others; 
second, severance of economic relations would be a deliberate attempt to subjugate the non-white 
population of South Africa to unmitigated perpetual poverty. Foreign investments offered 
employment opportunity to them to the extent that they “enjoy the highest standard of living in 
Africa.”[47]
The style of the pro-South Africa forces was too sophisticated for their opponents to match. 
Lawyer John Mahoney presented SASA to the Agriculture Committee of the House of 
Representatives (and later in a written statement to the Senate Finance Committee) as a dependable 
and reliable source of sugar supply to the US which had not only always met its quota but had 
increased supplies at short notice whenever the US encountered difficulties from other sources. 
Such difficulties were encountered in 1967,1969, and 1970, which Congressmen were free to see 
from the record. [48]
In the end, it came as no surprise that South Africa retained its sugar allocation while the 
opposition had to rescue their prestige by the crumbs thrown at them by virtue of the 15,000 tons 
allocation which Congress made to Uganda. [49] The fact that there was no hue and cry from the 
public was a testimony to the disjointed and disorganised efforts of Afro-Americans over the South
110
African sugar allocation debacle. Afro-Americans would only have themselves to blame because 
apart from their preeminent position in the civil rights movement, they attached tremendous 
importance to the issue as a means of determining their strength towards severing South Africa’s 
relations with the US. In the end not only were they found wanting but for once it exposed the fact 
that their impotence at influencing US policy direction toward Africa was partly a function of the 
absence of a competent institutional and organisational framework.
Conclusion.
The essence of this chapter is to assess Afro-Americans’ ability to influence the course of 
US policy in a favourable direction on issues of interest to them. While there was no shortage of 
such issues, yet they were gravely deficient when it came to exercise of influence. Nothing attests 
to this more than their failure over the issue of South African sugar allocation. Particularly 
disturbing was the evaporation of the discernible nucleus of influence they exerted during the 
Kennedy Presidency. One might expect consolidation of their position as wielders of influence in 
view of the fact that Kennedy’s replacement was his Vice-President who pledged to continue on the 
lines of his predecessor. Why then were the Afro-Americans left out of such a promise?
One way of answering this is to look at the role of their votes in the Presidential elections 
of 1960,1964 and 1968. Whereas a balance of power situation existed in 1960 which enabled 
Afro-Americans to play the role of a king-maker, there was no recurrence of the same factor in 
1964 for three reasons. First, by nominating Barry Goldwater whose racist views were well 
known, the Republican Party had virtually conceded the Afro-American votes to Lyndon Johnson. 
This deliberate strategy of alienating the Afro-Americans was designed to appease the predominant 
white population, especially the Southern elements who were still smarting over the attention civil 
rights issues received under President Kennedy. Second, by making reckless statements over 
Vietnam, Goldwater did not come across as one who had a well thought out policy on the area. He 
alarmed the electorate by giving the impression that his election would lead to an escalation of US 
involvement in Vietnam. Finally, by similar tactless statements on domestic issues, he also 
alienated his own Republican businessmen who were largely based in the South. The result of was 
that the Republican candidate had left the Southern white electorate open to political courtship by
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his Democratic opponent.
Under the circumstances, Chuck Stone observed that as early as November 3,1964, 
Johnson had gathered enough support to the tune of 486 electoral total to Goldwater's 52, which 
also reflected the winning per centage of 61.1 to 38.5 in his favour. Afro-American votes could not 
have hurt Johnson even if they were withheld. The President could still have won by 324 to 214 
electoral votes.[50]
The 1968 election was not different. Faced with a third choice, former governor George 
Wallace of Alabama whose racial bigotry was particularly appealing to “blue collar” workers, the 
Republican candidate Richard Nixon made Wallace's supporters his target. In the process, the 
Afro-American votes were left to the Democratic Hubert Humphrey whose lacklustre performance 
made no impact on the rest of the electorate, unlike Nixon’s emphasis on law and order.
Since, then, in the elections of both Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, Afro-Americans 
contributed no crucial votes, the victorious candidates owed them nothing on that account. This 
helps to account for the reverses they suffered with respect to exertion of influence. Valid as such a 
conclusion may appear on an empirical basis, we may still ask why a community which was 
managing to exert influence should suffer reverses simply because it was not essential in the 
election of subsequent administrations. Afro-Americans were not alone in casting their lot with one 
of the numerous independent candidates and political parties. The Jews and the Poles equally cast 
theirs with the Democratic Party, but their feelings were never ignored by either a Democratic or a 
Republican administration when it came to adopting policies towards Israel and Poland.
Unfortunately, much as it appears unpalatable, the answer may have a lot to do with race. 
Race as a determinant of issues is almost as old as America itself and there was hardly any 
evidence of fundamental attitudinal alteration in the 1960s. Afro-Americans were still not deemed 
important let alone the equal of their Caucasian countrymen which accounted for the disdain shown 
to issues of interest to them by either a Democratic or a Republican administration. A few examples 
would suffice. During his tenure, an Afro-American civil rights activist Jimmy Lee Jackson and a 
white minister James Reeb were assassinated by white supremacists. President Johnson sent 
flowers and his condolences to the wife of James Reeb and even mentioned the name of the 
deceased while making a speech on civil rights. But in the words of Martin Luther King Jr:
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Somehow the President forgot to mention Jimmy, who died first. The parents and sister 
of Jimmy received no flowers from the President. The students felt this keenly.
Not that they felt that the death of James Reeb was less than tragic, but because they felt 
that the failure to mention Jimmy Jackson only reinforced the impression that to White 
America the life of a Negro is insignificant and meaningless.”[51]
Such an attitude toward Afro-Americans appeared to be the stock in trade of President 
Johnson as occasioned by his failure to implement the Voting Rights Law whose signing he 
presented with fanfare as a portrayal of his interest in civil rights issues. Up to 1967, his 
administration failed to recruit the required number of registration officials and the law enforcement 
officers who would deter white supremacists to make the law meaningful. The result was 
frustration among Afro-Americans which partly accounted for the emergence of the militant “black 
power movement” during the 1960s.
Similar attitudes appeared to have been held by the Nixon administration as shown by its 
rudeness to President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia during his visit to the UN in 1970. The African 
leader wanted a meeting but was virtually ignored by the President who was busy campaigning for 
Republican candidates in a forthcoming election. The best President Nixon could do was to see 
Kaunda literally at the step of the General Assembly when the African leader was on his way to 
address the August body. Afro-Americans felt slighted by this action of the President because he 
could not have behaved in similar manner to the leader of either Israel, Ireland or any other country 
with whom an American ethnic group had identified itself, for fear amongst others of possible 
electoral repercussions.[52]
While the idiosyncrasies of officials especially the Chief of State no doubt have a bearing 
on their response to issues of concern to Afro-Americans, to blame them entirely is to say that 
governments operate outside the society at large. If Afro-Americans were not thorough in 
publicising the need to terminate South Africa’s sugar allocation in 1971, at least, Americans were 
conversant with issues relating to Africa like the Congo crisis, Rhodesia’s UDI and apartheid in 
South Africa. Africa was no longer a distant dark continent to the average American, otherwise, the 
campaign for or against Katanga's rebellion could not have generated as much heat as it did.
By the advent of the Nixon administration, Afro-Americans demands over the situation in
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South Africa, ably supported by their allies in the Democratic Party were clear. Despite the 
occasional disagreement with respect to scope and strategy which will be discussed in the next 
chapter, their demands on the administration focused on abandonment of support to the regime in 
Pretoria irrespective of the anti-communist mantle it had wrapped around itself, and greater support 
to those fighting to dismantle apartheid and colonialism also in the Portuguese territories and 
Rhodesia. To them, refusal to initiate total diplomatic and economic isolation of Pretoria and its 
allies in the region amounted to tacit collusion.
But the lack of public support over the broader issues of racist minority and colonial rule in 
Southern Africa meant that the Johnson administration and its successor, had no cause to look over 
their shoulders in their interpretation of US short term interest as one of cooperation with these 
regimes. This explains why the Johnson administration called for a review of the Kennedy 
administration’s policy toward South Africa with a view to tilting towards Pretoria and only failed 
to do so during its tenure because its UN Representative Joseph Palmer, who was supposed to 
come up with recommendations failed to do a proper job. [53] Johnson did not run for office in 
1968, but his successor, Richard Nixon had to perform the task as evidenced by the NSSM 39 of 
1969 which identified Washington more closely with Southern Africa’s white governments.
Why the American public in general was so apathetic to racism and white minority rule in 
Southern Africa needs more detailed attention than this study can provide, the more so in view of 
the fact that it was sensitive to issues dealing with American Jews and the security of the State of 
Israel. The public apathy cannot be explained in terms of non-possession of the vote by Afro- 
Americans, because the franchise was no longer an issue in the 1970s. But one thing was certain: 
public indifference contributed to the direction of US policy in Southern Africa. This explains why 
in his testimony before the Congressional Sub-Committee on African Affairs in 1974, David 
Newsom’s successor as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Donald Easum, 
abandoned protocol and appealed to the American public for support on grounds that “our own 
bureaucracy obviously depends very much upon public concern and awareness of major issues in 
the foreign policy field. There are many reasons for believing that now our relationships with 
Africa and particularly our relationships with Southern Africa will come more to the fore in the 
public mind and therefore must attract corresponding priority from the government and, of course, 
from the State Department.”[54]
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Three identifiable factors therefore conspired to rob Afro-Americans of the ability to wield 
influence over US policy towards Africa. The most important among these were the disdain in 
which Afro-Americans were held in the US and the apathy of the American public towards issues 
of concern to them. The absence of an overall Afro-Americans’ organisational structure, though 
significant and a potential handicap, was secondary in this respect as a combination of a lukewarm 
attitude from the public and disdain from the administration would still have a frustrating effect on 
Afro-Americans, however organised they might be. The primary task before Afro-Americans 
therefore, was how to ensure they were taken seriously both by the administration and the 
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CHAPTER FIVE.
NEW APPROACHES TO EXERTION OF INFLUENCE.
In analysing the efforts of Afro-Americans to influence Washington’s policy towards 
Southern Africa in the previous chapter, one observed that they were ineffective both in policy 
formulation and execution.
This could not be blamed on Afro-Americans' timidity. On numerous occasions, they had 
called on the incumbent administration to take a hard line against apartheid in South Africa, 
Portuguese colonialism in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau and minority rule in Rhodesia.
The problem however, is at the level of exerting influence: how to ensure that the vision 
of Afro-Americans and their liberal allies on Southern Africa was adopted by the administrations in 
the formulation of foreign policy. In the absence of any major development in Southern Africa 
itself to compel policy makers in Washington to reconsider their stand, the Southern Africa policy 
of the US had normally been predicated primarily on NATO and anti-communist interests. 
Economic interests though present had never played a crucial role. These when posited against the 
humanitarian argument of Afro-Americans tipped the scale in favour of the former as far as 
successive administrations were concerned. US Southern Africa policy could therefore only 
acquire a different colouration if there was a fundamental alteration to Cold War considerations as 
the basis for US foreign policy or if major changes occurred in the Southern African region. This 
therefore called for a new approach and strategic alteration in Afro-Americans’ tactics in exerting 
influence on the executive arm of government in order to ensure that their views were given 
adequate considerations in the formulation and implementation of Southern Africa policy.
This chapter concentrates on the period 1971-80, analysed in three stages. The first covers 
1971 to 1976 and examines Afro-Americans’ efforts to convey revulsion at their being excluded 
from the formulation of Africa policy, and how the incumbent administrations and those seeking 
electoral support for office responded. The inclusion of a distinct Southern African plank to the 
Democratic Party manifesto in deference to Afro-Americans in the 1972 presidential election, was 
an indication of their success. The second stage of analysis which covers 1976 to the emergence of
126
the Reagan administration analyses the strategy of Afro-Americans in consolidating their effort to 
make their revulsion felt, notably whether or not they were able to predicate their electoral support 
on implementation of specific policies by the beneficiary if successful at the poll.
Finally, the chapter will embark on an over-all assessment of the efforts of Afro-Americans 
to convince policy makers that they had not only an interest in the nature of Africa policy but that 
they should contribute to the policy formulation process. This will be done against the background 
of our observation in the last chapter that three factors undermined Afro-Americans’ influence: 
disregard for Afro-Americans by the administrations, public apathy to external issues of concern to 
this group, and to some extent the non-availability of an institutional framework to make their 
revulsion felt.
(i) The turning point in Afro-American tactics and strategy of exerting influence: 1971-76.
It is not easy to pin-point when Afro-Americans realised the futility of their existing 
tactics. What was certain was that Afro-Americans especially those outside the mainstream were 
unhappy with their impotence from the dying days of the Kennedy administration to that of 
Johnson amidst the fruitless efforts of mainstream Afro-American leadership to effect changes by 
working through the system. It was perhaps on account of this that as early as Richard Nixon’s 
first year in office, Representative Charles Diggs Jr. returned from a tour of Africa in his capacity 
as Chairman of the House Sub-Committee on Africa to express dissatisfaction with the direction of 
the administration’s policy in Southern Africa. This stemmed from what he observed as the 
contradiction between the administration policy in the area and the principle with which the US was 
associated with:
On the one hand, the United States, the most powerful symbol of 
democracy in the World, is committed to freedom and equality and opposed 
to tyranny and injustice. And on the other hand, America has made an 
immoral entangling alliance with one of the most tyrannical governments in 
the world, the Republic of South Africa. [1]
As an ameliorating measure, Diggs recommended four interim palliative (a) termination of 
South Africa’s sugar allocation; (b) prohibition of further installation of NASA tracking facilities in
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South Africa as well as the dismantling of existing ones; (c) incremental imposition of economic 
sanctions including disinvestment, contingent upon Pretoria’s refusal to reform apartheid and to 
withdraw from Namibia; (d) finally, reciprocity in the issuing of visas to each others’ nationals as a 
means of assaulting apartheid in the social area.[2]
Refusal to adopt these recommendations, he warned, would not only make South Africa 
unstable and susceptible to communist influence, but the situation if allowed to continue also 
earned domestic consequences in the US itself. These consequences were that Afro-Americans
were “increasingly identifying with their cultural heritage (and)...are on the threshold of
linking up with the goals of the African liberation movement”[3]
That such a view was prevalent in the Afro-American community (as opposed to being an 
attempt by Diggs to score cheap political points against the administration) was highlighted by a 
most unlikely person, Waldemar Nielson, President of the pro-administration Africa-America 
Institute. This organisation was accused of receiving funds from the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) and as such was sneered at by the non-mainstream Afro-Americans. When Nielson warned 
the administration in his testimony before Diggs Sub-Committee, that “whatever we do or fail to do 
with respect to Africa is going to have feedback and repercussion on our own society”,[4] he was 
infact expressing a popular feeling to which Diggs was but a forerunner.
If such views had been expressed either by a Republican think-tank or a different ethnic 
group in the manner in which the Afro-Americans did, perhaps one might have seen a difference in 
the administration’s approach and attitude to the issue of Southern Africa. But since these had 
emanated from Afro-Americans who were completely bereft of clout over a Republican 
administration, the government had no compunction in holding fast to the Cold War theme, and 
intensifying its support for the status quo in Southern Africa, as evidenced by the adoption of 
Option Two of the NSSM 39 of 1969. Option Two was stated thus:
“The Whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can 
come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political 
rights they seek through violence, which only lead to chaos and increased 
opportunities for the communists. We can, by selective relaxation of our stance 
toward the White regimes, encourage some modification of their current racial 
and colonial policies....our tangible interests formed a basis for our contacts in
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the region, and these can be maintained at an acceptable cost.”[5]
Such a policy was flawed in two planks. First, its belief that reward for the beneficiaries 
of the Southern African system would make them feel secure, resulting in voluntary reform of the 
political system to accommodate the non-European majority, had no historical precedence in the 
region. The second flaw emanated from the fact that the Nixon administration was not and never 
attempted to be an impartial interlocutor between the oppressed and the oppressors of Southern 
Africa. One gets a glimpse of this from the address of his Assistant Secretary of State David 
Newsom to the Northwestern University on December 8,1970, during which he totally rejected 
the idea of any discussions between the administration and the regional liberation movements.[6] 
Not that by doing so, the administration would either be breaking new ground or stepping on a 
mine field, for the Kennedy administration had had a conspicuous and sometimes stormy 
relationship with the liberation movements in the Portuguese territories. But in rejecting renewal of 
contact with the liberation movements, he formulated his own options for the region in which as 
expected he firmly endorsed “communication” with the regional regimes in line with the 
administration’s Option Two. While one might argue that he was expressing a personal opinion, 
his position in the administration meant that he was in fact articulating the administration’s stance 
on the issue. For example, the Nixon years at the White House saw the lowest levels of contact 
between the US and Southern Africa’s liberation movements since the War.
To the concerned Afro-Americans (non-mainstream), this implied adopting tactics of every 
measure that took their fancy with a view to making their revulsion felt at their inability to influence 
policy direction. Conspicuous in this regard was Congressman Diggs who used his position as the 
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa to hold hearings into the administration’s Africa 
policy to which interested persons both within and outside the government were invited to testify. 
Outside the Subcommittee Diggs also adopted the tactics of seeking opportunities to embarrass the 
administration over Southern Africa policy to complement the efforts of other Afro-Americans 
including the “Thursday Group” (discussed below), in the search for means of influencing 
Southern Africa policy of successive administrations.
(i) Afro-American initiatives both within and outside Congress.
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During the early 1970s, initiatives were taken by several Afro-American individuals and a 
variety of organisations, a fact which led Steven Metz to interpret their activities as stemming from 
political rivalries (discussed below). The most influential Afro-American individual in this period 
was Congressman Charles Diggs Jr, who was able to use his position as chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Africa in the House, to collect evidence and identify defects in US policy toward 
Southern Africa, to publicise proposals for changes in policy and to attempt to bring together the 
numerous individuals and organisations concerned to bring about these changes. It is therefore 
with the action and influence of Diggs that this section would be most concerned.
Not until Diggs’ Subcommittee instituted hearings into the administration’s Africa policy in 
1971 did it become public knowledge that the Nixon administration had taken sides with the 
Southern African regimes. The gradual lifting of the 1963 arms embargo in line with the 
“communication” policy of NSSM 39, had seen to this shift in the administration’s policy. For 
example, in his testimony before the Sub-Committee on June 3,1971, the Vice-President of the 
Export-Import Bank revealed that some services had been specifically set aside for South Africa 
under the existing guidelines - meaning under the Nixon administration. [7]
One might wonder whether or not South Africa availed itself of these facilities in view of 
the fact that a witness from the State Department told the Sub-Committee on May 20,1970, that the 
Bank guarantees were confined to medium and short-term insurance, without any evidence of the 
Bank awarding loans or credit to Pretoria since 1959. That however need not be the issue because 
it was a deliberate ploy by the State Department to divert attention from the fact that South Africa 
had been accorded a most favoured nation state status by the administration. If these facilities were 
not potentially useful, then they would not have been made available to Pretoria and indeed 
evidence abounds of their utility. As of April 30,1971, $9,882,000 was authorised for South 
Africa through the FCIA while the Bank revealed to the Sub-Committee that it made further 
authorisation of $20,246,000 medium term guarantees “without any disclosure as to whether it 
was for the US or South Africa.”[8] In this respect, Diggs’ observation that these guide lines to the 
Bank in respect of South Africa indicate “a change and relaxation of policy by this 
administration”[9] was a frugal summation of the administration’s effort to become a committed
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The rationale for the Sub-committee’s hearings had much to do with the limitation of 
avenues open to an interest group to respond to an administration whose foreign policy had been 
adjudged unfavourable to that group’s ancestral homeland. The Congressional Black Caucus later 
took up the issue in their meeting with President Nixon in March 1971, by recommending the 
termination of South Africa’s sugar allocation, withdrawal of investments from that country and 
the establishment of a multi-Departmental task force to oversee Africa policy, only for the President 
to dismiss these suggestions. This attitude of the President did accord with the general impression 
of Afro-Americans about their worth in the estimation of their government and probably the public 
at large. In this respect the hearings in the House provided for a powerless Afro-American 
community a legislative opening to achieve two goals. The first of these was to serve as a vehicle 
for pouring scorn on and sending a message to the administration as to what, in the estimation of 
Afro-Americans, should be the direction of US policy toward Southern Africa. Examples of this 
abound. Diggs’ denunciation of the administration’s Southern Africa policy for its “immoral 
entangling alliances with one of the most tyrannical governments in the world” and his 
recommendations on policy improvement coupled with Waldemar Nielson’s warning about failure 
to change policy direction over Southern Africa as aforementioned were all cases in point. Further 
examples were the testimony of Franklin Williams, Former Ambassador to Ghana and president of 
the Phelps-Stokes Fund, who offered racism as an explanation for the low priority being accorded 
Africa policy and recommended a revamp of the existing Southern Africa policy by unilateral 
disengagement from South Africa.[10] The second goal was to create an opportunity to Afro- 
Americans and others dissatisfied with the direction of the existing Africa policy to signal to the 
administration their determination to rectify the situation. Daniel G. Matthews, president of the 
Washington Task Force (one of the new Afro-American anti-establishment organisations) in his 
testimony before the Subcommittee made clear that one task of his organisation was “to ensure the 
presence of Black Americans in U.S. considerations of its Africa policy, and to assist in building 
an informed constituency for African affairs.”[l 1]
In this respect, it is evident that the Subcommittee hearings did succeed in offering an 
opportunity to those whose views would never have been heard let alone been incorporated in 
policy formulation; and gave publicity to the direction of the Africa policy which they regarded as
supporter of South Africa.
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being flawed, thereby embarrassing the administration.
The hearings could not have been possible had Diggs not been the chairman of the House 
Subcommittee on Africa. This position, coupled with the manner in which he used it to address an 
issue of importance to his community, made him not just a leader of his people but one whose 
actions and pronouncements on the issue were worthy of thorough examination to determine the 
pattern of thought prevalent in the Afro-American community. This is all the more so since Diggs’ 
disapproval of the administration’s Africa policy was not confined to the Congressional arena. It 
was he who in December 1971 published an “Action Manifesto” outlining recommendations for 
revising the Africa policy of the administration. Three days later, he intensified his position by 
dramatically withdrawing from the US delegation to the UN, announcing his decision first to a 
packed press conference in protest at the Nixon administration’s Southern Africa policy. Particular 
mention was made of the massive infusion of financial support to Portugal, which he described as 
“partnership in the subjugation of the African people”, and the tilt toward Pretoria without any 
compassion for the victims of apartheid, settler and colonial rule as vividly portrayed by the 
administration’s refusal to donate toward the UN administered Trust Fund for this category of 
people. [12]
The timing of the publication of the “manifesto” was meant to achieve two objectives. First, 
as an expression of outrage at the catalogue of events in 1971 which were all unfavourable to the 
stance of Afro-Americans and the anti-apartheid movement on Southern Africa. For example, not 
only was the Byrd Amendment to the Military Procurement Bill defying the UN embargo on 
importation of Rhodesian chrome passed through Congress, but it was also the year in which the 
administration made enormous commitments to Portugal, all for the sake of the Azores bases. 
These commitments include:
“(a) $15 million in P.L.480 agricultural commodities;
(b) the loan of an hydraulic vessel at no cost;
(c) $1 million for educational development programs;
(d) $5 million in drawing rights for non-military excess equipment;
(e) the waiver of support payments ($350,000) for the MAAG (Military Assistance
Advisory Group) to Lisbon;
(f) $400 million of Exim loans and guarantees for development projects.”[13]
It was certain that an Afro-American community smarting over its exclusion in formulation
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of policy, would be incensed at such a level of commitment to a country engaged in a colonial war 
in Africa. Of particular discomfort to Afro-Americans was the fact that the US was not only under­
writing Portugal s annual deficit of $500 million brought about by fighting a war to maintain an 
empire, but by providing military related (MAAG) facilities free of charge Washington was taking a 
direct hand in the war. [14]
The magnitude of the administration’s aid to Portugal in 1971 becomes glaring when 
compared with commitments by its predecessors. Between 1946-1970, Lisbon received less than 
$50 million through the Export-Import Bank as opposed to $400 million in just two years of the 
Nixon administration, a period which saw no greater level of deterioration in East-West relations 
than in previous years. When Congressman Charles Diggs described the commitment to Portugal 
as “an unusual and anomalous one” and agonised over “why a small nation of 8.6 million people
should receive such extra-ordinary treatment Why Portugal should qualify for such special
treatment If the administration cannot provide a statement of compelling reasons for making this
agreement, it must be considered as admitting that it is the intention of the administration to directly 
assist Portugal in waging these wars against the peoples of Guinea-Bissau, Angola and 
Mozambique”,[15] he was venting the frustration of Afro-Americans in general at their inability to 
influence events.
Secondly, the timing of the publication of the “manifesto” was aimed at embarrassing the 
administration. For example, its recommendations ranged from the need for the administration to 
“end its complicity with apartheid” to “implement its pronouncements of adherence to the principle 
of self determination and of abhorrence of apartheid with concrete actions towards their realisation” 
specifically called on the executive arm to “cease its hypocrisy, dissimulation, and legal dishonesty, 
and recognise that the situation in Southern Africa is within the purview of Article 39 of the United
Nations charter In order that the Security Council can get on with the task of considering
appropriate measures to be taken, the United States must acknowledge that the situation in each of 
the minority ruled area of Africa - South Africa, Namibia, the Portuguese territories, and Southern 
Rhodesia - presents a threat to the peace.”[16]
On South Africa, the “manifesto” endorsed the right of the oppressed majority to secure 
their rights by any means opened to them including armed struggle, and then called for a change in 
the contradictory policy of “pronouncement of abhorrence of apartheid on the one hand and co­
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existence with, and even support of its adherents on the other”. It then urged the administration to 
adopt a wide ranging number of policies from public acknowledgement of the illegal nature of the 
Bantustans and the right of all South Africans to participate in the government of their country, to 
abrogation of a September 1960 contract empowering NASA to establish facilities in South Africa. 
Other aspects of the document included a call on the administration to establish contact with the 
majority of South Africans by way of opening United States Information Services (USIS) offices 
in Soweto and other areas with a large concentration of non-whites; cessation of Export-Import 
Bank facilities and services to South Africa and termination of the Sugar allocation to that country; 
and an intensification of the arms embargo to include all sales to the South African military 
including spare parts, components, and light aircraft both for military and civilian purposes.[17]
It was evident that Diggs wrote his “manifesto” with the hindsight of information he was 
privy to during the Subcommittee’s hearings into the administration’s Africa policy which he 
chaired. For example, the recommendation for intensification of the arms embargo was no doubt 
inspired by the pattern of compulsory military training for white South Africans which could blur 
the difference between civilian and military aircraft. One could be converted for the other purpose 
in times of emergency. This fact was borne out by Jennifer Davis’s argument before the House’s 
Subcommittee on Africa in 1973:
“....flying is an all male sport in South Africa. The Air Commandos, ....can best be 
described as a flying militia. It is made up of volunteers who are not regular military forces,
but are paid by the government when they fly as commando Their training entails radio
cooperation with army and mobile police striking forces, reconnaissance, practice bombing 
with grenades, and general cooperation with the police in maintaining the security of South 
Africa and South West Africa. Many of these Commandos fly light planes, such as Piper 
Cubs and Cessnas.”[18]
An additional reason for this demand was probably the upsurge in the supply of US 
manufactured aircraft to South Africa about which the then Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs, David Newsom dropped a hint at his September 1971 address to the Council on Foreign 
Relations. During the occasion, he qualified the administration’s intention to uphold the arms 
embargo against South Africa with the proviso that licences for the sale of small unarmed executive 
aircraft would be considered. It soon became evident that the administration had devised an 
ingenious means of circumventing the arms embargo by classifying almost all prohibited items sent
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to South Africa as not duly covered by the 1963 embargo. Rauer H. Meyer of the Department of 
Commerce used this defence to rescue himself from close cross-examination when he appeared 
before the House Subcommittee on Africa in 1973. [19]
The Action Manifesto” further enjoined the administration to ensure that American 
business ventures adhered to the following:
“(a) Close the communications gap between United States headquarters and their 
subsidiaries and branch offices in South Africa;
(b) Pay equal wages for equal work;
(c) Get on with the task of training and whatever else is necessary so that blacks, 
coloureds and whites are performing equal work on a substantial scale;
(d) Throw off local coloration and give respect to all employees.
(e) In sum, to establish fair employment practices and to refuse to adhere to racial policies 
and practices.”[20]
Two points have been made about the manifesto. One was Diggs’ motive for publishing the 
manifesto and the other was the recommendation in the manifesto which expressed a preference for 
fair employment practices by US corporate operations in South Africa instead of imposition of 
sanctions against Pretoria. [21]
The first had misled some keen students of Afro-Americans’ interest in Southern Africa to 
propound what this study will refer to as “a borrowed garb thesis”. Simply put, this says that 
Congressman Diggs was a moderate who in an attempt to maintain legitimacy as a leader in a 
radicalised Afro-American community was simply trying to speak the language of radicals. His 
press conference to announce his withdrawal from the US delegation to the UN three days after the 
presentation of the Action Manifesto should thus be seen as the Congressman’s attempt to 
repudiate his moderate image before Afro-American radicals with a view to stemming the rising 
tide of dissatisfaction with his moderation both within the Black Caucus and the community at 
large. Steven Metz has argued:
“In large part, however, Diggs’ militancy was largely the result of politics within the black 
congressional group, and within the black community as a whole. A struggle was raging 
within the black community between the first generation of leadership - such as those 
associated with the NAACP and the Southern Christian leadership Association - and more
radical leaders who were dissatisfied with the pace of change The result was that in the
late 1960s and early 1970s, the “mainstream” black leadership - including most members of 
Congress were pulled toward the left by pressure within the black community. The 
contradiction was that this move to the left, which was necessary to retain legitimacy within
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the black community, served at the same time to diminish this groups influence on the 
traditional political elite. Throughout the Nixon administration, Charles Diggs, who was by 
instinct, the most moderate member of the black caucus in Congress, felt the 
pressure from more radical representatives such as Dellums and Conyers.” [22]
It is not difficult to see the basis of Metz’s explanation in view of the upsurge in Afro- 
American extra-Congressional activism. For example, in 1972 (the year in which Diggs 
relinquished the chairmanship of the Congressional Caucus) 27 Afro-Americans met in Puerto 
Rico in February for the sole purpose of discussing strategies for the involvement of Afro- 
Americans in the formulation of US policy toward Africa. A meeting was held in Gary, Indiana the 
next month by the National Black Political Convention to explore the possibility of a “Black 
Political Party”.[23] These events occurred against the background of other pressures. For 
example, soon after the inception of the Nixon presidency, Afro-Americans serving in quasi­
external affairs organisations (USAID and USIS) met in New York at the instance of C. Clyde 
Fergusson to found the “Thursday Group” with a view to demanding a definitive policy-making 
role for Afro-Americans in the formulation of Africa policy. [24] Secondly, in protesting against the 
treatment of President Kaunda by the administration during his visit to New York in 1970 as earlier 
indicated, Afro-Americans formed an ad hoc committee - Afro-Americans Concerned About US 
Policy in Africa - to demand, among other things imposition of sanctions against South Africa, 
Portugal and Rhodesia. [25] All these activities could be explained in terms of factional differences 
among Afro-Americans. Nonetheless Diggs’ resignation from the Chairmanship of the Caucus was 
not a reflection of any on-going struggle between radicals and moderates in the Afro-American 
community. Rather the resignation of Diggs arose from a desire by the Congressman to become the 
chairman of the District of Columbia Committee. He achieved this ambition in 1973 when the post 
became vacant.
What the devotees of the “borrowed garb thesis” fail to realise was that all the 
acknowledged non-mainstream Afro-Americans were aggrieved by the non-inclusion of Afro- 
American voices in the formulation of Africa policy and the activities enumerated above were a 
reflection of their efforts to rectify a situation which they regarded as patently flawed. The fact that 
there were different efforts did not mean each action and organisation represented a rival. It was 
part of the transition from a conservative pro-administration stance to a new situation in which
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Afro-Americans were eager to see concrete evidence of the incorporation of their views in the 
formulation of Africa policy. The fact that their efforts, though fragmented, were aimed at the same 
objective reflected the absence of a single over-all spokesman for the interest of Afro-Americans in 
Africa - the role that NAACP and SCLC had been able to play in the past decade. That all these 
initiatives had a common understanding of the situation in Southern Africa and a common policy 
goal was shown by the success of the African-American National Conference on Africa in 
Washington in May 1972. This conference was called by Congressman Diggs and the 
Congressional Caucus and was particularly remarkable by the absence of major divisions in policy. 
Thus, it was addressed by Senators George McGovern and Hubert Humphrey and also succeeded 
in formulating Afro-American preferences for US policy in Southern Africa to be recommended to 
the Democratic Party conference. Among these preferences were, the severance of diplomatic, 
commercial and military ties with the colonial and minority ruled states of Southern Africa. [26]
The success of the conference casts considerable doubt on arguments which relied on a 
conflict between “moderates” and “radicals”. Moreover, the assertion by Metz that a tilt to the left 
(radicals) diminished the influence of elected representatives like Diggs (a moderate) with policy­
makers is unsustainable because it fails to take into consideration the fact that neither the 
Congressional Black Caucus nor Afro-Americans had yet succeeded in influencing the Southern 
Africa policy of the administration, irrespective of the efforts of Diggs and his colleagues. While 
“moderates” like Diggs gained access to the White House and the State Department almost at will, 
they were unable to achieve their aim of effecting changes to the administration’s policy toward 
Southern Africa. Metz confirmed this, and thus undermines his argument in attributing the 
ineffectiveness of the Black Caucus to two factors. Firstly, Congress was not all that interested in 
Africa: “African issues were not the sort that win votes in most Congressional districts, and like the 
American population as a whole, most Congressmen have very little knowledge of Africa. While 
the African Subcommittee in the House did play a major role in policy formulation under the 
leadership of Charles Diggs, the fact remains that the Senate was by far the greater power on 
matters of international relations.”[27] Secondly, apart from exerting influence on the executive 
through personal contact and persuasion in which the Black Caucus had failed, Metz recognised 
the “appropriation process” as a viable means by which Congress could still bounce back to a 
position of influence over the executive. But the Black Caucus could not utilise this channel
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because the US had no military commitment in Africa.[28]
How then does one justify the argument that the erosion of influence of Afro-American 
Congressional leaders like Diggs was due to their attempt to respond to the demands of radicals in 
their community? Surely the influence was not there all along? Both the State Department and the 
Africa Bureau, the two agencies through which Africanists had always exercised influence were 
down-graded with the advent of this administration, as one saw with respect to the primacy of the 
NSC in the formulation of NSSM 39. Metz cited his personal interview with the Nixon 
administration’s first Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, David Newsom in support of 
his argument. Yet, Newsom elsewhere had made it clear that the State Department and the Africa 
Bureau lacked adequate influence over the administration’s Africa policy:
“ there are certain historical parts of the World which, of necessity, demand a
considerable attention on the part of the executive branch...of necessity the involvement of 
the United States in Europe, the involvement certainly in the Far East, the closeness and 
attention of Latin America, and the continuing concern over the problems of the Middle 
East, push their way into the policy makers, perhaps to a greater extent than some of the 
problems of Africa.”[29]
Newsom’s request to be relieved of his post in 1973 appeared to have been prompted by this lack 
of influence of the State Department and the Africa Bureau. [30] This point was also underscored 
by his successor who as earlier indicated in the previous chapter courted public interest on Africa 
as a means of influencing the administration’s policy toward the continent. It is therefore difficult 
to see how Afro-American Congressional leaders could have acquired influence over the executive 
by taking to the war-path against “radicals” in their community.
In the light of this, how do we then explain Diggs’ preference for fair employment practices 
as opposed to his previously held view of imposition of sanctions against South Africa? The 
change in position was a strategic calculation to harmonise his stance with what was likely to be 
adopted by a Democratic government. By virtue of his seniority in the Democratic Party and 
Congress, he had able to see by December 1971 an advance copy of the study on American policy 
toward Southern Africa which was undertaken by the United Nations Association of the United
States of America (UNA-USA).
It was not commissioned by either the Democratic or Republican Party, but its members
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were respected opinion leaders who had influence with the Democratic Party. Consisting mostly of 
liberal intellectuals and entrepreneurial elites interested in foreign policy analysis, the interest 
shown by such liberal scholars like Cyrus Vance and the publicly expressed view of the 
Association’s chairman, William Roth, that Southern Africa had been “unduly neglected as a 
priority of the US government” were enough to have convinced Diggs that the outline of the report 
could be incorporated into the Democratic platform. For example, while affirming the limitation of 
the capacity of the US to effect changes in foreign countries, the report supported official 
discouragement of new investments in South Africa, a halt to Export-Import Bank guarantees and 
insurance to business transactions in South Africa. It repudiated the idea of a linkage between 
economic prosperity and the demise of apartheid - a favourite argument of the South African 
Foundation and US business with South African connections - as the report noted that two decades 
of economic prosperity had resulted in affluence for the whites without a corresponding 
improvement in the apartheid regulated life style of the non-whites. Indeed it all but linked foreign 
investments to the longevity of apartheid and spoke of the need to break this unholy alliance. [31]
It called for a profound change in the administration’s approach to South Africa, and 
repudiated the possibility of communists fomenting conflict for the furtherance of their ideology, 
instead attributing any violence that might occur in that country to South Africa’s white population. 
The latter were warned that the US should not be counted upon to rescue them from any upheaval 
which apartheid might precipitate. The report emphasised the need for the US to maintain its 
distance from South Africa on the grounds that “the South African government complicates our 
commitment to racial equality because they tend to develop an interest in the status quo.” To avoid 
this situation, the report argued that “it is unwise for the U.S. to develop or maintain satellite 
tracking stations in South Africa.” [32]
To underscore the importance of the region, the report called for the creation of a functional 
Inter-Departmental Task Force to regularly review policy towards the region - a proposal which the 
Black Caucus had earlier made to the Nixon administration and which was dismissed 
contemptuously by the President himself.
On Portugal, the report called for a complete arms embargo and described the Azores bases 
as “technologically dispensable and politically costly”,[33] which in effect confirmed the position 
of Afro-Americans on the issue. Hence, although one might argue that the report did not go as far
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as endorsing the entire Caucus’ position on South Africa, there was broad agreement on the issue 
from which Afro-Americans could establish a foot-hold for further systematic assault on apartheid. 
Since an election was around the corner it was therefore not in the interest of Diggs to upset the 
situation by coming out with a manifesto diametrically opposed to the position of the UNA-USA 
report. This would rob the Democratic Party of the unity it needed to present to the electorate. 
Consequently the action manifesto was greatly influenced by the report of the Policy Panel - a fact 
which Diggs himself made clear by urging the administration to take appropriate action on it. What 
has been seen as the dictate of factional intrigue in the Afro-American community was therefore in 
effect an attempt to harmonise the position of Afro-Americans’ with what was likely to be adopted 
by a Democratic government. That this was so will become clearer when one analyses what took 
place during the 1972 campaign.
If Afro-Americans realised the futility of the existing pattern of exerting influence and if 
there were no differences in their objective as epitomised by the unqualified success of the 1972 
conference on Africa, then what changes were effected with a view to realising their objective?
Definitive results of Afro-American demands: The policy consensus arrived at the 
Washington conference armed Diggs - who was the brain behind the event - with a mandate to 
continue the struggle to effect changes in US policy toward Southern Africa. But the Action 
Manifesto had proved that his intention was to work within the framework of the Democratic 
Party. Thus, one saw the publication in June 1972 of the “Black Bill of Rights” by the 
Congressional Caucus, which included call on the Democratic nominee for the November 
Presidential election to take steps to sever every link between the US and South Africa.This meant 
the imposition of comprehensive sanctions.
Under normal circumstances, one would have expected the Afro-Americans to be less vocal 
on the issue for fear of provoking a white backlash against the Democratic Party. But the situation, 
at least as perceived by the Caucus and the community at large, was such that caution was hardly 
an issue. Most Afro-Americans had taken a stance on Southern Africa as a result of the events of 
1971 and the recalcitrance of the Nixon administration. Their emphasis was to bring about a 
reversal of the administration’s policy which they felt had strengthened apartheid and minority rule. 
Surprisingly they received unanimous broad support from all the Democratic contenders, 
irrespective of differences in detail, over the right of liberation movements to utilise every weapon
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at their disposal and the extent of sanctions. But there was agreement that the Nixon policy should 
be reversed.[34] All the candidates endorsed the UNA-USA report of 1971 on which Diggs 
tailored his Action Manifesto, as the basis of their policy towards the Southern African region. 
Hubert Humphrey read the report and “found it most comprehensive. In fact, I would recommend 
it as a useful tool in developing American foreign policy toward Southern African States and 
liberation movements.”
Humphrey went on to launch an attack on the Nixon administration’s Southern African 
policy which he said was in “desperate need of repair”. The Nixon doctrine on South Africa “has 
meant abnegations of an active role in promoting policies to assist in the achievement of basic 
human rights, particularly in the area of American investments”. He was no less restrained in his 
criticism of the administration’s policy in other areas of the region. He chastised it for its cozy 
relations with Portugal because it “means that we should fortify Portugal, as a member of NATO, 
through military-assistance programs and be forgetful of the fact that Portugal uses this assistance 
in her efforts to squelch independence movements and assertions of political justice in the 
territories of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau.” This pattern of thinking was equally 
evident with respect to Zimbabwe where the candidate regretted that “our government has remained 
silent as the grave racial unrest and injustice in Rhodesia become more and more apparent. The
record is alarming ” But the record had been no less alarming in 1968 when after a meeting
with President Kaunda in Lusaka, Humphrey came out to dismiss his host’s prediction of racial 
conflagration in the region should America fail to act, as an exaggeration. When asked by Africa 
Report if he still held the same view, Candidate Humphrey evaded the question as much as he 
could, while being relentless in his attack on the Nixon administration’s policy in the region.
As if there was prior agreement between the candidates, all of them took great delight in 
launching an attack on the administration’s record in the region. Even neo-conservative Henry 
Jackson regretted “that the Nixon administration has not recognised that our national interest cannot 
be served by the perpetuation of regimes of this sort. [South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal]....In 
the case of Portugal, I recognise the problems raised by participation in the Western security 
system. But American programs which enhance Portugal’s defense capabilities serve our interests 
only when they are used for the common NATO defense effort and are not diverted to suppression 
of the independence movements in Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea. If the
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Portuguese government does not respect this basic position, our military assistance program must 
be adjusted accordingly.”
The administration’s policy did not find favour also with New York’s Mayor John V. 
Lindsay because it “strikes me as grossly inappropriate. South Africa’s racial policies are a 
disgrace to civilised man.” Neither Eugene J. McCarthy, Edmund Muskie nor George McGovern 
had anything positive to say about the administration in this respect.
The significance of this development was that the candidates, most of whom were not 
hitherto known opponents of the administration’s Africa policy, were paying attention to the issue 
probably not out of conviction but most certainly of the need to obtain Afro-Americans’ support. 
This meant that in the 1972 Presidential elections, Afro-Americans were for the first time able to 
trade in their votes for an anticipated foreign policy objective. And that the Democratic Party 
realised this accounted for the writing of a distinct Southern African plank, independent of civil 
rights issues, into the 1972 Democratic platform - the first time in the history of the party. It reads:
“The United States should make clear its opposition to the racial totalitarianism of South 
Africa. The United States government should act firmly to press US business in South 
Africa to take measures for the fullest possible justice for their black employees. Blacks 
should be assigned at all levels to United States offices in South Africa, and throughout
Africa. The South African sugar quota should be withdrawn No US company or its
subsidiary should be given unlimited state tax credits for taxes paid to a white minority 
ruled countries of Africa.[35]
That the party leaned more towards Diggs’ “Action Manifesto” than an outright imposition 
of sanctions is irrelevant at this stage. But that the party had elevated the issue into its election 
manifesto without fear of alienating the majority white electorate was a testament not only to the 
pragmatism of the party’s elites and their intention to retain Afro-American electoral support, but 
also the determination, tenacity and enthusiasm of the Afro-Americans themselves. The Southern 
African problem was at the top of the priorities of Afro-Americans and their unanimity on the need 
to effect changes to the existing Southern Africa policy was responsible for its elevation into the 
Democratic Party manifesto.
This importance was recognised by the Party’s nominee, George McGovern, who in no 
time after the confirmation of his nomination, appointed an eight member Africa Policy Committee
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comprising liberal intellectuals such as Herschelle Challenor, Ronald Walters and John Marcum 
with the responsibility of charting the candidate’s Southern Africa policy in anticipation of victory 
at the poll.
That Richard Nixon won the 1972 election is an historical fact. But did the Democratic 
candidate fail as a result of the party’s Southern African plank? This question is necessary in view 
of the newness of the Southern African stance on the party’s agenda. The nearest the party had 
previously come to addressing Africa was in the Presidential elections of 1948 and 1960. In 1948, 
Truman not only lost some key Southern States on account of the attention he paid to civil rights 
but also saw the bolting of the party by some Dixiecrats. Kennedy’s enthusiasm over Africa, 
especially the liberation struggle in the South of that continent was abandoned by his successor, 
who also recoiled from embracing civil rights for fear of alienating the South as aforementioned. 
None of these candidates went as far as the Democratic Party in 1972, hence the need to wonder if 
Southern Africa helped lose the party the elections.
While acknowledging the difficulty of assessing the contribution of a single issue to the 
outcome of an election, one is lucky in the sense that the Congressional election of that year can 
serve as a pointer. In that election, liberals favourably disposed to African issues increased their 
position in Congress by eight more members - five in the House and the remainder in the 
Senate.[36] Indeed no one blamed the party’s electoral defeat on its African stance, for there was a 
consensus of opinion that the Nixon administration had been too sympathetic to the Southern 
African regimes - admittedly a consensus that could not have come about without the efforts of 
Afro-Americans. Rather, the party’s misfortune was blamed on candidate McGovern’s lacklustre 
campaign and the fact that he was squeezed virtually out of the race by Nixon and Wallace 
respectively.
However the re-emergence of Nixon meant that although Afro-Americans had succeeded in 
placing Southern Africa on the agenda of the opposition party, there could be no changes to the 
administration’s stance on the issue. The fact that Congressman Diggs continued to harangue 
officials of the Defence Department over NASA facilities in South Africa, resulting in the 
announcement that the facilities would be closed in 1973, meant that the opponents of the Southern 
African regimes were equally unprepared to let the matter rest. [37]
The early departure of Richard Nixon marked no difference as his successor Gerald Ford
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also inherited the NSC’s adviser, Henry Kissinger, who became the new Secretary of State. 
Although Afro-Americans in Congress and their sympathisers tried to embarrass the administration 
during Kissinger’s confirmation hearing, they watched helplessly as the administration followed 
the footsteps of its predecessor in expressing its disdain for Afro-American sensibilities over 
Southern Africa. For example when the Afro-Asian group in the UN sponsored a resolution to 
impose economic and military sanctions against South Africa on May 22,1973, it was the US 
delegation which led the British to the rescue of Pretoria by vetoing the resolution. This faithful 
service was once more rendered to South Africa on September 27,1974 following the refusal of 
the credentials committee to accord recognition to the delegation from Pretoria. The US followed 
up its stewardship to the floor of the Security Council where it also cast a veto when the issue was 
referred there by the Assembly. [3 8]
All that Afro-Americans could do was either to grumble aloud or to protest to the Secretary 
of State, Henry Kissinger, as Congressman Diggs did on the grounds that “the prospect of US 
veto or abstention on the issue of South African expulsion from the United Nations” was 
tantamount to encouraging “revolution in South Africa.”[39] Such protests were no match for the 
propaganda efforts of America’s UN Representative John Scarli who, in spite of describing 
apartheid as “evil” and “ugly” for the benefit of the mass media, had no qualms in defending the 
US position. This was an attempt to avoid the exclusion of any member which would infringe the 
universality of membership of the World body and relieve Pretoria of the pressure which member 
states would bring to bear on it to reform apartheid.[40] The only ray of hope came in 1974 when 
the Ford administration signalled its intention to repeal the Byrd Amendment. But any elation 
arising therefrom fizzled out rapidly when it became apparent that the administration was being 
compelled more by legal difficulties arising from implementation, as opposed to any attempt to 
placate Afro-Americans.[41]
However, events in Southern Africa soon brought about what at first looked like a meeting 
of minds between the administration and Afro-Americans. In 1974, battle weary officers in 
Portugal’s colonial wars overthrew their government in a coup and promised independence to the 
colonies. This development had made a mockery of the central plank of Option Two of NSSM 39 
of 1969 if Portugal was relinquishing control of its territories.
The manner in which Portugal went about its abandonment of what former Prime Minister
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Salazar frequently referred to at the height of imperial grandeur as “Portugal overseas” was even 
pathetic. Unable to bring about unity among Angola’s liberation movements it once fought in the 
bush, Lisbon simply lowered the Portuguese flag and departed without handing over government 
to a responsible authority. In the resultant outbreak of war between the liberation movements, the 
super-powers and their allies - Cuba and South Africa - backed the opposing combatants. The 
FNLA and UNITA which the US backed, not only lost at the battle field to the Soviet backed 
MPLA, but Washington also became highly unpopular in Africa on account of South Africa’s role 
at its apparent behest. While this might simply have signalled the degree to which South Africa was 
loathed in the continent, the irony was that even leaders like Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and 
Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia who were well aware of and even approved the American planned 
South African intervention in order to prevent the emergence of a communist backed regime in 
Angola, simply turned round to criticise the US as an impediment to African liberation.[42]
The administration, as expected, received support from Americans with conservative 
inclinations across the political divide who argued the need to anchor South Africa to the West, on 
account to the country’s economic importance and anti-communist stance. This was the first time 
Pretoria’s economic importance shared the limelight with its anti-communist credentials. Before 
then, the economic factor had always been subsumed by geopolitical cum ideological 
considerations as no administration could justify maintaining interests in an area simply for the 
benefit of big business.
However, the US economic stake in South Africa especially with respect to direct 
investment had by now risen sharply to $2.3 billion, a level that was maintained up to early 1983. 
In addition, US loans to Pretoria stood at no less than $3.7 billion while trade between the two 
countries was as high as $6 billion. Needless to say that the US also had more multi-national
il\ A L
corporations ah an any other country at the point in time. [43] The Republicans as the party of big 
business could not therefore be expected to abandon -ts constituents.
Buffeted by these conflicting demands, the administration could afford to ignore the Afro- 
Americans as was customary, but it could not do the same to the business community. However, 
the classic anti-communist strategy of supporting friendly regimes in sensitive areas of the world 
needed a rethink in the Southern African context if the edifice around Pretoria was crumbling. The 
Portuguese empire had fallen, and worst of all to the “communists , while the liberation
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movements in Zimbabwe and Namibia were also being supported either by Soviet or Chinese 
communists. Thus, to a seasoned Cold War proponent like Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, 
this was the time for laying the groundwork to change the direction of the administration’s 
Southern Africa policy with the backing of supporters and foes alike.
It was easier to appease supporters as their cardinal objective was the prevention of South 
Africa from falling into the “warm embrace of communism” - a phrase Verwoerd frequently used 
to dramatise South Africa’s importance to the West. The problem was how to appease the foes - the 
Afro-Americans - hence one saw the occurrence of two events to act as incentives. One was the 
resignation in July 1975, of the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Nathaniel Davis 
whose appointment seven months earlier (January 1975) as a replacement for the popular Donald 
Easum had raised protests from Afro-Americans.[44] One of the reasons (or so it seemed from the 
outcry against his appointment) was the fact that he was US Ambassador to Chile when Marxist 
Salvador Allende was overthrown. To Afro-Americans, Davis’ appointment was inspired by the 
threatening triumph of liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique. His Chilean experience, 
they maintained was the qualification for the job, and the Congressional Caucus supported by 
ACOA and WO A attempted unsuccessfully to scuttle the appointment. [45] Southern Africa 
articulated the view of Afro-Americans when it protested vehemently against the “Latin 
Americanisation” of Africa. [46]
The second event occurred between November and December 1975. Far from casting a 
veto, the US - notorious for its support of the Southern African regimes in the UN General 
Assembly and the Security Council - voted in favour of sports boycott of South Africa and even 
supported another resolution calling upon Pretoria to free political prisoners whose guilt was 
opposition to apartheid. [47]
Since years of protest had made Afro-Americans and the Congressional Caucus adroit in 
detecting platitudes, it took them no time to realise that far from having a change of heart, the 
administration’s effort was to secure domestic consensus to ease its path in its attempt to thwart an 
alleged Soviet hegemony in Southern Africa. This meant that there was still no meeting of minds 
between the administration and Afro-Americans as one was concerned with the evils of 
communism and the other the oppression of the majority by the minority in Southern Africa.
On the whole, 1971 was a watershed in Afro-Americans’ concern with Southern Africa in
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the sense that it galvanised them into rethinking their strategy for achieving changes in the 
administration’s policy for the region. All along, Presidential candidates soliciting Afro-American 
votes had sought to address the domestic civil rights issue as if it were the only area of concern to 
this segment of the American society. Even where Africa was addressed as Truman did in 1948, it 
was not with seriousness as no mention was made of a different line of policy to be adopted. It 
was only designed to capture the Afro-Americans’ votes in the North, hence on that occasion, the 
South African government whose apartheid policy was the subject of criticism sneered at his 
remarks as an unfortunate by-product of electioneering. [48]
The idea of an international dimension to Afro-American demands had never been seriously 
addressed by Presidential hopefuls either on the campaign trail or in the administration of 
successive candidates, except in the brief interlude of the Kennedy Presidency as discussed in 
Chapter Three. That there could be a link between the interests and desires of Afro-Americans and 
the foreign policy of an administration was never contemplated in the history of electioneering 
campaign prior to 1972. This was because the respected segment of the Afro-American leadership 
whose views could attract the attention of the authorities were themselves preoccupied with the 
domestic issue of civil rights. As a result, they were unable to elevate issues affecting Africa to the 
same significance as the Poles and the Irish had successfully made of their homelands or settlement 
as in the case of the Jews. But in pressing the Democratic Party to include a Southern African 
plank independent of civil rights as they did in 1972, Afro-Americans had successfully taken a 
tentative step toward imposing a reciprocal mandate upon those who sought their vote. Similarly 
the softening of the level of disdain, occasioned by the feelers being put across to Afro-Americans 
by the Ford administration could not but be inspired by the emergence of a new assertive Afro- 
American leadership not eager to kowtow in the name of working within the system to achieve an 
objective. Further testimony to this was the meeting which Kissinger granted Afro-Americans in 
late 1975 just to discuss Africa. [49] Was the administration now seeing Afro-Americans as 
constituents to be carried along if there should be an effective response to the developments in 
Southern Africa? If so how did the Afro-Americans respond? The answer to these questions 
constitute the bulk of the analysis in the next section.
(ii) Afro-Americans and US African Policy, 1976-80 
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If Afro-Americans moved from a period of disdain and powerlessness to demand definitive 
foreign policy stance from the Democratic Party in 1972 and were subsequently granted an 
audience by the Ford administration to discuss Africa, then the analysis in this section would have 
to concentrate on the consolidation of this nucleus of influence. But an analysis of the role of 
Afro-Americans in influencing the direction of U.S. policy in that region from 1976 to 1980 can 
only take place within the context of two key events of 1976. One was the victory of the Soviet- 
Cuban backed MPLA in Angola over then pro-Westem UNITA and FNLA movements, the other 
the US presidential election of 1976 and its outcome.
The victory of a Soviet backed movement brought about an increase in interest over 
Southern Africa both in Congress and the media. At issue was the renewed importance of South 
Africa to the US in the light of the “communist take-over” of Angola and Mozambique. To 
Senators John Tower of Texas, Barry Goldwater of Arizona, Jesse Helms of Northern Carolina, 
Sparkman of Alabama and Gam of Utah among others, the time had come to anchor South Africa 
in the Western orbit with a view to protecting her from communist encroachment. The 
administration’s policy of neutrality on the issue of US business involvement in South Africa - 
which Afro-Americans derided as succour to minority rule - was seen to be inadequate because it 
had failed to take adequate notice of South Africa’s importance as the last anti-communist bastion 
in the region. Apart from the familiar ideological and economic virtues of South Africa, there was 
now offered an added advantage in securing the country for the West: that of strategic location 
especially the Cape route which came in handy during the 1973/74 oil crisis. Fuelled by an alleged 
Soviet build-up in the Indian Ocean, the note of caution voiced by C.I.A. Director, William Casey 
in his testimony before Senate’s Foreign Affairs Committee in July 1974, that Soviet expansionism 
was in response to US activities in the Indian Ocean, was drowned out by the pro-Pretoria 
argument. The Director was speaking in response to a $32 million allocation for improving the 
military facilities in Diego Garcia which the executive asked for in the 1974 budget.[50]
As far as the Senators and like-minded Republicans were concerned, the administration’s 
policy was therefore shortsighted because it did not encourage US business to flourish in South 
Africa. This view was reinforced by the administration’s inability to be as imaginative as its 
predecessor as evidenced by its failure to act on the policy of “communication” which would have
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allowed South African importers of American goods to gain unfettered access to Eximbank 
loans. [51] Sixteen Senators, including the ones mentioned above, wrote to the administration in 
early 1976 emphasising that the Eximbank prohibition against South Africa was “detrimental to the 
U.S. not only in our balance of payments but also in the acquisition of advanced technology in the 
energy field.” [52] They had in mind South Africa’s intention to construct a coal gasification 
project, probably S ASOLII which the US high technology conglomerate Fluor Inc.wanted to 
exploit. Metz suggests that the Senators action was triggered by the lobbying activities of National 
Constructors Association (NCA) in response to a complaint about Eximbank restriction difficulties 
by Fluor Inc.[53]
Whether or not this was true, given the ideological predilection of those involved, they 
were capable of taking the initiative in view of the window of opportunity opened by the situation 
in Angola and Mozambique. They were not alone. South Africa which for years had construed any 
domestic opposition as communist inspired while describing intensification of apartheid as an 
attempt to protect itself from the “grabbing hands of communism”, saw the latest concern about 
communism in the former Portuguese territories as a windfall to which all its spokesmen working 
in either information offices or the South African Foundation brought their skill to bear. The tour 
of South Africa by 39 Congressmen amidst a well publicised visit to military facilities including 
Simonstown in early 1976 was the consequence. The high profile visit to the US by South Africa’s 
Information Minister Connie Mulder, during which he visited Congressional leaders and also 
engaged in delivering lectures all aimed at emphasising his country’s importance to the West from 
the point of view of security, [54] was also part of Pretoria’s offensive to cash in on the debate in 
the US. Perhaps the most audacious act was exposed by the revelation that Illinois’s Congressman 
Philip Crane’s eloquent speech on the floor of the House in August 1976 on the need for the US to 
recognise the so-called “Republic of Transkei” was written for him by a South African agent called 
Donald de Kieffer. The Congressman’s protestation of innocence on grounds that he thought it was 
written by the Republican Study Committee rang hollow in view of his friendship with the South 
Africa Foundation - an arm of Pretoria’s propaganda machine - and a well publicised trip to South 
Africa during which he and his entourage of fellow Congressmen emphasised the need for closer 
security cooperation between the US and Pretoria. [55]
Even at the best of times, criticism of an incumbent administration on Southern Africa was
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never one-sided. On this occasion, the Angolan misadventure had added urgency to the criticism. 
To Afro-Americans and their supporters in the anti-apartheid movement, whose stance appeared to 
have been vindicated, the lesson from the Angolan fracas was that the US had no credible policy in 
the region. One which would align itself with the majority African population was needed in place 
of the discredited “communication” policy because in addition to its inadequacy in bolstering up 
repressive tottering regimes, it had succeeded in conferring upon the US a pariah status in Africa 
and all over the world where there were African sympathisers. Senator Edward Kennedy’s 
taunting of the administration on its Angolan adventure while prescribing termination of military 
cooperation and other tacit support to South Africa with a view to playing a constructive role in the 
self determination of the peoples of the region should be seen in this light. [56]
The fact that 1976 was an election year meant that it was the most inappropriate period for 
the Democratic Party either to ignore or pay lip service to an area of interest to Afro-Americans. 
This particular year was hardly the one to give succour to one’s opponents. With the Republican 
Party demoralised by the trauma of Watergate and President Ford playing a second fiddle to Henry 
Kissinger in order to conceal his inadequacy in foreign affairs, this was the time to unite the party. 
Focusing on Southern Africa was advantageous to the party on two counts. First it emphasised the 
party’s commitment to issues of concern to Afro-Americans irrespective of ideological label. 
Second, in the light of the Angolan development, Southern Africa policy was of considerable 
discomfort to the Republican Party. The Democrats could not therefore be expected to ignore an 
opportunity to embarrass their opponents.
The result was that for the first time since 1969 when dissatisfaction with main-stream 
Afro-American leadership spilled over into Congress with the emergence of the Black Caucus, one 
saw Southern Africa as an area of interest to influential and powerful members of the Democratic 
Party. Lobbying for support was no longer a headache as Congressmen and the party 
heavyweights, some with an eye on Afro-American electoral support, joined the fray. This 
accounted for the over-kill response to the Eximbank loan restriction. While on that occasion only 
16 Senators wrote to the President for the lifting of the Eximbank prohibition, a total of 49 
legislators - 41 in House and 8 in the Senate including Republican Javits of New York - wrote a 
counter letter to the President urging retention. Sandwiched between Republican Hawks and 
mainly Democratic Doves, President Ford uncharacteristically bowed to the latter by retaining the
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prohibition. This was the first real as opposed to symbolic victory for the anti-apartheid front. [57] 
To the Republicans, the administration’s Eximbank decision was a betrayal of the business 
community, and would be politically suicidal to the president and perhaps economically disastrous 
to the country. In his testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1976, 
Eximbank’s Vice-President, Stephen. M. Minikes brought this factor home when he painted a 
symbiotic relationship between the termination of the loan restriction on his Bank and an increase 
in US exports to South Africa. The benefit which would result from this, he argued, would be an 
improvement in the balance of payments. He indicated that political upheaval as a product of social 
and economic disequilibrium had made the going too tough for American corporate interests to 
operate in the developing world without support of the type being provided by Eximbank. [5 8] The 
implication in his testimony was that without Eximbank facilities, US corporations would be at a 
decided disadvantage in the South African market when faced with stiff competition from European 
consortia who could count on their governments to guarantee sources of financial support.
President Ford’s challenger for the Republican nomination, Ronald Reagan, had declared 
himself opposed to the administration’s stance on the Eximbank controversy and had launched a 
scathing attack on the White House for its ambivalence towards South Africa in spite of the 
“communist” threat at its doorsteps. In his speech at The Alamo, San Antonio, Texas on April 30, 
1976, the challenger invidiously emphasised South Africa’s acceptability by asking: “how then do 
we explain our ignoring the plight of the enslaved millions in the Soviet Union and other 
communist countries?”[59]
Under the circumstances, the President could not secure his party’s nomination much less 
the presidency in the November elections without a dramatic initiative to steal the limelight from 
Reagan. Thus one saw two dramatic developments in April 1976, aimed at appeasing the business 
lobby and the Republican Party as well as the country. One was that US corporate interests, 
especially Fluor Inc. got from the Private Export Funding Corporation - a consortium of 
commercial and investment banks and corporations - the backing which Eximbank was compelled 
to deny them. Second was the gradual unfolding of a new strategy for arriving at the objective of 
Option Two of NSSM of 1969 as indicated above. The erosion of the Portuguese presence in the 
region and the threat to the settler administration in Rhodesia amidst low level insurgency in 
Namibia called into question the wisdom in predicating a policy on the longevity of minority rule.
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As such, the administration especially its foreign policy ideologue, Henry Kissinger had realised 
that to shore up western influence in the region with a view to combating the “communist” gains in 
Angola and Mozambique, reliance must be placed on the region’s trust-worthy indigenous 
moderates as opposed to settlers. If this could be achieved in stages, first in Rhodesia and then in 
Namibia, massive infusions of US funds would compel those moderate leaders to open a dialogue 
with Pretoria with a view to forming a formidable front which would include Botswana, Malawi, 
Zambia and Zaire, against further Soviet-Cuban encroachment. This was the essence of 
Kissinger’s whirlwind tour of Southern Africa in April 1976, in which he committed the US to 
majority rule in the region and repeated the often-made but never implemented promise to repeal the 
Byrd Amendment without telling his audience what Washington intended to reap from such 
reversal of policy.[60]
The trip attracted hostile comments. Reagan saw it as “an impulsive reaction in a potentially
explosive situation The great issue of racial justice is as vital here at home as it is in Africa and
it would be well to make sure our own house is in order before we fly off to other lands to attempt 
to dictate policies to them.” [61] To perennial enemies such as the Afro-Americans, the trip was 
self-serving if not an exercise in outright demagoguery. They complained to the Secretary of State:
“The perception of your general indifference to Africa and relative inaccessibility to the 
African diplomatic community in Washington, except when there is a public relations 
advantage to be gained, has created scepticism about the timing and substance of your visit, 
particularly during this election year.” [62]
But there was no connection between the criticism of Reagan and Afro-Americans. The latter were 
incensed that in spite of their efforts to alter the direction of the administration’s Southern African 
policy, it had to take a crisis of the magnitude in Angola for the White House to realise that a 
change of policy was needed. As a result, they were skeptical of the administration’s commitment 
to work toward genuine majority rule in the region - a scepticism confirmed by Kissinger’s 
unpreparedness to tamper with the status quo in South Africa itself. One has in mind the protest 
marches which the Pan-African Students Organisation organised on grounds that the tour was 
designed to protect corporate interests in the region and the adverse testimonies of Congressman 
Andrew Young and Career Diplomat Donald McHenry before the Senate s Committee on Foreign 
Relations in 1976.[63]
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On the other hand, Ronald Reagan’s criticism was inspired by his concern for the effect of 
a reversal of policy on America’s effort to combat communism. Majority rule should not be 
achieved at the expense of weakening the anti-communist allies in the region because what posed a 
threat to humanity was communism and that alone. This accounted for his outburst at the 
administration’s indication of interest to repeal the Byrd Amendment:
“He said (Kissinger) the administration will ask Congress to repeal the legislation 
which permits us to buy chrome from Rhodesia. There is only one other major source of 
chrome in the World, the Soviet Union. Chrome is absolutely essential to American 
industries and to the production of military hardware. In 1967 through 1971, we obeyed 
U.N sanctions and did buy our chrome from Russia. Russia doubled the price. Now 
Secretary Kissinger would make us once more totally dependent upon the Soviet Union at a 
time when they are intent on out-building us militarily. [64]
The good news for the administration was that apart from Reagan’s fiery criticism, the 
realisation of possible defeat in an election in which they had very little to cheer about, made the 
Republican Party less belligerent towards the White House. But this was of partial comfort as the 
Democrats intensified their criticism of the administration’s Southern African policy. Since the 
Afro-Americans now had no problem convincing doubting “Thomases” within the Democratic 
Party, they had no qualms in flexing their muscles further. Thus, one saw the convening of what 
became known as a “Caucus of Black Democrats” in Charlotte, North Carolina in April 1976 by 
the Congressional Caucus to put the Democratic hopefuls to the test, about their knowledge of 
Southern African. This was a follow-up of the strategy of reciprocal mandate which Afro- 
Americans first tried in 1972 to extract a commitment from the Democratic Party on Southern 
Africa policy.
Afro-Americans’ endorsement was crucial and indeed sought by each of the four 
candidates. This accounted not only for their attempt to outdo each other but the effort and the 
seriousness the contenders put into it to impress and convince Afro-Americans of their 
understanding of the issue. This becomes glaring when one compares Senator Frank Church’s 
statement that he knew “of no agency in government that has less black influence than the State 
Department, and that’s why we’re in trouble in Africa”, [65] with Jimmy Carter’s speech to the 
Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs on March 15,1976 when he regretted the fact that “we have
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either ignored them (developing world) or treated them as pawns in the big power chess game.” 
Such attitude of neglect and disrespect toward the developing nations of the world is predicated in 
part in a sense of superiority towards others - a form of racism.”[66]
The observation one can make from these statements is that the candidates were displaying 
their ability to feel the pulse of Afro-Americans. It was dissatisfaction with the perennial dearth of 
Afro-Americans and Afro-American influence at the level of policy formulation which galvanised 
Afro-Americans into seeking an active role in policy towards Africa. By stating in no uncertain 
terms their intention to incorporate Afro-Americans and their views into the policy making process, 
all the four prospective Democratic nominees were responding positively to the concern of 
America’s African community. Since Afro-Americans were suspicious of Kissinger’s motives in 
Southern Africa, all the Democratic hopefuls embarked upon the familiar process of tailoring their 
speeches along the path of assailing the administration on the issue. Thus, Frank Church found 
Angola of “no strategic or national interest to us” and frowned upon any attempt to counter the 
Soviet-Cuban presence there. Rather the US, he cautioned, should side with liberation movements 
in quest of freedom from colonial rule.[67] Jimmy Carter lamented the missed “opportunity to be a 
positive and creative force for good in Angola during the years that we supported Portuguese 
colonialism. We should also realise that the Russian and Cuban presence in Angola, while 
regrettable and counter-productive of peace, need not constitute a threat to United States interests; 
nor does that presence mean the existence of a communist satellite on the continent.”[68]
The candidates views appear to have been wrested from the mouths of Afro-Americans 
which indicated a convergence of views between them and the Afro-Americans and as such a 
positive development, but they also proved beyond doubt that the Democratic Party was now the 
spokesman for Afro-American concern on Southern Africa. While conceding that the interest of the 
Democratic Party could have been inspired more by the need to gamer Afro-Americans’ support 
and to embarrass the administration over Angola, than by conviction, it should be emphasised that 
there was direct correlation between the importance of Afro-American support in a closely fought 
race and the interests shown by the candidates over Southern Africa. For example, no contender 
for the Democratic Party’s nomination in the 1976 race could have been expected to carry Michigan 
without the endorsement of Congressman Charles Diggs. The price tag for an endorsement could 
not have been anything less than an enthusiastic commitment to the cause of Afro-Americans in
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Southern Africa, bearing in mind the fact that it was an era in which Afro-Americans’ external 
interests had eclipsed domestic concerns like civil rights.
In this respect, the surge in extra-Congressional Afro-American action in the wake of the 
Soweto rising in South Africa in June 1976, such as NAACP’s end of year resolution urging the 
US to intensify its opposition to the “racist policies of the South African regime and the barbaric 
treatment of its non-White citizens”, and Jesse Jackson’s challenge to the administration to take 
moral and public positions “against the recent massacre of blacks in South Africa”, should be seen 
as exerting pressure on both the administration and the Democratic Party. [69] On the latter to 
remind it of the need to intensify its efforts as spokesman for Afro-American concern on Southern 
Africa; and on the administration because far from being contemptuous of Afro-Americans’ 
demands, its position on the Eximbank controversy showed that it was amenable to persuasion by 
opposing parties to an argument. This no doubt accounted for the balancing act the administration 
indulged in on the issue relating to the events in Soweto. For example, the US supported a 
Security Council resolution of June 19,1976, condemning Pretoria’s massacre of school children 
in the Soweto riots, but stopped short of seeing the event as a threat to world peace, [70] which 
could have led to the evocation of Chapter Seven of the charter. In a worse case scenario such 
development could have had the opposite effect of introducing communist troops into South Africa 
under the canopy of UN intervention. This accounted for the administration’s effort to pacify its 
two opposing domestic critics irrespective of whether or not either was pacified. The July 30,1976 
abstention in the Security Council on a raid on Zambia by South African forces and the August 2, 
1976 address to the Urban League in Boston by the Secretary of State, as well as his speech at 
Leon Sullivan’s government funded Opportunities Industrialisation Centre (OIC) later in the 
month, while at the same time rejecting the Afro-Americans’ demand for severance of relations 
with South Africa [71] should be seen in the light of playing a balancing role.
This pattern of taking turns to appease opposing factions was a novelty in the 
administration’s response to such issues. Its predecessor all but ignored Afro-Americans’ pressure 
on Southern Africa throughout its tenure. Why then should the Ford administration depart from the 
course of its predecessor given that there was nothing to be gained electorally?
There are two basic though related explanations for this. First, during the tenure of Richard 
Nixon, public apathy on African issues meant that they could conveniently be relegated to a non­
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priority position. The administration was therefore free from the constraints which could have been 
imposed by public interests and expectations. It was this that gave the administration a free hand to 
pursue its Southern Africa policy and overwhelmed Afro-Americans’ concern on the area. Second 
and equally important was the fact that the administration did not witness any dramatic 
development in the region which could have roused the American public from their deep slumber.
Neither was true for the Ford administration, which necessitated the different reaction from 
it. The administration’s policy of trying to please everyone should therefore be seen as a 
consequence of its being a prisoner of competing and vocal interest groups on Southern Africa in 
the light of escalating events on the ground in the region.
The Aftermath of the 1976 Election and the Response to Afro-Americans’ Interest in 
Southern Africa.
How then did the Afro-Americans fare in their attempt to exert influence on US-Southern 
African policy in the aftermath of the 1976 presidential election? In other words how important was 
the Afro-American vote in the election and did the new administration respond to Afro-Americans’ 
concern on Southern Africa?
At the election, the Democratic nominee, Jimmy Carter, won the presidency with the 
support of the Afro-American vote. Just as a balance of power situation enable Afro-Americans to 
play a crucial role in the election of John Kennedy in 1960, by the time of the 1976 election, the 
margin between the Democratic contender and the incumbent Gerald Ford was too close to call.
The Afro-American tilt in favour of Jimmy Carter took him to the White House.
The Afro-Americans’ strategy of reciprocal mandate, as earlier indicated, did not end with 
merely sounding out the opinion of the Democratic presidential nominees at the North Carolina’s 
“Caucus of Black Democrats” in April 1976. By September 1976, a “Black leadership Conference” 
had produced an 11 point African-American Manifesto on Southern Africa. The points ranged from 
demand for US government’s unreserved support to the liberation struggles in Zimbabwe,
Namibia and South Africa to imposition of sanctions against an intransigent South Africa, as well 
as request to the president to “institute a program of tax disincentives to US corporations operating 
in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia. And should those corporations remain unprepared to use
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their leverage to bring about concrete steps towards economic and political justice in South Africa, 
and to operate there, in Namibia and in Zimbabwe on the basis of fair and non-discriminatory 
employment practices, humane working conditions and just compensation for the exploitation of 
African resources, they should withdraw.” [72] To oversee the implementation of these demands, a 
Washington lobby was formed.[73] This appears to have been the nucleus of TransAfrica which in 
1977 emerged as the lobbying apparatus of Afro-Americans.[74]
Thus President Carter was immediately confronted with a set of demands on Southern 
Africa by part of his constituents whose support he had publicly acknowledged as being 
responsible for his election.[75] They were armed with their lobbying apparatus to ensure 
fulfilment. In talking about the President’s response to these demands on Southern Africa, there 
are three issues worth addressing: how did the President perceive the problems of the region; what 
strategy did he adopt and finally how harmonious were his perception and strategy with the 
position and expectations of Afro-Americans on the issue.
(a) The President’s perception of the problems of Southern Africa: Jimmy Carter acceded to 
the presidency during a period of turmoil in Southern Africa: Angolan troops facing the South 
African Defence Force (S ADF) in combat formation along the Namibian-Angolan border, 
Mozambique’s FRELIMO troops in a state of combat readiness against possible attacks from 
Rhodesian Selous Scouts; escalating liberation wars in varying degrees in Rhodesia and Namibia 
and above all, intermittent uprisings in major townships of South Africa, the most intense being 
Soweto.
The president’s perception of the region was that the indigenous populations had been 
wronged and their dignity violated by settler, minority and colonial regimes. It was this 
abnormality that posed a threat to US interests in the region because the struggle for human rights 
by the majority population had provided the rationale for the involvement of hostile powers. The 
main threat to the interests of the US therefore, was the existence of gross social and economic 
disequilibrium among the races.
Needless to say that such perception while diametrically opposed to the position of pre- 
1974 administrations was in accord with the position of Afro-Americans on the issue.
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(b) The President’s Strategy: The new government’s ability to manoeuvre with a view to 
correcting what it recognised as gross injustice had been circumscribed by its predecessor’s belated 
change of strategy - as opposed to conviction - in the region. In embarking upon his Southern 
African tour of April 1976, the then Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger committed the US to 
majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia without any attempt to advocate the same in South Africa 
itself. Hence, there had been some movement on both Rhodesia and Namibia before the advent of 
the Carter administration. For example, in September 1976, Ian Smith committed himself to 
relinquishing political power to the majority population within two years pending which an interim 
council of ministers of equal number of Africans and Whites would administer the territory. Ian 
Smith’s assertion that the arrangement received the blessing of Whitehall, which was duly 
confirmed by the British government White paper in September 1977, indicates that it was part of 
the Kissinger’s initiative. Under it, Britain was to assume its colonial obligation to supervise the 
emergence of a new majority-ruled Zimbabwe. Thereafter a joint concerted international campaign 
by the US and UK coupled with infusion of economic aid and guarantee of pension rights for the 
White civil servants, sanctions would be lifted against Zimbabwe. [76] Although the Frontline 
States and Zimbabwe’s two main liberation movements, ZAPU and ZANU, under the umbrella of 
the Patriotic Front (PF) later repudiated the arrangement on grounds that it left key ministerial 
portfolios in the hands of Whites, it meant that the Carter administration had inherited a pattern of 
solving Zimbabwe’s problem which entailed coopting South Africa and the UK as co-adjudicators.
But the approach of the administration was different without totally ignoring the efforts of 
its predecessor. While the Ford administration approached the regional issues on a case by case 
basis and accorded priority according to its whims, the Carter approach was a three-pronged 
strategy which focused on Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Namibia and South Africa simultaneously.
On Zimbabwe where some effort had been made, the administration took cognizance of this 
by liaising with Britain to formulate a new initiative to solve the impasse which had developed 
there. Impasse it undoubtedly was because, while the Frontline States and the PF rejected the first 
phase of the Kissinger plan, they went along with the British sponsored Geneva Conference of 
October 1976, only for Ian Smith to reject the outcome of the deliberations. His preference was the 
Kissinger plan which his own opponents had earlier rejected. To break the deadlock, the 
administration’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Mr. Andrew Young in conjunction with the
158
British Foreign Secretary, Dr. David Owen presented a new Anglo-American plan to Ian Smith on 
September 1,1977 which was not much different from the one earlier rejected except that a British 
resident Commissioner was to govern Zimbabwe pending independence in six months. Smith also 
rejected it out of hand. Instead he proceeded with his own internal settlement, for which he signed 
an agreement with Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole and Chief Jeremiah Chirau in 
March 1978.
The administration’s response was to distance itself from Smith’s gamble while being vocal 
on the need for a negotiated settlement. The US also declined to use its power of veto in the UN 
and abstained on a Security Council resolution of March 14,1978 rejecting the new development, 
thus ensuring its success as no Eastern bloc country would support Ian Smith. Instead, the 
administration continued to support the Anglo-American initiative as epitomised by the Malta 
conference between Andrew Young, David Owen and the joint leaders of the PF on January 30 and 
31,1978. Washington took the line that any settlement without the participation of the PF was 
tantamount to rejection by the majority of the Zimbabwean peoples. It was this position that made 
the President announce later in the year the convening of an All-Party Conference on Zimbabwe, a 
pointer to which was the flurry of shuttle diplomacy by the US and British Secretaries of State to 
Southern Africa, to confer with the parties involved. That the conference did not take place was a 
consequence of the internal contradictions within and among the parties to the conflict. Some of 
these were the acrimony arising from the secret meeting between Ian Smith and Joshua Nkomo 
without the knowledge of the other leader of the PF, Robert Mugabe, and the shooting down of a 
Zimbabwe passenger plane by partisans of the ZAPU wing of the PF in August 1978.[77]
The administration’s resolve was put to the test in October 1978 after an earlier 
unsuccessful attempt by Abel Muzorewa to convince US officials of the need to lift sanctions 
against Zimbabwe. This time, Smith accompanied by his partners in the internal settlement, 
Muzorewa, Sithole and the entire Executive Council travelled to the US to convince officials of the 
validity of the new arrangement. They were there at the invitation of Republican Senators who 
called themselves members of the “American Security Council”. Except a brief meeting with 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, the visitors did not succeed in their mission because the 
administration did not see any merit in lifting the 1968 sanctions against Zimbabwe. Nor would the 
President meet with them. The UN Representative, Andrew Young articulated the view of the
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administration when he dismissed Ian Smith’s internal arrangement as a viable alternative to an all­
party conference on the future of Zimbabwe:
We just don’t think that he had much of a case. His claim that the US support would 
ensure his government’s success just does not bear up under either our political judgment 
or our intelligence information. You have some 30,000 to 50,000 armed men in 
Rhodesia, Zambia and Mozambique, and they are not going to go away.”[78]
But by holding out against the internal settlement, the administration incurred the anger of 
the Republican establishment and probably some Democrats in view of the fact that Ian Smith’s 
effort had support within the US. It was this support which was translated into tremendous 
pressure on the administration to grant travelling permit to the visitors. While in the US, the 
delegation also had an audience with important establishments including Senate’s Foreign 
Relations Committee.
The fact that Smith appeared to be letting go his racial group’s stranglehold on power in 
favour of majority rule in the interest of peace in Zimbabwe fitted with Jimmy Carter’s justice and 
human rights crusade, and this made the administration’s objection questionable in the estimation 
of some sections of the American populace. Kissinger articulated this view when he publicly 
voiced his resentment on October 13,1978, at what appeared to be the administration’s obduracy: 
“I am not saying that we should support the internal settlement. All I am saying is that we should 
give his approach an opportunity [to be tested.]”[79] That was the dilemma of the administration: 
how to reconcile support for a faction intent on achieving its aim by armed insurrection when 
another had accepted peaceful means of achieving the same aim. By objecting to Ian Smith’s 
proposal on the basis of non-inclusion of the PF, would seem that the administration was not 
committed to a peaceful transition in Zimbabwe. This would make a mockery of the protestation of 
Andrew Young when he said in an address in Lagos on August 25, 1977:
“I don’t believe in violence. I fought violence in my own country. I am determined that the 
UN continue as one institution that is devoted to peaceful change. And yet, I have never 
condemned another man’s right to take up arms in pursuit of his freedom. Too often, 
however, the armed struggle is advocated most vigorously by those who are thousands of 
miles away and whose only contribution to the struggle is the rhetoric of bitterness and 
frustration.”[80]
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The explanation for the administration’s position was based on the fact that while the 
Republicans were going public with their exertion of pressure to recognise the Smith proposal, 
there was an under-current of Afro-American counter-pressure spearheaded by TransAfrica. The 
Afro-American reaction was based on their perception that the indigenous parties to the internal 
settlement were puppets of the government they intended to replace.[81] TransAfrica’s Executive 
Director, Randall Robinson, subsequently claimed that its pressure had been a significant factor in 
the administration’s position:
“Without our work, the United States would have lifted the economic sanctions on trade 
with Rhodesia long before this year, and the London conference would not have 
happened. When he was Prime Minister, Muzorewa tried to get Washington to lift the 
sanctions as a step toward recognising his regime; we were able to stop that from 
happening.”[82]
In this context, Senator Edward Kennedy’s criticism of the administration for its failure to 
achieve a settlement in Zimbabwe which Margaret Thatcher did within seven months in office did 
not take cognizance of the conflicting pressures on the administration and the fact that Washington 
did not want to upstage the British over Zimbabwe. If the administration had recognised the Abel 
Muzorewa government, then the British conservative government would hardly have reopened the 
issue in 1979, because when the party was in opposition it sent out a team of observers under 
Viscount Boyd. The team returned with a positive report on the Bishop’s accession to the Prime 
Ministership of Zimbabwe. [83] The criticism should therefore be seen as part of the on-going 
storm of protest from Congress and the Republican establishment over SALT II, Iran, Nicaragua 
and Southern Africa.
Kissinger’s Lusaka speech of 1976 had also meant majority rule in Namibia to which 
South Africa had responded by making a statement to the UN in August 1976 promising 
independence to the territory by December 1978. However it became clear that this statement was 
meant to divert attention from Pretoria’s occupation as no concrete effort was made to ensure its 
materialisation. Kissinger did not speak of majority rule in South Africa.
Here, the authorities’ answer to the yearnings of the non-white masses was intensification 
of apartheid with pressure on the African “homelands” to declare themselves independent
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“Bantustans”. The declaration of “Transkei” as an “independent country” took place before the end 
of the Ford administration. The task before the Carter administration was how to walk a tightrope 
between support for the status quo in South Africa as advocated by conservatives in the light of 
“communist gains” in Angola and Mozambique, and the demand of Afro-Americans for the 
withdrawal of support from that status quo. Added to this was the third factor of the president’s 
personal idiosyncrasy of basing foreign policy on the basis of human rights, which complemented 
the Afro-Americans’ position on the issue. The fact that in April 1977 the Contact Group under US 
Ambassador Don McFlenry succeeded in talking Pretoria into accepting the basic tenet of UN 
resolution 385 in addition to the warning which Vice-President Walter Mondale issued to Pretoria 
against reliance on Washington over apartheid induced difficulties during a meeting in Vienna in the 
same year, appeared to be a tilt toward Afro-Americans’ position on the issue. This is all the more 
so when weighed against the background that the administration carried along the European 
powers with extensive economic interests in South Africa in voting in favour of a UN mandatory 
arms embargo against Pretoria in the same year.[84]
The result of this favourable development from the administration was an upsurge in 
demand for corporate disinvestment from South Africa by elements within the larger multi-racial 
anti-apartheid movement of which Afro-Americans have always played a pivotal role. ACOA’s role 
in spearheading the picketing of Banks which gave loans to South Africa was a case in point. 
University students across the racial divide, famous for their anti-apartheid activities, joined the 
fray in calling on their university authorities to sell their stock in corporations with South African 
connections. From their University premises, students demonstrated and offered themselves to be 
arrested to dramatise their case while the Interfaith Centre On Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) 
provided them with the back-up support, mostly in the form of information on share holdings and 
in publicising their case.[85] So deafening and persistent were the protests that some corporate 
interests with university holdings had to seek sanctuary in signing the Sullivan principle - a 
corporate code of conduct on employment by US firms operating in South Africa - while 
Minnesota, Illinois and Wisconsin Universities amongst others had to act to pacify their restive 
students. For example, Wisconsin thought it wise to divest itself of its shares in corporations with 
South African connections, Illinois placed a moratorium on investments while Minnesota gave 
corporations with South African connections the breathing space to sign up the Sullivan
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principle.[86] ACOA’s part of the protest also yielded dividends as the threat of withdrawal of 
business, duly supported by the powerful United Auto Workers Union, forced some Banks such 
as Chase Manhattan to announce a moratorium on further loans to South Africa.[87] The aftermath 
of the oil crisis of the mid-1970s had caused a dislocation of the South African economy to the 
extent that continuous prosperity was contingent upon the advancement of credit from overseas 
financial institutions among which the US Banks played a major role. [88]
If there were expressions of elation at the progressive stance of the administration on issues 
relating to Southern Africa, they were short-lived. By 1978, the administration’s progressive and 
from all indications, pro-Afro-American outlook in its Southern African policy had suffered 
reverses. Although the catalyst seemed to be the May 1978 attempted invasion of Shaba province 
by Zairean refugees based in Angola, the real problem was the conflicting positions of officials 
who had considerable input in foreign policy. These were the President, Secretary of State Cyrus 
Vance, Ambassador Andrew Young and the NSC adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski. While the 
President, Vance and Young shared liberal instincts on issues of foreign policy, the NSC adviser 
was far to the right especially where the issues involved the Soviet Union and communism, such 
as Angola. As far as Brzezinski was concerned, recognition of the MPLA government should be 
predicated on the international conduct of Moscow. Africa was being seen within the spectrum of 
the bipolar world view in which the US must tailor its policy to deter Soviet hegemonic intentions 
in any part of the world.[89]
This tendency to posit a symbiotic relationship between Soviet conduct and US policy in all 
parts of the world was not shared by Andrew Young, Vance or the President. The President had 
expressed his view on the issue during the campaigns of 1976 as aforementioned. This had been 
reinforced by Andrew Young in 1979 when he described the Cuban troops in the region as a 
positive force in stemming the rising tide of warfare and balkanisation in Angola. But by failing to 
assert his authority effectively, the President contributed in no small measure to the tension 
between the regionalists and globalists in his administration which later deteriorated to almost the 
level of personal animosity between Brzezinski and Cyrus Vance.[90]
The implication in this was that in spite of his personal idiosyncrasies, the President was 
bound to be inundated with conflicting advice from officials. Unfortunately for Andrew Young, 
Brzezinski’s articulation of the globalist perspective coincided with the buffeting of the
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administration’s policy in Southern Africa by a storm of protest within the US and in South Africa. 
The latter’s popular entrepreneur, Harry Oppenheimer ridiculed the administration’s insistence on 
the principle of one-man-one-vote as a basis for reforms in his country, while the Republican 
establishment led by former president Gerald Ford trained their big guns on the incumbent’s Africa 
policy. Ford’s appeal for closer business co-operation with South Africa when viewed within the 
spectrum that it was a former Democratic Assistant Secretary of State George Ball, who in 1977 
ridiculed the existing Africa policy as a mixture of emotion and naivete for pandering to domestic 
pressure without recognising the US ’ limited leverage on Pretoria, called into question the collision 
course the administration had embarked upon with South Africa. [91]
Opponents claimed the administration was sacrificing tangible American economic and 
strategic interests in a region under communist threat, just to pacify the vocal domestic anti­
apartheid lobby. Thus South Carolina’s Governor James Edwards returned from a sponsored trip 
to South Africa in early August 1977 to say that it was Afro-Americans’ influence on the executive 
which was preventing the “White South African government from getting its fair share of 
sympathy and understanding” in the United States.[92]
With Andrew Young out of the way over an incident which infuriated the Jewish lobby, 
Congress increasingly becoming hostile across the political divide as epitomised by the criticism 
over Zimbabwe as earlier indicated, amidst increasingly hostile editorials and articles in the 
Washington Post and Times. [93] and with Brzezinski becoming bolder as evidenced by the 
meeting between his aide and CIA Director Stanfield Turner in May 1978 to resume covert aid to 
UNITA, the Carter administration found it unappealing to continue its new chapter of US-Southern 
Africa policy with the same degree of commitment and enthusiasm.
With its own officials divided amidst growing criticism from without, the administration 
could not afford to appear weak or kowtowing to communism in Africa. This made South Africa 
and its Cape route as important to the Democratic administration as the Republicans had always 
insisted. An indication of how tough the administration had become manifested itself on May 30, 
1978, during a NATO summit meeting in Washington when the President strongly protested the 
attempted Shaba invasion earlier in the month. He complained to his guests:
“The activities of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Africa are preventing individual nations
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from determining their own future. As members of the World’s greatest alliance, we cannot 
be indifferent to these events because of what they mean for Africa and because of their 
effect on the long term interests of the alliance itself.”[94]
This view was diametrically opposed to his statement on the issue when he was a candidate 
in 1976. Furthermore Cuba had a legitimate presence in Angola as attested to by the overwhelming 
endorsement the MPLA government of Angola received from African countries and beyond after 
the defeat of the American sponsored South African invasion as aforementioned. Andrew Young 
was therefore justified in seeing Cuba as playing a stabilising role in Africa.
There is also hardly any justification for the administration to pick on the attempted Shaba 
invasion to launch its reversal of policy on Southern Africa. That invasion can be seen as part of an 
on-going antagonism between the central government in Zaire and the remnants of the Katangese 
rebellion in the 1960s. Not only did they take refuge in Angola after the collapse of their venture 
but they had since formed themselves into a closely knit unit under the political umbrella of Front 
pour la Liberation Nationale du Congo. They had not abandoned their ambitions to their own 
nationhood. Besides this, they had no commitment to either Cuba or the MPLA government of 
Angola as evidence abounds of their being recruited by the Portuguese to fight the indigenous 
liberation movements during the colonial war. [95] The invasion of 1978 was to all intents and 
purposes inspired by the desire to capture lost territory as opposed to acting under the direct 
instrumentality of either Cuba or Angola. It is quite unlikely that the President was unaware of 
these facts. Indeed, not only did the CIA fail to produce evidence of communists or Cuba’s 
involvement, but the Cuban President had earlier called in the American diplomat in Havana to 
explain his country’s innocence. Yet, President Carter went on to provide political and logistical 
support to a joint Franco-Belgian intervention force to “rescue” Zaire from an alleged communist 
sponsored invasion. He was resorting to the post-war American politics of obsession with 
communism - something he had earlier played down - as a means of mobilising public support for 
his failing political fortunes.
Thus, in an attempt to project a tough image, the administration had to compromise on its 
earlier stance on Southern Africa. A virtual declaration of war against injustice in the region had to 
be scaled down in the interest of political exigency. The result was that Afro-Americans interests
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and their preferences in the Southern African region had to become the greatest casualty of the new 
phase of US-Southern African policy. Their call for sanctions by means of the recall of the US 
Ambassador in Pretoria and down-grading of the embassy including cancellation of the position of 
attaches, prohibition of Eximbank facilities to South African bound exports and the cancellation of 
tax credits to that country which the Congressional Caucus had advocated and spear-headed, 
became a non-issue. The administration even failed to take advantage of South Africa’s dependence 
on foreign loans to back up its policy at the early period of its inception. South Africa was indebted 
to US banks by as much as $42 billion.[96], brought about mostly by the effect of the oil crisis of 
1973/4. An executive order prohibiting rescheduling, would have made Pretoria realise that the 
administration was serious in its intention to see some visible movement in the direction of change 
which Vice-President Mondale spoke about in the Vienna meeting with Vorster. Instead the 
administration sank deeper into pursuing a Southern Africa policy of stopping perceived Soviet 
interests in the region. Not only did the administration refrain from recognising the government in 
Angola irrespective of the fact that American oil prospecting firms were engaged in lucrative 
business there, but South Africa became a comrade in the defence of Western interests against 
Soviet encroachment. For example, the US led Britain and France to abstain in the Security 
Council resolution condemning South Africa’s invasion of Southern Angola in June 1980.[97]
The administration lowered the final curtain on the incorporation of Afro-American views 
in US-Southern Africa policy and their role as wielders of influence when protests at the 
resignation (sacking it seems) of Andrew Young failed to yield any encouraging reassurance in 
spite of the fact that the Black Leadership Conference convoked for the occasion received a wide 
response from the community. [98] The frustration being felt by Afro-Americans at the direction of 
the administration’s Southern Africa policy was encapsulated in Congressman Diggs’ statement in 
1978 in support of the Maguire bill prohibiting Eximbank facilities to South Africa. In it, he told 
Congress that in view of the “White House seeming ambivalence toward adopting measures 
regarding South Africa that go beyond mere verbal condemnation and support for the mandatory 
United Nations arms embargo against Pretoria, it is up to the Congress to move decisively to give 
concrete expression to our policy pronouncements”. [99] And yet it was the administration which 
protested Congressional attempts to predicate South Africa’s access to Eximbank facilities on 
improvement of Pretoria’s human rights record. The Carter administration protested that the
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amendment (Paul Tsongas proffered it to pacify opponents), which conferred upon it the right to 
determine the degree of relaxation of apartheid and to respond accordingly by gradual lifting of the 
ban on Eximbank facilities, would impair its relations with Pretoria.[100] Although the House 
ignored this in approving the bill,[101] the administration’s protest contributed to the stiff 
opposition which the bill encountered in Senate. At its hearing in May 1978, the Senate Committee 
on Banking bluntly refused to be pacified by an amendment similar to that of Paul Tsongas in the 
House, because to the pro-South Africa Senators it was iniquitous and inimical to America’s global 
interests to proscribe South Africa while communist countries could gain access to Eximbank 
facilities. [102]
In the end, South Africa’s massive crackdown on dissent including the death of Steve Biko 
in a Police cell under mysterious circumstances enabled the supporters of the bill to occupy a high 
moral ground by portraying their effort as an attempt to register disapproval of apartheid.[103]
This tactic coupled with the series of amendments and alterations to pacify and accommodate the 
views of opponents led to the passage of a watered-down version of the bill in June 1978 
prohibiting Eximbank support for sale of items to South Africa which could be deemed supportive 
of apartheid; that any support from the Bank should be contingent on progress on racial issues and 
certification by the administration that clients of the Bank with South African connection had 
signed the corporate code of conduct on employment known as the Sullivan principles. [104]
For an administration eager to establish its anti-communist credentials, the implementation 
of the bill would be self defeating. Even the arms embargo against South Africa which it elaborated 
at its inception and promised to implement studiously[105] was no longer a priority as arms 
traffickers were having a field day circumventing the rule. The best the administration could do in 
that direction was to placate Afro-American critics by randomly apprehending arms traffickers, 
such as the Olin Corporation in early 1978.[106] No one in the Congressional Caucus or the Afro- 
American community in general regarded that incident as a portrayal of the administration’s resolve 
however, because the bulk of the traffickers were small time crooks taking advantage of official 
apathy.
Perhaps the most vivid illustration of the administration’s lack of interest in taking 
measures against South Africa was the pathetic picture it cut over the Kalahari nuclear controversy 
of August 1977. This was the Soviet Union’s revelation to the US that South Africa had exploded
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a nuclear device in the Kalahari. We can perhaps overlook the question of whether the US did not 
indeed know of South Africa’s explosion of nuclear device or the construction of a test site in the 
Kalahari desert prior to its being informed by the Soviet Union. So also could the conflicting 
statements from the President that he had secured an assurance from Prime Minister John Vorster 
that South Africa would not explode nuclear devices, only for the said Prime Minister to publicly 
contradict the President on grounds that he did not remember to have ever given such an 
assurance. [107] But what could not be ignored was the fact that South Africa had not signed the 
Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NNPT), and hence was unqualified to receive U.S. support on 
issues relating to the development of nuclear capability even for peaceful purposes. Yet as late as 
1979, the administration was unflinching in its effort to supply nuclear fuel to South Africa on the 
flimsy excuse that to do otherwise would compel Pretoria to either seek the supply elsewhere or 
develop its own materials.[108]
Conclusion
One can make the following observations about the policy of the Carter administration in 
the light of Afro-Americans’ attempt to influence the formulation and implementation of Africa 
policy.
(1) What started on a note of optimism ended in frustration and disenchantment as a result 
of the administration’s inability to match its campaign promises and rhetoric with deeds. The issue 
had nothing to do with the absence of a blue-print for policy formulation and implementation at the 
inception of the administration as evidenced by the steadfastness and determination over 
Zimbabwe. This proved the viability of the pluralistic method of foreign policy formulation which 
the administration adopted because it prevented the frustration and acrimony that could have arisen 
between the NSC and the Department of State as one saw during the Nixon presidency. In this 
respect, the administration had its heart in the right place.
(2) But Jimmy Carter was a weak president who panicked at the sight of crises as 
evidenced by his inability to curb the feud between his officials, the sacking of Young to silence the 
Jewish lobby and above all, the ease with which he switched from the human rights/regionalist
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perspective to the globalist vision in an attempt to stem the erosion of his political base. A more 
determined Chief of State would have stood by his policy while making every effort to convince 
the American public of the justice and merit of his case. Instead one witnessed a switch in rhetoric, 
as Pretoria whose apartheid policy and refusal to grant independence to Namibia was originally the 
focus of condemnation by the administration now became an ally in the fight against Russo-Cuban 
activities in Africa. While this development signified harmony in perception between Pretoria and 
the administration, it could not conceal the fact it was a negation of all that the president professed 
as a candidate in 1976, especially when compared to his speech to the Chicago Foreign Relations 
Committee in March 1976.
(3) The logical outcome of this was a feeling of betrayal on the part of Afro-Americans as 
the administration appeared to have cast its lot with the previous target of its criticism at the 
expense of all that they stood and worked for. Preston Greene expressed this feeling in guarded 
language when he insisted that Afro-Americans were not bent on monopolising US policy toward 
Africa but that the “multi-ethnic character of America can be a tremendous asset when positively or 
constructively utilised.”[109] That the administration failed to achieve its aims in South Africa and 
Namibia was because these aims and objectives became blurred at the later stage. This meant that 
apart from the initial euphoria which was not matched by deeds, the advent of the Carter 
administration marked no improvement in the aspirations of Afro-Americans with respect to US- 
Southern African relations irrespective of their efforts to commit the administration to a particular 
foreign policy stance.
(4) Afro-Americans had the issue and an organisational structure (TransAffica) to drive 
home their point of view. Yet, a combination of public apathy and deliberate neglect from the 
executive arm made their efforts ineffectual.
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CHAPTER SIX
US POLICY TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA IN THE EARLY 1980s IN THE LIGHT OF 
AFRO-AMERICANS’ EFFORTS TO EXERT INFLUENCE.
The previous Chapter has revealed that Afro-Americans did not succeed in having durable 
influence over the Africa policy of the Carter administration because the latter was unable to prove 
itself different from previous administrations when it came under pressure from right wing 
elements within and without. Afro-Americans’ weak position stemmed from the fact that the 
general pattern of Cold War consideration and their lack of electoral significance, except in a 
balance of power situation, had always prevented them from having significant impact on Africa 
policy. If the Carter administration adopted an Africa policy that was deemed unfavourable to the 
stance of Afro-Americans, then there was still less reason to suppose that a Republican 
administration would adopt a favourable policy.
This chapter concentrates on the first Reagan administration 1980-84, analysing the Africa 
policy of the administration (which Afro-Americans found unfavourable) and Afro-Americans 
efforts to thwart and transform that policy. In sharp contrast to the second Reagan presidency and 
for familiar reasons, they were unsuccessful.
The Administration’s Africa Policy
Unlike Carter, whom he defeated in the 1980 Presidential election, Reagan left no one in 
doubt as to the direction of his Southern African policy. As a candidate, he told a campaign rally in 
1979 that pro-communist changes in Africa such as the victory of MPLA and FRELIMO and 
probably that of ZAPU-PF in Zimbabwe were losses to the U.S. for which the ineptitude of the
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Carter administration should be blamed.[l]
His nominee for Secretary of State, Alexander Haig Jr. returned to this theme at his 
confirmation hearing in early 1981 when he expressed concern over the presence of 20,000 Cuban 
troops in Angola. He blamed the Clark Amendment for restricting the ability of the Ford 
administration to effectively forestall communist take-over of a region vital to the interest of the 
U.S. “Several years ago”, he said, “I felt that we could have done something to prevent the 
outcome that confronted us there (Angola)”. But there was still cause for optimism because 
according to him “UNITA elements are still going strong and are functioning.”[2] He also went out 
of his way to endorse Pretoria’s procrastination over Namibia’s independence on grounds that it 
should come about in a manner which would not jeopardise Western interests in that territory in 
particular and the region in general. Presumably, Pretoria’s activities were designed to bring this 
about. [3]
To complete the equation, Haig nominated Chester Crocker, an academic with a similar 
perspective on the region as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Unlike his immediate 
predecessor, Crocker had a specialised scholarly knowledge on Africa sharing only the globalist 
perspective with the administration he had been called upon to serve. In May 1981 Crocker 
outlined the administration’s policy as unequivocal support to friendly administrations with a view 
to ensuring unfettered access to mineral resources and to defeat subversion and to promote security 
in the area to which he added another objective, a desire for a negotiated settlement of the conflict 
in the region, a month later.[4]
Before long, it became obvious that the Reagan administration’s regional policy would 
have four inter-related facets: (i) withdrawal or expulsion of communist forces in the region; (ii) 
settlement of Namibia’s independent issue conditional upon the success of the first; (iii) the 
existence of regional security and consequential peaceful co-existence between a minority ruled 
South Africa and the other states in the region; (iv) South Africa to respond to these developments 
by carrying out its choice of reform of apartheid. A combination of these four facets constitute 
what Crocker dubbed “constructive engagement” - the code name for the Reagan administration’s 
strategy in Southern Africa which he was appointed to implement.
First signs of how the administration intended to implement its “constructive engagement” 
emerged from leaked State Department papers in 1981. The strategy was to concentrate first on
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securing Pretoria’s cooperation. To obtain that cooperation, the administration chose to substitute 
coercion and moral indignation over apartheid with pragmatism, contact and private pressure on 
Botha’s government. Thus one saw resumption of sale of military equipment not deemed combat- 
related by the administration, training of SADF personnel, relaxation of export control regulations 
and the exchange of military personnel between the two states. [5]
No one could fault the minority regime for accepting the Crocker plan in view of the 
numerous advantages inherent in it. First, in predicating Namibia’s independence on the 
withdrawal of Cuban troops, the American administration was echoing South Africa’s own 
position on the issue. Pretoria had never ruled out Namibia’s independence, but it did not want a 
government headed by SWAPO in view of the close relations between it and the Soviet bloc. 
Pretoria’s antagonism toward the independence package worked out by the UN Contact Group, the 
procrastination and delay tactics amidst hosting of conferences and a visible bias toward the 
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) should be seen in the light of efforts to find an alternative to 
SWAPO. To allow the latter in Windhoek would bring the Soviet bloc too close to South Africa 
with the likely result of an upsurge in revolt against apartheid in the domestic scene. In this respect, 
“constructive engagement” had cast its lot with Pretoria because both it and the Reagan 
administration viewed the Cuban role in Southern Africa as none other than a relay point for the 
transmission of Soviet hegemony throughout the sub-continent. Crocker vividly illustrated this 
when he described the presence of Cuban troops in Angola as: “a major impediment to progress on 
Namibia. It is a situation which allows the Soviet Union and Cuba to foment disorder: to keep the 
pot boiling... and to prevent development of regional cohesion.”[6]
Pretoria stood to gain immensely from the American initiative for two reasons: (i) the 
promotion of regional security as intended by Washington would help to minimise the tempo of the 
liberation struggle inside South Africa and Namibia, legitimise apartheid and improve the image of 
its practitioners from their pariah status in Africa and the UN. This would be the logical outcome of 
any understanding of peaceful co-existence the regional states might enter into with Pretoria as they 
would not be prepared to continue to offer sanctuary to the liberation movement without violating 
the agreement. This would mean acceptance of the status quo in South Africa in violation of the 
stance of the OAU and the aspirations of the vast majority of the non-white South Africans unless 
Pretoria willingly made concessions to the latter. Such concessions could not be guaranteed to be
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substantive; (ii) the Crocker plan for ensuring regional security would enable Pretoria to achieve its 
vision of a “constellation of states” involving it and the other regional states. This idea owed much 
to Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy of 1976. That Pretoria still favoured its materialisation was 
attested to by Foreign Minister Pik Botha’s secret discussion with Crocker as outlined in the leaked 
State Department documents in 1981. Pretoria’s fascination is understandable in view of the fact 
that experts had reckoned that continuous growth in the economy would depend upon the 
availability of new markets and investment outlets to supplement the narrow domestic market, 
made so by the limited purchasing power of the vast majority of the population as a result of the 
rigidity of apartheid.[7]
Since South Africa was the focus of the regional economy brought about by the colonial 
pattern of communication which linked the regional States to South Africa, the regime in Pretoria 
was therefore in a position to use the carrot to compensate subservient states and the stick against 
opponents of apartheid. Pretoria experimented with this possibility when it used the stick against 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe in 1981. On Mozambique, it took the form of abrupt suspension of 
traffic between the two countries on the flimsy excuse that wagons sent to Mozambique were 
delayed on their return journey. The truth of the matter was that the ANC had a functional 
operating base in Maputo which Pretoria suspected of master-minding the increased guerrilla 
activities within its borders. Although Maputo responded by returning the wagons hurriedly, the 
authorities in Pretoria refused to allow any peace. Rather South Africa stepped up its direct 
intervention and the sponsorship of a puppet organisation called Mozambican National Resistance 
(MNR) to destabilise the country. Major manifestations of direct intervention were the Matola 
massacre of 1981 and the attack on Maputo in 1983 in retaliation for bomb explosions in Pretoria 
for which the ANC claimed responsibility. Pretoria’s justification was that the freedom fighters had 
their base in Mozambique from which they undertook the journey. [8] That such explosions were a 
direct result of apartheid after years of persuading the regime to abandon the system was lost on 
Pretoria, nor was Washington ready to drive home this point to the South African regime. The 
emphasis was on ensuring a communist free Southern Africa as opposed an apartheid free region.
Zimbabwe and Angola did not fare better. In the former, apart from the fact that South 
Africa offered to train at independence 5000 men of the former auxiliaries of Bishop Muzorewa 
with a view to infiltrating them back to overthrow the government in Harare, there were also
182
visible signs of direct intervention: in addition to intermittent destruction of expensive military 
equipment and bombing of ANC offices, a unit of Zimbabwe’s armed forces intercepted an armed 
South African column in the Sengwe area on August 18,1982 at a time when “constructive 
engagement” had matured. [9] Previous manifestations of the pressure had taken the form of 
withdrawal of 25 locomotives on loan to Harare, followed by an announcement to withdraw a 
further 200 wagons also on loan to the same source. Pretoria had earlier abruptly terminated a 1966 
Trade Agreement between the two countries in such a manner that would have compelled Harare to 
pay a heavy sum in arrears on previously unlevied tariffs and goods exported to South Africa. 
These moves were unnecessary except that they were designed to hurt the fledgling government of 
Robert Mugabe at a time it was facing a domestic crisis with its war-time ally, ZAPU-PF. Needless 
to say that that was exactly what Pretoria achieved when the difficulties created by the withdrawal 
of the equipment restricted Zimbabwe’s capacity to meet export orders of about 100,000 tons of 
maize and over 50,000 tons of sugar. [10]
South Africa was also involved in frequent incursions into Angola where it gave 
considerable military and financial support to UNITA, in the hope of reducing the country to 
political and economic ruin.[l 1] Without the continuous support of Cuba and the Soviet bloc, the 
activities of the Pretoria regime would indeed have resulted in the collapse of Angola.
But the fact that the American initiative did not specify the gravity and scope of reform 
expected from the South African authorities meant that they could realise these advantages while 
brandishing a token political reform. This therefore raises the question: how did South Africa fulfil 
its own part of the bargain and how did the Afro-Americans respond to the latter in particular and 
“constructive engagement” in general?
Pretoria’s response to “constructive engagement”.
Since the Crocker plan did not specify the nature of the reform expected of the authorities in 
Pretoria, one expected “constructive engagement” to have a fair wind. In April 1981, the regime 
showed its eagerness to address the issue of “liberalisation of political process” by proposing 
voting rights for some sections of the disenfranchised majority. These were those of Asian descent
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and the mixed race population known as “coloured”. No similar arrangement was made for the 
indigenous Africans. But even those with the new found favour had little to cheer about as the 
authorities balked at the idea of repealing such legal instruments of apartheid as the Group Areas 
Act which enforces racial segregation and the Internal Security Act which violates civil liberties and 
the rule of law in the country.[12]
There was other evidence to support the contention that the reform was a mere subterfuge 
to ensure continuous white domination. It envisioned three separate Parliaments, for whites, 
Asians and the so-called “coloureds”. Each Parliament was to make laws on its own racial affairs, 
while the three Houses in which Whites enjoy a clear majority jointly legislate on issues affecting 
the entire country irrespective of the fact that the total number of the participating groups was still 
less than thirty per cent of the South African population. Fig 2 illustrates the disparity in population 
between the racial groups in South Africa.
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Source: Annual Survey of Race Relations 1986 
(Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1986)
It was into such “power sharing” arrangement that but 20 per cent of the registered Indian 
electorate and 30 per cent of the so called “coloureds” voted “representatives” in August 1984 
amidst protests, rioting and boycott by the majority of these population groups and others who
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opposed the scheme. [13] While this arrangement seemed to have been intended by the regime to 
build a solid minority solidarity against the majority Africans, the government’s bad faith in 
securing undue advantages for the whites scuppered the intended objective. Instead, the elections 
roused the non-white population to confront the regime. The formation of the United Democratic 
Front (UDF) by nearly 400 organisations spanning all races in August 1983, was designed to 
coordinate their opposition to the new constitution as a whole. It was the UDF that organised the 
boycott campaign which led to the dismal turn-out in the September elections.[14].
Far from being the only problem to confront Pretoria, 1984 onward saw a wave of rent 
boycotts by township residents.[15] It began in Sebokong, Sharpeville, Evaston, Boipatong and 
Bophelong in September 1984 only to spread to Kwa Thandeka, KwaZanele and 
Ethandukukhanya in the Eastern Transvaal the following year. Seeing that the state had failed to nip 
the protest in the bud, other township residents followed suit; each with its own mechanism for 
enforcing compliance with the protest. For example, in the Rand district, townships such as 
Alexandra, Soweto, Tembisa and Tsakanne which joined the boycott in 1986 were not only 
equipped with self appointed boycott committees, they also held regular “judicial trials” against 
suspected non-conformists. The mushrooming of Rent Action Coordinating Committees (RACC) 
by activists of the anti-apartheid struggle, to complement the existing civic associations, was no 
doubt instrumental to the widespread^ the boycotts. The fact that in early 1987, the government 
gave the figure of 178 million Rand as the arrears arising from the rent boycotts attests to its 
success.
Why was the government confronted with this latest crisis when it had barely recovered 
from the poor response to its Parliamentary reform initiative? The answer has everything to do with 
the conflicting positions of the government on the one hand, and its opponents to the left, as to 
what an ideal South Africa should look like. While the government sought to tinker with the 
system of apartheid by means of adjusting its framework without destroying its structure its 
opponents, emboldened by decades of struggling against the system, were just as determined to 
destroy apartheid. Since the late 1970s, Pretoria had accepted the need to restructure its urban 
policy by relaxing influx control (as a step toward pacifying big business over labour mobility) and 
to reform local government. But just as the tricameral Parliamentary structure was meant to 
perpetuate white autonomy at the central governmental level, Pretoria’s “generosity” in ceding
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authority at the local level had nothing to do with terminating apartheid. Rather it was designed to 
rescue the central government from the burden of providing a subsidy for local services. The white 
run Administrative Boards which had hitherto administered local affairs had failed to operate along 
commercial lines by limiting their expenditure to the amount of income generated from within. For 
example, as at the 1982-83 fiscal year, the Boards had accumulated on the average deficits of 32 
million Rand. These Boards could not do otherwise because some residents had responded to rent 
increases simply by squatting on unoccupied land in make-shift houses. The government felt that it 
would be easier for local officials elected directly by the people to undertake unpopular measures 
like raising rents and transport fares to balance the books. White officials could precipitate 
township revolts by adopting an unpopular line of action in an effort to reduce expenditure. It was 
on this logic of absolving central authorities from paying for township consumption that direct 
elections were held into the Community Councils between 1976 and 1980 by virtue of the 
Community Council Act of 1977.
By 1982, a new bill known as the Black Local Authority Act had increased the powers and 
responsibilities of the Councils to include allocation of housing and business premises and 
administration of schools and student bursaries. Totally ignored by Pretoria was the inadequacy of 
fiscal resources to enable the BLA’s to finance the enlarged responsibilities from internally raised 
revenues as the government insisted. Rather, in an era of “constructive engagement” in which 
Pretoria was required to reform itself voluntarily, the government was too busy trumpeting to a 
largely inattentive international audience these increased responsibilities to local authorities as part 
of the dispensation for the Africans. This was an attempt by the government to deflect the attention 
of the international community from the tricameral structure which totally excluded the indigenous 
Africans. Hidden out of sight was the motif.
Within South Africa, the anti-apartheid front (under the canopy of the UDF) opposed to 
separate dispensation along racial lines promptly called a boycott of elections into the BLA’s. 
Moreover, the non-representation of Africans at the centre meant it was a paternalistic system 
aimed at presenting apartheid in an acceptable guise. The success of this boycott was duly attested 
to by the 12 per cent turn-out on average in the 1983 local elections. Some of those who boycotted 
the election did so because of dissatisfaction with the quality of services being provided. But since 
the BLA’s were the creation of the government, the “elected” representatives, irrespective of their
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lack of legitimacy still assumed their positions. This of course meant the creation of animosity 
against the officials of the local authorities by the anti-apartheid and dissatisfied elements within the 
community. The BLA officials added to their unpopularity by their conspicuous corruption and 
ostentatious living while local services were evidently deteriorating on account of non-availability 
of funds. True, the central government had either withdrawn or sharply reduced subsidy in line 
with the basis for handing over local responsibilities to Africans, but had the Councillors been 
prudent in their conduct, they could at least have carried the sympathy of the communities. After 
all, the limited avenues for raising revenues such as liquor licences were not enough to cope with 
providing services to communities with rising population. Instead the corrupt practices of the 
officials made them to form a common cause with the government in the eyes of the communities 
they were “elected” to serve. Consequently, the hatred which Africans had for the government on 
account of apartheid was immediately extended to the local officials. Since these officials live 
within the community, they provided an easy target to the enemies of the government. It was in 
such a tense situation that the BLA’s decided to take a number of measures to compensate for 
dwindling revenues in order to keep deficits at manageable levels. These measures included raising 
of rents on the average by 15 per cent without consideration of the high unemployment rate, 
eviction of rent defaulters, demolition of illegally constructed hovels without regards to the limited 
number of council houses and increasing transport fares - these were the dirty work for which the 
government granted the expanded responsibilities. It was these actions that set in train the protest 
that first manifested itself in the form of rent boycotts.
It was understandable that those implacably opposed to apartheid would not allow this 
moment to pass by. They had an axe to grind with the officials of the BLA’s whose elections they 
boycotted but who were still imposed on them by the government. The situation was made worse 
by the fact that it coincided with the inauguration of the tricameral Parliament. The ease with which 
the boycott spread equipped with coordinating committees meant that even without the rent 
increases, some other event could still have ignited an already tensed situation. In this respect, 
South Africa’s Minister of Law and Order, Louis Le Grande had a centrifugal perspective of the 
events when he expressed doubts whether the rent increases were the “real reason” for the unrest: 
“..there are individuals and organisations clearly behind what has happened in the Vaal Triangle.”
Were he not a Minister of the apartheid system, he could have been aware that by
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embarking on an overseas tour soon after increasing house rents and by sending in the bull-dozers 
to demolish shacks when there was an acute shortage of council houses, the Lekoa Councillors 
were clearly asking for trouble. The Tjaert van der Walt Commission of Inquiry into the unrest, 
indicated this in its report when it said, “No resident I spoke to had a good word for the Lekoa 
Municipality.”[16] The rent increases were the immediate cause because the revolt started at the 
grass-roots among people devoid of ideological inclination. Some of them could not afford the new 
rents and service charges nor could they turn to their shacks which had been demolished by the 
council bull-dozers. The Minister could have been more convincing had he identified apartheid, 
corrupt and inefficient apartheid created Councils and the insensitive nature of the rent increases by 
these apartheid Councillors as reasons for the explosion.
The admissions of Mayors Sam Buti of Alexandria and Khumalo of Katlehong also cast 
doubt on the Minister’s prognosis. Buti’s assessment that the rent increases “would throttle our 
people. It would be absurd if the development of Alexandra were to become a threat to our people. 
The uprisings in black townships are tied to these same issue”, when compared with Khumalo’s 
confession that “our people had turned against us because they had lost confidence in us”, show 
that the immediate cause of the unrest had nothing to do with incitement of local people by 
individuals and organisations bent on causing chaos. Rather, it was a local response by local 
people to a local situation. National anti-apartheid agitators clambered aboard and brought their 
influence to bear because the opportunity had presented itself. It was through this means that the 
rent boycotts transformed themselves from being a local issue to one of political mobilisations at 
local level for a national political objective, namely the creation of an apartheid free South Africa. 
That was why the protesters were not content with merely attacking council officials but even when 
these Councillors had resigned en masse or even been killed, the protests still continued with 
demands for dialogue between imprisoned leaders and the government; and the unbanning of 
political organisations. It took no time for internationally famous figures such as Archbishop Tutu 
and the Reverend Boesak to become involved and lend credibility to the agitation.[17]
Since opposition to the government involved some 80 per cent of South Africa’s 30 million 
people, the probability of this latest phase of protest degenerating into violence was quite high 
unless skillfully handled by the government. This became a reality when opponents of apartheid 
turned their anger against officials of local authorities whom they had all along identified as
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collaborators. In some cases respected members of the community were either shunned or shunted 
aside for not doing enough to resist apartheid, while imprisoned leaders became greatly revered 
and admired as the symbol of resistance. Others no doubt used the occasion to settle old scores. On 
their part, the Police and the military apparatus unused to controlling crowds by peaceful means 
used force in an attempt to quell the protest. In other cases, inexperienced young conscripts 
(military service is compulsory to whites only) either panicked at large crowds by opening fire, or 
deliberately responded to stone throwing youths with live bullets. In some cases, funeral 
processions of victims of Police brutality were themselves fired-upon by the security force while in 
other cases, security personnel simply lured stone throwing teenagers by concealing themselves in 
camouflaged areas of their vehicles only to open fire when they felt enough youth had responded to 
their bait.These moving scenes were shown on televisions across the world.[18] Table 4 highlights 
the pattern of killings at the point in time.
Between January and September 1985, at least 800 unarmed protesters were killed by the 
security forces while the government took further steps to legitimise its repression by declaring a 
state of emergency under which the Police could detain citizens indefinitely irrespective of the 
nature of their crime. By mid-September 1985, more than three thousand protesters had been 
locked behind bars amidst reports of torture, intimidation and blackmail. That the regime felt 
confident that the friendly administration in Washington would not lift a finger against it was 
attested to on August 15, 1985 when instead of crossing the “Rubicon”, P.W.Botha told critics that 
“I am not prepared to lead White South Africans and other minority groups on a road to abdication 
and suicide.”[19].
The South African President need not be faulted for this, after all he had received the 
public support of Washington when on October 23,1984, out of the 15 member nations, the US 
cast the lone abstention in the Security Council on Resolution 556 (1984). This resolution 
expressed alarm at the “wanton killing and the maiming of defenceless demonstrators and workers 
on strike as well as the imposition of virtual martial law...to facilitate the brutal repression of the 
black population....”; commended the “Asian and coloured communities in South Africa for their 
large-scale boycott of the recent “elections” which constituted a clear rejection of the so-called new 
constitution”. It then reaffirmed “the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of South 
Africa for the full exercise of the right to self determination and the establishment of a non-racial
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democratic society in an unfragmented South Africa.”[20]
(ii) Afro-American response to events in South Africa and “constructive engagement” in 
general.
In outlining the Afro-Americans response it will be necessary first of all to devote attention 
to the impression of the administration about the situation in South Africa. This is necessary 
because the creation of the tricameral Parliamentary structure owed much to Pretoria’s attempt to 
fulfil the requirement of “constructive engagement” the only way it saw fit.
For an administration willing to trust Pretoria to institute reform, it is difficult to determine 
the lower and upper limits of its expectations. But one way of gauging its opinion is by its 
response to public reaction to the reform in South Africa.
From the inception of the idea of a tricameral Parliamentary structure, African opposition 
was almost unanimous inside and outside Africa. They also saw “constructive engagement” as 
supportive of the minority regime in South Africa.[21] Under the circumstances, one would have 
expected the Reagan administration to clarify its preference for an orderly transition to an apartheid 
free South Africa. Instead Chester Crocker engaged in serious negotiations with Pretoria on how to 
bring about what TransAfrica’s Executive Director, Randall Robinson, referred to as a “de facto 
alliance that was to be developed between the United States and South Africa.”[22] At no time did 
Crocker confer with any non-white political leader all through the frequent visits he paid to the 
country for fear of alienating the regime whose cooperation was needed in the Cold War 
confrontation in the region.[23]
Other public statements made in Washington on the situation in South Africa, amounted to 
an endorsement of the regime in Pretoria and its political “reform”. For example, in a long and 
rambling speech to the National Conference of Editorial Writers in San Francisco on June 23,
1983, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Lawrence Eagleburger expanded his 
presentation to cover the entire region as opposed to the specific political dispensation in South 
Africa. While giving the impression of America’s neutrality, submerged in the maze of words was 
the clear endorsement of Pretoria’s divide and rule tricameral Parliamentary tactics when he said:
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“Politically, Prime Minister Botha put his own political base in jeopardy with his proposal 
to extend a limited and ethnically-based franchise to the coloured and Asian
communities I do not see it as our business to enter into this debate or to endorse the
constitutional proposals now under consideration for South Africa. Nor do we offer tactical 
advice to any of the interested parties. Yet the indisputable fact which we must recognise is 
that the South African government has taken the first step toward extending national 
political rights beyond the white minority.”[24]
Such an admission of faith in the South African regime at a period of heightened tension attendant 
upon the throwing of crumbs at the disenfranchised majority highlights the limited importance 
Washington attached to the degree and scope of reform required of Pretoria.
President Reagan himself had no compunction in blaming the victims of apartheid as 
opposed to the perpetrators in his reaction to the killings at Uitenhage on March 21,1985 at the 
25th anniversary of Sharpeville massacre of 1960. Crowds of mourners on their way to the 
cemetery to bury 13 people killed by the Police at an earlier shooting disobeyed Police orders to 
disperse, apparently after taunting them and making “provocative” signals and remarks, such as the 
clenched fist salute and chanting “a luta continua” and “viva FRELIMO”. The Police opened fire 
resulting in the killings of 19 mourners and wounding 36 others. President Reagan’s reaction was 
to lament the fact that: “There is an element in South Africa that ....wants trouble in the 
streets.”[25]
That the Reagan administration could go down this path, need not be surprising in view of 
the fact that they came into office with an articulated view of Southern Africa, namely, the need to 
confront both the Soviets and the Cubans in the region irrespective of the issues involved. Helping 
to shape this view was the administration’s perception of the Carter’s practice. This was seen as 
one of abandoning old friends at moments of need (Samoza, or the Shah of Iran) and giving too 
great importance to human rights as a foreign policy criterion as in Southern Africa. Those who 
helped to articulate this view for the administration include Republican Senator Jesse Helms, Vice- 
President George Bush and Ronald Reagan himself. [26] Bush interviewed while still a presidential 
candidate, reiterated that human rights would be a factor but so also would strategic minerals. [27] 
Reagan assumed office with three stated foreign policy objectives: (i) a commitment not to 
abandon friendly regimes despite the nature of their rule; (ii) to confront the Soviets in any arena 
that is of interest to the US irrespective of regional peculiarities; (iii) to demonstrate to the world
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that the US could transform itself from psychological defeat in Vietnam and the low morale of the 
Carter years to strength and effectiveness through an efficient and strong leadership. Southern 
Africa provided an arena for the administration to achieve its articulated objectives. First, the 
Pretoria regime is friendly to the West but was “abandoned” and “isolated” by the previous 
administration - a gross miscalculation in Republican eyes. There were communist bloc forces in 
the region, hence the need for the US to protect its interests.
How then did Afro-Americans’ respond to these developments in the region in the light of 
“constructive engagement”?
All along, Afro-Americans had watched with despair the administration’s inability to 
recognise that the chaotic situation in Southern Africa was the outcome of a white minority clinging 
on to power by force of arms as opposed to an attempt by the communist bloc to take over a region 
adjudged immensely important to the West. By adopting a policy of “constructive engagement” that 
laid more stress on the expulsion of communist forces than on internal political reform, the 
administration was discounting what amounted to a state of war within South Africa and between 
the latter and the Frontline States. South Africa’s massive crackdown on internal dissent and 
destabilisation effort in neighbouring states were necessitated by the need to preserve apartheid as 
opposed to an attempt to stem the rising tide of communist take-over of the region.
Thus, Afro-Americans’ reaction was not different from that of Tutu who decried 
reconciliation between the US and the government in Pretoria as a negation of the efforts of the 
non-white South Africans to achieve their rights in their country, and bluntly warned Washington 
that a “decision to align itself with the South African government would be an unmitigated disaster 
for both South Africa and the United States.”[28] Their reaction was therefore part of the over-all 
disappointment they had about the thrust of “constructive engagement”, namely that in a blind 
effort to contain communist interests in Southern Africa, the Reagan administration had formed a 
de facto alliance with Pretoria. Not only had this alliance conferred a certificate of respectability 
upon South Africa but it had also encouraged the regime to commit acts of aggression within its 
borders and against the neighbouring states. Robinson vividly brought this factor home:
“The South Africans knew how to read the signs. They moved with renewed vigor to
step up repression. They began to step up invasion into neighbouring states, to participate 
in assassination schemes against members of the African National Congress (ANC) and to
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move to the right at home. Things worsened when the new constitution was proposed - a 
constitution that continues to disallow blacks the vote and makes Indians and Coloureds 
junior partners in apartheid by bringing them into the Parliament and at the same time 
rendering them powerless...”[29].
Afro-Americans could only grimace as opposed to taking action because as with previous 
Republican administrations they had no electoral clout over the Reagan administration.
Perhaps a greater handicap was the fact that America had relapsed into conservatism in the 
1980s. This phenomenon owed much to Jimmy Carter’s ideological turn-around after the initial 
period of his administration in response to public mood. For example, a 1979 survey on US policy 
in South Africa conducted for the Council on Foreign Relations by William Foltz found profound 
dissatisfaction with the Carter administration’s policy in that country. The respondents (confined to 
the members of the Council and affiliated committees) saw no need for the administration to 
embark on a collision course with the white minority regime, even though they recognised the 
merit of African nationalism.[30]
Carter’s turn-around implied that the liberal stance with which he had been associated was 
incapable of protecting the US against predictable and ever present Soviet hostile designs, thus 
identifying conservatism with patriotism. That Carter was voted out of office in favour of a 
Republican in 1980 meant that the American voters did not believe him as a natural ally of the 
conservative creed.
Flerein arises the problem: Carter did not fall alone. He took along in his plunge some of 
the most outspoken and courageous liberal allies of Afro-Americans at Capitol Hill. While the 
fulcrum of Afro-American concern on Africa in Congress, Congressman Charles Diggs Jr., 
became politically impotent from 1980 after an unsuccessful appeal against conviction for fraud, 
Congressman Andrew Maguire of New Jersey lost his seat in 1978. Paul Tsongas survived and 
later went on to the Senate, but then resigned in 1984. In the Senate, the casualty list included well- 
known liberals like Dick Clark and George McGovern. As a Senator, Clark was a champion of 
African freedom as exemplified by his amendment restricting further US assistance to UNITA 
rebels in Angola and his highly publicised recommendation that tough measures be taken against 
Pretoria as earlier noted. It was therefore not surprising that the term “senator from Africa” became
193
the battle cry of his opponents, the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) in 
the election. This was a means of emphasising Clark’s liberal credentials - a discredited 
phenomenon in conservative America. The dramatic decrease if not outright extinction of anti­
apartheid efforts at Capitol Hill in the early 1980s should be seen as lack of enthusiasm on the part 
of Legislators to risk their career on what was evidently an unpopular course. This will also 
explain the ease with which “constructive engagement” was pursued without much criticism from 
outside the Afro-American circle.
With “constructive engagement” being overseen by Reagan, Haig (later George Shultz who 
brought no new style) and Crocker, coupled with the virtual dearth of anti-apartheid enthusiasm in 
Congress and public indifference, the odds were stacked against any attempt to orchestrate the 
isolation of Pretoria reminiscent of the early years of the Carter presidency.
It was this realisation that made TransAfrica adopt a strategy of selected leaks of the 
administration’s secret arrangements for improving relations with South Africa, with a view to 
rekindling Congressional interest on Southern Africa and focusing public anger at the nature of the 
administration’s policy. That the leaks were considered serious by the administration was attested 
to by Haig:
“Let me suggest that the leaks were atrocious and appalling to me. It has sometimes seem to 
me inconceivable that public officers on the public payroll feel they have a right to protect 
their constituted leadership from itself because leaks just don’t happen: they are in many 
instances executed in order to set up backwashes and to prevent policy decisions”.[31]
Since no dramatic development occurred between 1981 and early 1984, the tactic was not 
successful. This no doubt was due to the absence of an effective means to influence the 
conservative “mood” of the American people and the administration’s indifference. As a result the 
administration was free from domestic constraints in the pursuit of its Southern Africa policy, 
which Afro-Americans adjudged to be favourable to Pretoria. This was encapsulated in the 
complaint of TransAffica’s Robinson, that the situation in South Africa had “worsened altogether” 
since the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 because not only had the “South African white 
regime..felt that it can do anything it wants to do with impunity because it has an ally in the White 
House” but that on its part:
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“The administration has rescinded many past restrictions on the export of technical data to 
the South African military police...this administration allowed over $100 million in 
military-use items - computers, image intensifiers, light aircraft - to go to South Africa. 
...support for $1.1 billion International Monetary Fund loan to South Africans and an 
overall growth in U.S. investment. In addition a 20-year-old policy that discouraged 
meetings between South African military personnel and high American policymakers... 
was reversed.[32]
What inspired TransAfrica with enough confidence to embark upon a frontal attack were 
none other than events in South Africa itself. As the unfolding chaos following the 1983 “reform” 
was beamed into the living rooms of Americans by the news media, TransAfrica as the lobbying 
arm of Afro-Americans realised the need to cultivate public support to dislodge the administration 
from its pro-Pretoria stance. This was possible because it had become clear to the American 
television viewers that the casualties of police brutality and repression in South Africa were neither 
communists nor likely sympathisers of that ideology. Some were clerics, others were children too 
young to have witnessed Sharpeville let alone to remember anything about it. These were children 
who had had no contact with the exiled ANC. They were fighting oppression the way they know 
how, only to be confronted with massive state repression they were too young to cope with. 
Gunning down children could not be defended in the estimate of the American people as an attempt 
to defend the Republic of South Africa against communist encroachment. The role of the television 
in this regard was acknowledged by Robinson:
“Americans have the impression something doesn’t exist unless it’s on television....a good 
deal of the concern about South Africa, now, has been the result of electronic media 
attention.”[33]
Under the circumstances, South Africa’s image as a trusted ally in the struggle against 
communism in the region became threadbare. TransAfrica was now in a position to take advantage 
of the public revulsion at the events in South Africa to evoke the humanitarian impulse and 
sensibilities of the American people to create an avalanche of pressure too great for the 
administration to ignore. The result would be the distancing of the administration from Pretoria, a
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dramatic turn-around in favour of the oppressed peoples of Southern Africa. TransAfrica’s 
response to the township revolt in South Africa, therefore, was to launch a new public protest and 
involve itself in the creation of a new organisation uniting the efforts of the existing anti-apartheid 
forces. It was this that crystallised into FSAM.
In this respect, it is quite obvious that when Randall Robinson visited the South African 
embassy in Washington on November 21,1984 to protest the detention of labour leaders in South 
Africa, he had up his sleeve a plan for circumventing the administration’s unequivocal support for 
the regime in Pretoria. His arrest at the embassy and the prompt and dramatic manner in which 
Free South Africa Movement (FSAM) with the close cooperation of ACOA and WOA came into 
being on that very day suggested that not only had elaborate planning gone into the making of the 
organisation but that the arrest was a dramatic by-product as opposed to the basis of the emergence 
of FSAM.
Consequently, while FSAM was TransAfrica’s and Afro-Americans’ means of relieving 
Pretoria of the unequivocal support and patronage of the Reagan administration, its remote 
motivating factors were Afro-American frustrations arising from decades of official cynicism at 
worst, and at best non-durable concern, on foreign policy issues of interests to them.
Steven Metz has dismissed such a connection between the emergence of FSAM and Afro- 
Americans’ concern over US-Southern African policy. To Metz, FSAM emerged for the purpose 
of rejuvenating Afro-Americans’ morale and “activism” and to win back their support following 
Jesse Jackson’s disastrous bid for the Democratic presidential nomination and Ronald Reagan’s re- 
election in 1984. South Africa featured in the campaign of the FSAM because its policy of racial 
discrimination evokes emotion among Afro-Americans', allowing the use of the apartheid ploy to 
unify the black electorate.[34]
What Metz was emphasising was that the founders of FSAM were more concerned with 
their domestic political power and the need to ensure its coherence than with America’s policy in 
South Africa and racial discrimination in that country. The psychologist, Don Beck, echoed the 
same view in a rather cruder fashion: “How else can they excite the news media, act like saviours 
of South Africa, present such a strong and united image to the American public and be identified 
with world-wide black causes.” [35]
There are some anomalies in this argument. First by asserting that Afro-American
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campaigners used the anti-South African plank to rehabilitate themselves, it tends to ignore nearly a 
century of efforts of Diaspora Africans to identify themselves with continental Africa. The 
emergence of the Negro Unions in Philadelphia and other settlements of the American colony, the 
activities of Bishop Henry McNeal Turner, Marcus Garvey’s Pan-Negroism, Dr. W.E.B. Du Bois 
and Henry Sylvester’s Pan-Africanism are too well known to necessitate repetition in this section. 
Recent efforts in that direction have been analysed in the previous chapters. That Afro-Americans’ 
interest in Africa has been sustained if not intensified has been brought home in a recent study 
conducted about the same time that Metz and Beck published their articles. Using the key informant 
methodology in a study on the significance of the ethnic factor in America’s relations with Africa, 
Masipula Sithole found that in spite of disappointment with some African leaders, all respondents 
attached importance to the continent as a result of its being their ancestral homeland. Most 
respondents emphasised the need to emulate international Jewry by not forgetting Africa as the 
Jews had not Israel. In addition, internal squabbles within various African countries such as the 
break-up of the ZANU-ZAPU-PF alliance and general economic decline in the continent were all
major concerns to Afro-Americans as one would expect of continental Africans.[36] i
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Another possible anomaly in the position of Metz was the importance he attached to Jesse
Jackson’s unsuccessful bid for the Democratic nomination in 1984. Jackson was not the only
person in that position, Senators John Glenn and Gary Hart among others dropped out of the race
at one stage or another. Afro-Americans were too intelligent to believe that Jackson’s effort in 1984
could take him to the White House. His was a protest candidacy determined to drive home to the
Democratic establishment that the Afro-American vote was not there for the asking, but that it must
be accompanied with a price tag. Newsweek was on target when it said:
“For one thing, as even his sharpest critics are now inclined to concede, Jackson is not
seeking the vice-presidency or any other official position for himself What he really
wants, and what other black politicians want passionately as well, is simply to demonstrate 
that the Democratic Party can no longer take black America for granted - that black votes 
count, that they may indeed be critical to the party’s survival, and that black allegiance at 
the polls no longer comes cost-free. The best way to prove the point, as Jackson clearly 
saw, was simply to run a credible presidential campaign - a strategy that simultaneously 
denied black votes to the white contenders and brought black enthusiasm for presidential 
politics to a fever pitch.”[37]
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That Afro-Americans had no illusions about Jesse Jackson’s chances for the Democratic 
nomination, much less the presidency was attested to by the support Walter Mondale received from 
some establishment prone Afro-Americans.[38]
True, Afro-Americans passionately supported Jesse Jackson, but even the most zealous 
realised that his effort was at best a foundation laying exercise for national recognition in 
anticipation of a more spirited performance in future. That was why Jackson was universally 
greeted with chants of “run Jesse run” in the campaign trails in 1984.[39] It was only in 1988 
when he had become a more credible candidate that this was changed to “win Jesse win”.
To say that those Afro-Americans who were involved in FSAM capitalised on the 
misfortune of the non-white population of South Africa to further their own interests following a 
disastrous attempt by Jackson in 1984 is unconvincing. The truth of the matter was that events in 
South Africa had increased the frustrations of Afro-Americans to an extent that they were unwilling 
to put up with four more years of the same Southern Africa policy. Robinson brought this factor 
home when he said: “If there was a single precipitating event that caused this frustration to spill 
over, it was the lone refusal of the United States in the Security Council in October (1984) to 
support a resolution of moderate condemnation of South Africa”. [40] That makes sense in view of 
the fact that FSAM emerged in November 1984 soon after Ronald Reagan’s election to a second 
four year term in office. Whether or not FSAM was capable of succeeding as a panacea to the 
frustrations of Afro-Americans on foreign policy issues of concern to them will only be determined 
when one has analysed the tactics, strategy and objectives of the organisation.
Conclusion
While this as with the previous Chapter set out to explore Afro-Americans’ ability to 
institute new methods for exerting influence on Washington’s Southern Africa policy, the finding is 
that except for a brief period in the Carter presidency, they were in the main unsuccessful and 
ineffectual. The reasons are two-fold. First, they were not deemed electorally important by the 
Republican Party and as such no effort was made to solicit their votes. The result was that they 
were unable to influence Republican administrations especially when they chose to interpret US
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interests in terms that favoured Pretoria.
A second reason for Afro-American ineffectiveness was the fact that they had not built a 
solid foundation with a wide base of support encompassing the racial divide, to create pressure and 
wield influence. As a result, their interests become subordinated to those of others. Nothing attests 
to this more than the way President Carter abandoned them by sacrificing their interests in 
Southern Africa in order to save his political career. This and the subsequent defeat of Senator 
Clark among others would suggest that Afro-Americans had too narrow a political base. Whether 
or not it would be in their interest to rectify the situation by entering into coalition with other 
interests groups would be addressed in the concluding chapter.
Steven Metz has advanced three further reasons for the lack of influence of anti-apartheid 
efforts on the relevant organs of the state. Two of these are common to a wide variety of foreign 
policy questions including Southern Africa: the US tendency to pay exclusive attention to priority 
issues, which he called “crisis diplomacy” and of which apartheid is not a part, and the tendency of 
policy-makers to do nothing when policy positions conflict. More important from our point of 
view is the third reason. According to him, the ineffectiveness of the anti-apartheid efforts 
stemmed from their tactics: a high profile public mobilisation publicity prone approach as opposed 
to a down to earth strategy of persistent quiet lobbying, and negotiating with foreign policy 
formulators in order to achieve the desired results. Mass mobilisation and excessive dependence on 
populism, he argues, are outmoded tactics of the civil rights era which are ill suited to influencing 
modem foreign policy makers, though better suited to domestic issues:
“....the anti-apartheid movement has often relied on ineffective methods of influence. 
Rather than exclusively pursuing what Nelson Polsby has labelled “inside strategies” of 
influence which utilised compromise, bargaining and structural power to gain results within 
the “standard operating procedure” of the pertinent unit of government, the anti-apartheid 
movement has frequently resorted to “outside” strategies of influence stressing publicity 
and public mobilisation... Outside strategies of influence are usually less successful on 
foreign policy issues than on domestic ones.”[41]
Metz sees too close a parallel in the activities of the civil rights movement and those of the 
anti-apartheid movement. True, like the civil rights organisation the anti-apartheid movement also 
use mass mobilisation but it is not the choice that led to the failure of the latter. The issue is not so
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much the strategy for exerting influence, but the existence or the non-existence of durable influence 
itself. It was not a refusal to adopt “inside strategies” of bargaining within the pertinent units of 
government that robbed either the wider anti-apartheid coalition of liberal/labour/Afro-Americans or 
the Afro-Americans themselves of influence.
Perhaps one can illustrate with the Carter period. Accomplished liberals like Andrew 
Young, Cyrus Vance, Walter Mondale and Jimmy Carter himself exerted considerable influence 
over Southern African issues on the Carter administration. The fact that this influence was not 
durable as we saw in the text had more to do with the strength of the anti-apartheid lobby and its 
constituents than with the nature of its strategy for exerting influence. If it had had a wide 
following, then it would have been in a position to trade in its numerical strength for certain 
concessions on policy from the executive arm of government. This meant that the larger the size, 
the greater the political clout unless a different arrangement had been made to compensate for the 
lack of numbers.
The capacity of the anti-apartheid elements to exert influence at the inception of the Carter 
administration arose mostly from their electoral contribution, and not because of an intrinsically 
wide following or numerical strength but as a result of an existing balance of power situation in the 
1976 presidential election. While in early September 1976 opinion polls gave Jimmy Carter a 16 
per cent lead over his opponent Gerald Ford, most probably due to disunity among the 
Republicans, the challenger’s lead was cut to 8 per cent before the end of the month only to be 
reduced further to a mere 2 per cent by early October. Thereafter, the difference was virtually non- 
existent.[42] Under such highly balanced and unpredictable circumstances, it was possible for any 
minority group to throw its weight in support of either combatants at the expense of the other. 
Afro-Americans did exactly that in favour of Jimmy Carter, which took him to the White House in 
January 1977.
His early get tough approach to the anomalies in Southern Africa was to a considerable 
extent a function of the pressure which Afro-Americans in particular and the anti-apartheid lobby in 
general were exerting on account of their electoral investment. It had nothing to do with inside or 
“outside” strategies. But because the chorus of dissent over the administration’s Southern Africa 
policy was more than the electoral gain inherent in adhering to the existing policy, the 
administration had no qualms in changing track in order to save its political skin. This brought
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about the abrupt official perception of a communist threat to western interests in Southern Africa.
Until then the administration had seen no threat in the region, which meant that Cold War as a 
factor in determining US policy towards Southern Africa had more to do with the idiosyncrasies of 
the ruling elites than what was put across to the public. The balance of power position is therefore 
a precarious one for any minority group to rely upon because its impact will always be dependent 
on equilibrium in the system. The moment there is a disequilibrium, it ceases to be a king maker.
The minority group therefore becomes an hostage to other peoples’ political preferences.
What exacerbated the decline of Afro-Americans as wielders of influence was the fact that 
although the anti-apartheid lobby cut across the racial divide, only they were passionately 
committed to anti-apartheid causes, at least up till 1984. White Americans had to balance their 
liberal goals against the interests of their constituents who in most cases were not only Whites but ¿x.'JL 
frightened by the bellicose pronouncements of some Afro-Americans in the wider anti-apartheid 
movement. Afro-Americans had no such inhibitions as they approached the issue from a “kith and 
kin” point of view irrespective of the prize. What this meant is that narrowly based as it was, the 
anti-apartheid movement was further marginalised by fragmented perception and limited 
commitment which in turn could militate against the broadening of that narrow base.
Whether or not FSAM would adopt a different approach including the much criticised 
“outside strategies” to overcome these difficulties in order to expand the base of support of anti­
apartheid causes, will become clear in the next chapter.
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Table 4
Casualty Figures in South Africa’s Unrest - Senfemher 1984 - .Tulv 1985
Y EAR MONTH DEATHS IN JU R IE S NATURE OF UNREST
1984 September 56 900 Fire-bombing and riots by blacks over municipal 
elections and rent hike. Deputy-Mayor Dlamini 
was one of the deaths. Worst areas of unrest were 
Sharpeville and the black townships near 
Johannesburg.
ditto October 44 600 Members of the non-white National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM) went on strike only to be 
confronted by Police resulting in the casualties.
ditto November 60 Unknown Violence resulting from anti-apartheid strike by
500.000 black workers who were joined by
300.000 students near Johannesburg. The strike 
was in part in response to Police and military 
raids on black townships leading to arrests. Two 
Unions, Federation of South African Trade Union 
(FOSATU) and Council of Union of South Africa 
(CUSA) were involved in the strike and had their 
leaders arrested under section 29 of the Internal 
Security Act. Altogether 21 labour leaders were 
arrested. This was the issue that sparked off the 
anti-apartheid demonstrations in the United 
States when TransAfrica's Randall Robinson and 
two others protested at the South African 
Embassy in Washington. Their arrest at the 
Embassy set the scene for the emergence of 
FSAM in the United States.
1985 February 18 230 Clash between Police and residence of the 
squatter town Crossroad over government's 
attempt to demolish it. Most were shot at the 
back by the Police as duly confirmed by a white 
physician, Dr. Diana Hewitson, who treated the 
injured. On the basis of the clash, eight UDF 
members were rounded up and charged with high 
treason.
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ditto March 60 bringing 
the total in 
the last six 
months to 
234
Unknown 13 were killed by the Police for demonstrating 
against apartheid, eight were killed in gasoline 
bomb attack in the b lack township of 
Kwanobuhle. Between 29 and 36 people were 
killed when Police fired upon funeral procession 
of 13 people killed nine days earlier by Police. 
Police While defending themselves that they 
responded to attacks from the crowd, it soon 
transpired that the attack was nothing more than 
defiance in the form of provocating gesture like 
clenched-fist salute and shouting of "a luta 
continua". Even the Police autopsy disclosed 
that 17 of those killed were shot in the back 
while 10 received bullet wounds in their heads..
ditto March 67 Unknown 36 charred bodies were found in Langa and 
Kwanobuhle tow nships, ostensibly from 
com munal fighting among blacks. Also 
Councillor Thamsanqua Kinikini and his two 
children were killed while the Councillor's body 
was set ablaze for being a "stooge" of apartheid. 
Other deaths include one white youth caught by 
mobs near Uitenhage and was set ablaze. Five 
people were killed by a joint Police/Military 
patrols while two people were hacked and burnt 
to death. Within two weeks, 17 others were 
killed in the Eastern Cape in revenge killings for 
the murder of alleged government informants.
ditto May 1 bringing 
the figure to 
400
1 A white woman was dragged out of her car and 
beaten to death by black mobs while the injured 
was a black rioter who was deliberately shot at 
by a white who had earlier drove his car over the 
victim.
ditto June 1 Unknown Killed at Daveyton township in protest against 
South Africa's raid on Botswana.
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Unknown Four were killed by their own explosions at 
Duduza apparently designed to be used in attacks 
against government "stooges". Six killed by 
Police for allegedly attacking the home of a 
black Policeman in the Kwa Thema township 
near Johannesburg, although Township residents 
claimed the six were killed while fleeing from 
Police raid at a protest meeting in a local movie 
theatre. The posiktion of the bullet holes on the 
corpses tend to back up the account of the local 
residence. Four leader of the UDF were killed at 
Duduza and Cradock in Eastern Cape. Death 
squads sponsored by the Police were suspected 
inspite of Police denial supported by another 
incident a few days later when Police sponsored 
masked death squads lured youths to the streets of 
Duduza with ANC slogans and songs only for the 
waiting Police to fall on them. Apart from all 
this, before the month ran out, seven persons 
were killed by the Police in Duduza and Soweto. 
In another development, a black woman was 
beaten to death by a township mob and the 
corpse burnt to ashes at Nonzwakazi for the 
simple offence of purchasing grocery from a 
white-owned shop in defiance of black boycott 
of white business ventures. Numerous others who 
defied the ban suffered various degrees of 
injuries. ._________________________________




1. See Richard Deutsch, “The Republican Challenge on Africa,” Africa Report. May/June 1979. p.
2. See U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, “The Nomination of Alexander 
Haig Jr. to be Secretary of State”, 97th. Congress, 1st. session, 1981. p. 147-8; Richard Deutsch, 
“Africa From a Strategic Perspective”, Africa Report. March-April, 1981. pp. 42-48.
3. ¡bid-
4. Richard Deutsch, “Building an African Policy”, Africa Report. July-August 1981. pp. 44-5; 
Chester Crocker, “The United States and Africa”. Africa-Report. September-October 1981, pp. 6-
5. “Secret State Department Documents” reproduced in Covert Action, no. 13. July-August 1981. 
pp. 37-41; David B. Abernathy, The Major Foreign Policy Position of the Reagan Administration: 
Implications for United States-South African Relations”, International Affairs Bulletin 
(Johannesburg) vol. 5. No. 2. 1981. pp. 18-44.
6. For Crocker’s statement, see, Chester. A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs, “U.S. Interests in Africa: Address Before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York 
City on October 5, 1981”, DSB. vol. 82. January 1982. p. 23; Further evidence of the 
administration’s position could be gleaned from the statements of Crocker and Under-Secretary for 
Political Affairs, Walter J. Stoessel during their meeting with UNITA’s Jonas Savimbi in 
Washington during the latter’s visit in December 1981. The two officials were reported to have told 
the guerrilla chieftain about “our wish to see all Cuban and other forces leave Angola and our belief 
that this must take place if a necessary climate of security is to return to the region.” See, “Angola: 
Department Statements”. DSB. vol. 82. March 1982. p. 34; For general reference: Barry Streek, 
“South Africa’s Stakes in the Border War”. Africa Report. March-April 1984. pp 54-60; Robert 
Fatton, “The Reagan Foreign Policy Toward South Africa: The Ideology of the Cold War”. African 
Studies Review, vol. 27 (March) 1984. pp. 51-9; George W. Shepherd, Jr. “The United States’ 
South Africa Policy: The Failure of Constructive Engagement”. Africa Today, vol. 31. No. 2.
1984. pp. 15-35. For Crocker’s statement, see, Chester. A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State 
for African Affairs, “U.S. Interests in Africa: Address Before the Council on Foreign Relations in 
New York City on October 5, 1981”,DSB, vol. 82. January 1982. p. 23.
7. Crocker re-iterated the regional security aspect of his “constructive engagement” when he told 
the Baltimore Council on Foreign Relations in October 1982 in terms expected of a South African 
minister seeking respectability for apartheid rather than a high ranking official of the US. Said he: 
“Until there develops a structure of understanding - some reciprocally understood basis for 
coexistence - between South Africa and its neighbours, this situation (Pretoria’s aggression in 
Frontline States) will remain a major source of instability and could result in growing violence 
across borders.” See Chester A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Address 
Before the Baltimore Council on Foreign Relations on October 28,1982, “U.S. Response to the 
Challenge of Regional Security”, DSB. 82, December 1982. p. 22; On the importance of new 
markets and investment outlets to South Africa, see, Ann and Neva Seidman, South Africa and 
U.S. Multinational Corporations, (Tanzania Publishing, Dar 1974), p. 137.
8. See President Samora Machel’s address to the 7th Summit of the Non-aligned Movement in 
New Delhi, on March 12. 1983. Reproduced in Sechaba. May 8, 1983. pp. 13-14.
205
9. See Prime Minister (now President) Robert Mugabe’s speech to Ecclesiastical leaders on April 
5, 1983; Policy Statement No. 11. (Ministry of Information, Post and Telecommunication, Harare, 
April 1983) p. 3.
10. Southern Africa , vol. xiv. Jan-Feb. 1981. p. 8
11. See President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos Statement in Brazzaville at the 23rd Anniversary of 
Independence of the Republic of Congo. August 15.1983 (Angop, Luanda 1983)
12. William Gutteridge, “South Africa’s Strategy for Survival”. Conflict Studies. No. 131, June 
1981. pp. 25-6; Details about the new political initiative could be obtained from LJ.Boulle, 
Constitutionalism and Control in South Africa. (St. Martin’s, New York 1984); Gail Hovey, 
Apartheid’s New Clothes. (The Africa Fund, New York 1983).
13. Mark Whitaker, Peter Younghusband and Zufia Sommuz, “South Africa’s Bloody Return to 
Sharpeville”. Newsweek . September 17. 1984. p. 17.
14. See Sanford J. Ungar and Peter Vale, “South Africa: Why Constructive Engagement Failed”, 
Foreign Affairs. (New York) Vol. 64. No. 2. Winter 1985/86. pp. 234-245.
15. In writing the following account, I have relied heavily on the following: Mathew Chaskalson, 
Karen Jochelson and Jeremy Seekings, “Rent Boycotts and the Urban Political Economy”, in 
Glenn Moss and Ingrid Obery (eds). The South African Review 4. (For the South African 
Research Service (SARS) by Ravan Press, Johannesburg 1987) pp. 53-4; Jeremy Seekings, “The 
Origins of Political Mobilisation in the PWV Townships, 1980-84”, in William Cobbett and Robin 
Cohen, (eds.), Popular Struggle in South Africa. (Africa World Press, Trenton, New Jersey, 
1988) pp. 59-72; Mark Swilling, “Introduction: The Politics of Stalemate”, in Philip Frankel, 
Noam Pines and Mark Swilling, (eds.), State. Resistance and Change in South Africa. (Croom 
Helm, London 1988) pp. 1-18; Martin Murray. South Africa. Time of Agony. Time of Destiny. 
(VERSO, London 1987) pp. 239-306.
16. For the quotations, see, Jeremy Seekings, “Origins of Political Mobilisation in the PWV 
Townships, 1980-84”, Ibid. pp. 69-70; For an analytical essay, see, Jeremy Seekings, “Political 
Mobilisation in the Black Townships of the Transvaal” in Philip Frankel, et al, Op.Cit., pp. 197- 
228.
17. M. Murray, Op. cit.
18. These scenes were on television screens on all channels of British television between August 
1984 and September 1985 and no doubt helped to move public sympathy in the direction of the 
anti-Pretoria forces. The tapes are available at the BBC and the ITV.
19. Michael Holman and Jim Jones, “Hopes of Southern African Reform dashed by Cautious 
Botha”, Financial Times. Friday August 16, 1985. p. 1; BBC-TV News Bulletin, 21.00 hrs, 
August 15 and 16, 1985; Harry Anderson and Peter Younghusband, “Can South Africa Save 
Itself?” Newsweek . August 19, 1985. pp 7-13; It must be indicated that in a section such as this 
which required eye-witness account, one cannot dispense with journalistic sources. This is the 
justification for using this and similar sources of information.
20. See “United Nations Security Council Further Condemnation of Apartheid”, The United States 
and South Africa: U.S. Public Statements and Related Documents, 1977-1985. Document 142
206
(Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington. D.C. 1985) p. 262.
21. See Stanford Ungar and Peter Vale.op. C it., pp. 244-5.
22. See interview he granted Dianne Weathers, “We Have Not Reallv Begun”. Newsweek . April 
1, 1985. p. 52.
23. S.J.Ungar and P. Vale, Op.Cit. . p. 245.
24. See address by the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger) Before the 
National Conference of Editorial Writers, San Francisco, June 23,1983, “Southern Africa: 
America’s Responsibility for Peace and Change”, Document 115, The United States and South 
Africa: U.S. Public Statements and Related Documents. 1977-1985.('Office of the Historian, 
Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington. D.C. 1985) pp. 193-5.
25. Reagan quoted in Nancy Cooper and Peter Younghusband, “South Africa: A Bloody 
Anniversary”. Newsweek . April 1, 1985. p. 17.
26. Richard Deutsch, “Reagan and Africa” Africa Report, vol. 26. No. 1. January-February 
1981. pp. 4-6.
27. See interview granted Richard Deutsch by George Bush, Africa Report. Vol. 25, No. 3. May- 
June 1980. pp. 39-41.
28. Bishop Tutu quoted in Stanford Ungar and Peter Vale, op. cit.
29. See, Interview: Randall Robinson: “We have Not Really Begun”. Newsweek, April 1, 1985. 
p. 52
30. William J. Foltz. Elite Opinion on United States Policy Toward Africa: A Survey of Members 
of the Council on Foreign Relations and its affiliated Regional Committees! Council on Foreign 
Relations Inc. New York 1979.)
31. See “Remarks by the Secretary of State (Haig) Before the National Foreign Policy Conference 
For U.S. Editors and Broadcasters, Washington, June 2, 1981.” Document 3. op. Cit. p. 74; For 
the leaks, see TransAfrica News Report (Washington) Vol. 1. No. 10. (special edition), August 
1981; New York Times, May 30, 1981. p. 4.
32. Interview: Randall Robinson, Op. cit.
33. New York Times, 3 November 1985.
34. Steven Metz, “The Anti-apartheid Movement and the Populist Instinct in American Politics”, 
Political Science Quarterly , hereinafter referred to as PSO. (New York) No. 3. 1986. pp. 380- 
386.
35. Don Edward Beck, “Psychological Recipe’ to South Africa”, South Africa Forum, (Pretoria) 
vol. 8. No.3. 1985. no. page. This was one of the carefully edited items sent to me by the South 
African Embassy in London, as a result the pages either conflict or have been omitted in an attempt 
to cut out unfavourable pieces. Beck’s article was favourable and the omission might have been 
inadvertent.
207
36. Masipula Sithole, “Black Americans and U.S.Policy Towards Africa”. African Affairs 
(London) vol.85. No. 340. July 1986. pp. 326-338.
37. Tom Morganthau, Sylvester Monroe, Nikki Finke Greenberg, Margaret Garrard Warner, 
Howard Fineman and Gloria Borger, “What Does Jesse Jackson Want?”. Newsweek. May 7, 
1984. pp. 184-185.
38. Interview: Walter Mondale, “View From the Front”. Newsweek. May 7, 1984. p. 39.
39. T. Morganthau, et a l , Op. Cit.
40. Interview: Randall Robinson, Op. cit.
41. S. Metz, “The Anti-apartheid Movement...”, Op. cit.
42. R. J. Payne and E. Ganaway, Op. Cit.: Francis Komegay, “Africa and Presidential Politics”, 
Op.Cit.: William Rasberry, “The Mystery of Carter’s Support Among Blacks”. Washington Post 
May 28, 1976. p. A21; Chuck Stone, “Black Political Power in the Carter Era”, The Black 
Scholar: Journal of Black Studies and Research, vol. 8. No. 4. January-February, 1977. pp. 7; 
The Black Vote: Election ’76 (Joint Centre for Policy Studies, Washington. D.C. 1977).
208
CHAPTER SEVEN
FSAM’S TACTICS AND STRATEGY.
The preceding chapter has shown that FSAM’s primary purpose was to deprive South ' 
Africa of the patronage of the Reagan administration. Afro-Americans in general and TransAfrica 
in particular (the two principal actors in FSAM) regarded this patronage as an essential factor in 
encouraging Pretoria to intensify repression at home and destabilisation in the Frontline States.
To achieve this objective, TransAfrica renewed the old Afro-American demands for 
imposition of comprehensive sanctions. Once again they called for the tightening of the arms 
embargo to prevent the export of dual purpose equipment. In addition, they demanded the 
prohibition of new investments and the withdrawal of existing ones. This presupposed a 
connection between the activities of foreign multinationals in South Africa and that country’s ability 
to maintain apartheid, such that severance of this connection might undermine apartheid. The likely 
impact on South Africa of US sanctions has been the subject of passionate debate on and off since 
the imposition of the arms embargo in the early 1960s as earlier indicated. Simply put, imposition 
of sanctions entails the use of an economic weapon against a state to bring about the desired 
behaviour in its political activities. Within the South African context, the understanding was that 
imposition of sanctions could bring about an abandonment of the policy of apartheid by the 
authorities in Pretoria. This study will not rehearse the numerous arguments for or against 
sanctions; these are well documented.[1] Rather, this study will discuss three questions: the factors 
that made FSAM choose a particular line of action in its attempt to create a rupture in the relations 
between the Reagan administration and South Africa; how it went about it; and the results.
This chapter is organised in two sections. Firstly, it gives two main reasons why FSAM 
preferred imposition of sanctions, as opposed to some other strategies, as the means for severing 
the relations between South Africa and the Reagan administration. These are: (i) FSAM saw the 
resumption in the export of equipment with obvious military capability and the increase in 
transactions in the economic domain between the Reagan administration and South Africa as a 
factor in the sustenance of apartheid and Pretoria’s aggression abroad; (ii) it was one area in which 
international consensus was necessary because of the dependence of South Africa’s economy on
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the international community and at this point, such a consensus became possible for the first time. 
The second section of the chapter is devoted to an analysis of the tactics and strategies chosen by 
FSAM to achieve its objective. This calls for answers to three questions: what did FSAM do, how 
did the public and the law makers respond and finally what was the outcome?
Reasons for FSAM’s Call For Sanctions
As identified in Chapter Six, the justification for the emergence of FSAM had much to do 
with the perception of TransAfrica and the wider Afro-American community that the South Africa 
policy of the Reagan administration made a direct contribution to the chaos in South Africa. 
TransAfrica’s Robinson said in no uncertain terms that the policy of the Reagan administration had 
emboldened Pretoria to intensify repression at home, to attempt to co-opt the Asians and the 
“coloureds” as “junior partners” in apartheid, and to continue the policy of destabilisation in the 
Frontline States.
Even granting that these activities of Pretoria were a direct result of the Reagan 
administration’s South Africa policy, they alone could not justify the advocacy of sanctions as the 
means for severing the relations between Washington and Pretoria. Why not some other means? 
Why call for sanctions? One answer could be that Afro-Americans were used to advocating 
imposition of sanctions against South Africa; as such, they were better off doing what they knew 
best. This answer is not convincing in view of the fact that their success in this area was patchy. 
Neither the Kennedy nor the Carter administrations, in whose elections they played a pivotal role, 
responded to the call for sanctions against South Africa with absolutely satisfactory results. They 
all achieved qualified successes.
It might also be tempting to seek explanations for FSAM’s position in the call for sanctions 
by Winnie Mandela and the South African Council of Churches (SACC). Mrs. Mandela’s view that 
American investments were “..a shoulder to the wheel moving apartheid forward”[2] could be seen 
as a compelling reason. Clearly the fact that the ANC was asking for sanctions mattered. But 
FSAM stressed sanctions at this time because there were two compelling contemporary trends. One
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was that the goal of undermining the South Africa regime seemed best tackled through sanctions. 
Secondly, the situation in South Africa allowed sanctions to seem much more feasible at the 
international level.[3] Neither the general trend in South Africa, nor demands for sanctions are 
enough in themselves to explain FSAM’s choice.
i) Increase in Commercial and Military Related Activities Between Washington and
Pretoria:
The Carter administration could be accused of a lukewarm attitude to the activities of arms 
suppliers, and even of direct cooperation with South Africa in the area of nuclear weapons. The 
emergence of Ronald Reagan, however, recorded a tremendous increase in the relations between 
the two countries in the area of conventional arms. As early as March 1982, the administration 
paved the way to reverse the Carter administration’s strict adherence to arms embargo against 
South Africa. Thus, munition industries were granted two sets of licences - general and validated 
ones. Those who were granted general licence were required to supply innocuous, non-military 
related, items to South Africa. Hence, they were in the main free from the bureaucratic difficulties 
associated with obtaining approval for exports. Only those who were granted the validated licence 
were required to satisfy the Commerce Department that their exports would neither contribute to 
nor augment South Africa’s military capabilities. Yet, the interpretations of what could enhance 
South Africa’s military strength were made in such a manner that Pretoria received items that it 
could not have gained access to had the arms embargo been strictly enforced. Some of these were 
assorted computers including the Cyber 170/750, the Amdhal and the MV/8000. Other items 
included a fleet of reconnaissance aircraft, the Super King 200C, and air ambulances.[4]
These computers had a military capability because they could be put into use in two military 
related areas. One of these was their ability to break coded messages, with relative ease. Perhaps 
the other is of more deadly proportions. Because of the sophistication of these computers, they 
could enable Pretoria to set accurately the trajectory of big field guns like the Howitzers, which 
were successfully used in Southern Angola on numerous occasions. As for the reconnaissance 
aircraft and the air ambulances, they were some of the equipment South Africa was starved off 
throughout the tenure of the Carter administration because of its adherence to the arms embargo.
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What the Reagan administration had done was to create a loop-hole for South Africa to remedy its 
obvious deficiency in arms acquisition. Nothing attests to this more than the leeway given to the 
licensees: no restrictions were placed on third parties exporting US military components to South 
Africa. This meant an American multinational could export arms to its subsidiary in a foreign 
country only for the firm to re-route the items to South Africa. By so doing, the parent company in 
the US could not be held responsible for the activities of its subsidiary with a different name in a 
different country. It was this process that accounted for the $28 million worth of arms and military 
related equipment which Pretoria bought from US munition industries within the first three years 
of the Reagan presidency. [5] Further, the Commerce Department, which was supposed to ensure 
adherence to the restrictions, actually issued a blanket directive in September 1982 allowing 
munition industries, which had sold military equipment to Pretoria, to supply service manuals 
without application for a licence. [6]
This period of rapid augmentation of South Africa’s military capability by the Reagan 
administration coincided with a surge in new US loans to the same regime. TransAfrica’s Randall 
Robinson observed that what had come down to a mere $350 million in 1980 from $1.2 billion 
when Carter took office rose dramatically to $623 million within two years of the Reagan 
presidency.[7] The period also witnessed the approval of South Africa’s application for a $1 
billion loan from the International Monetary Fund, (IMF) without the elaborate scrutiny for which 
the institution was famous. Other African and South American applicants had to adhere to stringent 
conditions, such as imposition of austerity measures in their domestic policy including the 
streamlining of the bureaucracy, in a manner that enabled the IMF to virtually assume a 
supranational role. South Africa was spared that indignity. For example, no attempt was made to 
ascertain whether the conditions that had brought about the request for the loan had anything to do 
with the impact of apartheid in labour mobility in the country’s productive sector. This was an area 
in which South Africa was vulnerable in view of influx control, the restriction of some sections of 
the populace from skilled employment, the Pass Law and Group Areas Acts which amongst others 
confined employees to hostels without the comfort of their families - an obvious impediment to 
productivity.
While the US Treasury and the State Departments denied any involvement in the decision 
of the IMF to grant the loan, one wonders if such conduct in awarding a loan by an institution as
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meticulous as the IMF could have taken place except in deference to the White House. Being the 
major contributor to the organisation as well as being its chairman, the US has twenty per cent of 
the vote in the IMF, thus virtually guaranteeing support to any application supported by 
Washington. It is obvious too that South Africa’s military purchases from US munition industries 
at the point in time might have necessitated or at least added urgency to the loan. For example, in 
his analysis, Christopher Coker observed that the contract for the air ambulances alone amounted 
to $15 million.[8]
That these efforts coupled with the clandestine activities of arms suppliers in the developed 
world would bolster Pretoria’s military capability, and help it to maintain apartheid at home and 
embark upon aggression abroad, are apparent when we examine South Africa’s set backs in the 
battle-field. On December 6,1983, the SADF launched an ambitious military operation with the 
intention of over-running Angola and installing Jonas Savimbi and UNITA in power. What was 
supposed to be a routine military operation ended in disarray as the SADF had to retreat when it 
confronted an unexpectedly stiff resistance from the Angolan regular forces without the support of 
their regular mentors, the Cubans. The SADF’s hasty and undisciplined pattern of retreat after 
losing two troop carriers and 21 soldiers even before the commencement of real battle was brought 
about by South Africa’s deficiency in equipment for aerial warfare. While the Soviet military 
advisers were able to monitor the advance of the SADF from afar as early as November 1983 with 
the aid of satellite reconnaissance equipment, the South Africans had nothing else to rely upon 
except their hardware on the ground. As a result, when they encountered a band of SWAPO 
insurgents at the Angolan border, they failed to realise that this was a bait only for the Angolans to 
fall upon them when their attention was focused on what they regarded as an easy military 
target.[9] The SADF’s position was untenable because apart from the disparity in sophisticated 
military equipment, the South Africans had lost the initiative in the sky. They had all along retied 
on the international sanctions busters to counter the then US imposed arms embargo. Had Reagan 
been in office during the four years Carter was there perhaps South Africa would then have been 
able to make up for the deficiencies.
South Africa’s “self sufficiency” in arms through the establishment of ARMSCOR is thus 
much exaggerated. Pretoria had never produced any sophisticated armament that was not a copy of 
other peoples products, bought in the “black market” or illegally smuggled in by arms suppliers.
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Hardly is this an exaggeration in view of the findings of an international seminar on UN embargo 
against South Africa in London in May 1986:
“...Armscor’s capabilities are restricted by the limited technological base of South Africa’s 
domestic industry as a whole and its subsidiaries remain dependent on components and 
technology imported from other countries. While it has managed to provide SADF with 
some of its basic arms requirements, largely as a result of licensing arrangements with 
western countries during the 1960s and 1970s, Armscor is unable to assemble or 
manufacture more sophisticated military equipment, leading to serious 
shortages, especially in the airforce.” [10]
The implication of the Reagan administration’s South Africa policy in the area of arms 
export meant that Pretoria could overcome these difficulties with relative ease, thus paving the way 
to its utilisation of the strongarm tactics against opponents within and without. That was a key 
reason why FS AM sought to disrupt the relations between Washington and Pretoria.
ii) Possibility of International Consensus over Sanctions:
The analysis above need not imply thatFSAM’s advocacy of sanctions was necessitated 
purely by the comfort South Africa received from the Reagan administration in the area of arms 
procurement. The administration of apartheid needs money and this is where South Africa’s 
international connection plays a part. In the modem world, no semi-industrialised country of the 
type of South Africa (whose industrial base was built by foreign multinationals^ 11] can survive on 
its own without transactions with others. South Africa realises its funds from foreign investments, 
loans from the international financial institutions and international trade between it and the 
international community. The US plays a major part in this regard as epitomised by the statistics on 
US financial involvement in South Africa as indicated in Chapter Five. In a study in 1985, Ann 
Seidman estimated that as at 1983, total US financial involvement in South Africa stood at $14.6 
billion. Apart from loans and direct investments as indicated earlier, US investors held $8 billion 
worth of shares in South African business ventures and accounted for nearly 60 per cent of the 
shares for mining in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. This no doubt had taken into account the 
reported 13 per cent increase in US investments since the advent of the Reagan administration.
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Only Britain surpassed the US as an investor, highlighting the importance of the US to the South 
African economy and the likely impact of divestment to Pretoria should Washington decide to 
utilise that line of action. [12]
While increase in investments may generate revenue for government coffers, it was 
precisely because of the earlier presence of foreign investment that some of the legislation 
prohibiting Africans from skilled jobs at the work-place were enacted as noted in Chapter Two. 
Corporate concerns complied with these apartheid laws for decades, reaped super-profits arising 
from cheap pliable non-white labour and only complained when a shortage of skilled labour 
threatened the efficiency of their expanded operations and their profit margins.[13]
The higher profit margins of foreign multinationals in the South African investment scene 
in comparison with other parts of the globe had much to do with the presence of a cheap and (until 
the 1970s) non-unionised pliant non-white work-force. The law regulating the movement of the 
virtually landless Africans not only depressed the price of their labour but guaranteed a pool of 
labour at the beck and call of employers. In addition, two other factors also helped to lure 
multinationals to the South African investment scene. One were generous tax incentives from the 
government. Second, the colonial pattern of communication in the region tied the regional states to 
South Africa, thereby creating a large potential market for the output of the manufacturing sector. 
The formation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was 
aimed precisely at breaking out of this colonial pattem.[14] The international commercial 
connection is therefore important to South Africa as noted by its Minister of Finance, Senator 
Owen Horwood, in his budget speech for fiscal year 1983-84: “Exports are of vital importance to
the economy of any country especially South Africa. An increase in exports is the best and
soundest way to finance the country’s necessary imports. Besides this, rising exports enable a 
country to exploit its domestic resources more effectively for increase prosperity.”[ 15]
FS AM therefore sought to reverse South Africa’s connection with international commerce 
on the grounds that it was essential to enabling Pretoria to maintain the system of apartheid. In this 
respect, Congressman William Gray’s assertion before the House Subcommittee on Financial 
Institutions, Supervision, Regulation and Insurance on June 8,1983 that South Africa was 
engaged on refurbishing its image in the US, with the aid of law firms, [16] did not come as a 
surprise in view of the importance it attached to its reputation at the international market place.
215
To sever these links with the international scene will not only cause a dislocation of South 
Africa’s economy, but might even cause it to collapse. In this respect, not only is South Africa 
vulnerable to sanctions, but it is one area in which it might be possible to create international 
consensus irrespective of the Reagan administration’s belief in South Africa’s importance to the 
West. Without prejudice to the importance of the South Africa’s investment scene to Western 
multinationals [17] and its contribution to Western requirement of chromium, manganese and 
vanadium - minerals of considerable importance to the developed economies - [18] South Africa is 
by no means vital as it does not possess a monopoly of the production of these minerals. This 
therefore robs it of any meaningful retaliatory measures against the international community in the 
event of comprehensive sanctions arising from that source. Sanctions therefore matter to South 
Africa because of the dependence of its economy on the international community.[19]
In this respect, FSAM’s advocacy of sanctions was partly inspired by the damage which 
South Africa might experience in the event of an international consensus on the issue. What was 
the likelihood of an international consensus on the issue of imposition of sanctions against South 
Africa? In part, what were the prospects of support from the administration?
The Administration’s Likely Reaction to FSAM’s Call For Sanctions Against South Africa 
By the International community:
Unlike previous administrations which saw Africa as of peripheral importance, or ceded the 
predominant role to Africa’s former colonial rulers, and which had only offered political support to 
Pretoria on the basis of anti-communist solidarity without any binding commitment, Reagan fought 
the 1980 election on a manifesto that committed himself to support for friendly regimes and 
confronting the Soviet-Cuban presence in Southern Africa. In this respect, when Reagan spoke 
about South Africa’s friendship and importance to the West from military and strategic points of 
view, he was indeed emphasising his endorsement of the regime and thereby serving notice on 
those who would seek to influence his perception on account of opposition to the domestic policy 
of Pretoria. One saw an inkling of this in the administration’s reaction to the Congressional rider 
by Representative Steve Solarz to the State Department’s Authorisation bill for fiscal year 1984-85. 
This rider tied US firms to a mandatory observance of the Sullivan principles; and prohibited new
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US investments and importation of Kruggerands.
Opposing these restrictions before the Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Wisner, enumerated the positive 
contributions of corporate firms to the lot of the non-white population of South Africa. He told the 
Committee that 330 US firms and affiliates operating in South Africa had a work-force of 127,000 
South African employees. 178 of them adhered to the Sullivan code, and employed 90,000 people. 
Of those that did not adhere, the US had no controlling interest in 19; and the remaining 133 firms 
employed 17,000 persons. He argued that to impose legislation on corporate interests to comply 
with the Sullivan principles would amount to interference in the fair employment policy of US 
ventures and a failure to recognise the effort of the signatory firms to improve the lot of their 
employees. For example, they spent $3.3 million on training their employees in 1982; sixty per 
cent of the beneficiaries were non-whites. In addition the signatory firms had contributed 
$10,500,000 to various projects to assist “disadvantaged black, colored, and Asian communities in
South Africa In short, US firms are acting as catalysts for change in South Africa, not only in
terms of fair employment practices, but across the board in all aspects of community life. The 
Sullivan code deserves most of the credit for being the engine which is driving this corporate force 
away from apartheid and discriminatory employment practices.” [20]
True, the signatory firms to the Sullivan code employed 127,000 persons, but they were no 
more than one and a half per cent of the South African work-force. Wisner also failed to mention 
that a high proportion of these workers were whites already protected by the apartheid system. For 
example, in her study in 1983, Elizabeth Schmidt found that the non-whites who work for the 
signatory firms numbered only about 50,000.[21] Nor did the Assistant Secretary address the 
deficiency in monitoring adherence to the Sullivan principles by the signatory firms. For example, 
Arthur. D. Little Co. who were responsible for monitoring reported in 1982 that only 93 signatory 
firms responded to their questionnaires while 29 ignored them. It was on the basis of the response 
to the questionnaires that Arthur D. Little Co. identified 32 signatory firms as having made “good 
progress” and classified them “category 1”. 38 other firms were in “category II” on grounds that 
they were “making progress”, and at the rear were 37 firms in “category III who were required to 
improve their adherence to the code. Thus only a little over half the firms could be identified as 
“making progress”; and before long it emerged that one of the criteria for Arthur Little s
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categorisation was a mere willingness on the part of a signatory firm, to underline its commitment 
to the code, by taking membership in the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce 
(NAFCOC)[22]
Such a monitoring mechanism of voluntary response to a questionnaire without either the 
means for verification or enforcement was open to abuse. Thus it was not surprising that there 
were disparities between what workers in South Africa thought about the efforts of their employers 
and the reputation which some firms enjoyed in the US for their adherence to the code. For 
example, during an official tour of South Africa in the summer of 1984, Stephen Weissman, a staff 
consultant of the Subcommittee on Africa, asked for confirmation of Colgate-Palmolive’s 
reputation as a prime example of corporate compliance with the Sullivan principles. The answer 
indicated the inadequacy of reliance on voluntary application of the code as the means for 
eliminating discrimination at the work place. He was told by Dusty Ngwane of the Chemical 
Workers Industrial Union and the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU):
“They provide video games to the community - free Pacman! You remember in 1980 they 
maintained separate locker rooms for whites and blacks. Later, management said the white 
change room was really for monthly paid workers. We said, what if you paid all workers 
on a monthly basis. They replied that it would then be a change room for “skilled” 
workers. Blacks still don’t use that change room. They have a program to train 
supervisors, but at the end only two African workers and four whites were picked up and 
the whites were from outside the company.”[23]
This pattern of dissatisfaction with the code was common among non-white workers in 
South Africa, the people for whose benefit it was allegedly formulated. In 1982, the Motor 
Assemblers and Components Workers Union of South Africa (MACWUSA) made a six point 
counter submission to the Ford Motor Company to counter the firm’s “highest rating” in the US 
for adherence to the Sullivan code.[24]
In spite of these deficiencies in the monitoring of the Sullivan principles the failure of the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State to point out that the contributions by the signatory firms to the 
advancement of the non-whites constituted a mere two per cent of their profits for the period called 
into question his sincerity as an advocate of corporate responsibility. Nor did he indicate that the 
“training facilities” equipped their recipients merely with a basic knowledge of vocational-
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commercial training, which would confine them to a peripheral role in a modern economy.[25] It is 
not the victims of apartheid that benefit from from foreign investment, but the apartheid state and 
the investors. Archbishop Tutu put this argument succinctly and vividly in 1985:
“ Foreign companies in South Africa should stop kidding themselves by saying they are 
there for our benefit. That’s baloney. Whether they like it or not, they are buttressing an 
evil system. The Sullivan principles... are there to make apartheid more acceptable, more 
comfortable; and we do not want apartheid made more comfortable, we want apartheid 
dismantled. These principles are saying nothing more than the kinds of things a good 
employer ought to be doing in any case.” [26]
The argument by the Reagan administration in defence of the facilities that sustain the 
regime in Pretoria, meant that FSAM had a fight in its hands in advocating the imposition of 
sanctions against South Africa. An administration which opposed legislative backing for corporate 
firms to adhere to the Sullivan code ( a domestic decision) would not go out of its way to initiate an 
international action to isolate South Africa. FSAM’s choice of tactics and strategy would, 
therefore, have to take into account strong opposition from the Reagan administration.
C ho ice  o f ta c tic s  and s tra te g ie s .
The Reagan administration was thus likely to continue to attach importance to its friendship 
with South Africa irrespective of FSAM’s objection. How then would the anti-apartheid movement 
persuade the administration to do what it would not normally have done, namely the imposition of 
sanctions against Pretoria?
The generally friendly and harmonious relations between the Reagan administration and 
South Africa meant that the situation in South Africa received the approval of Washington, or there 
was no one in the administration to argue effectively against Pretoria’s domestic policy and its 
stance towards the Frontline States. Both appear plausible if one looks at the perception of South 
Africa and the Southern African region by the three main formulators and executors of US foreign
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policy toward the region. President Reagan’s pro-South African stance in order to counter 
perceived Soviet and communist hostile designs, analysed at length in the previous chapters, was 
supported by Secretary of State Alexander Haig (and by his successor). Despite his far greater 
knowledge of the region and the sophistication of his analysis and policy recommendation, the 
same holds for the last of the trio, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester 
Crocker.
Before his appointment as Assistant Secretary, Crocker had argued strongly before Steven 
Solarz’s Subcommittee on Africa in the House in 1980 against imposition of a statutory obligation 
on corporate concerns with South African interests to adhere to the Sullivan principles.[27] 
Crocker’s opposition to the Sullivan principles compares sharply with that expressed by Afro- 
Americans, since his position was based upon a neoclassical laissez faire stance of not imposing a 
political burden upon corporate concerns. By contrast, Afro-American criticism stemmed from the 
weakness of the principles’ impact. Not even the principles’ author, the Reverend Leon Sullivan 
ever deluded himself into thinking that his efforts were a panacea for apartheid in South Africa. 
Indeed, he himself argued before the Solarz panel that the principles he formulated were designed 
to help in minimising the effect of undiluted apartheid at the work-place in South Africa: “They can 
help produce change, they cannot end apartheid by themselves... in order to totally eliminate 
apartheid, help must come from churches, unions, educational institutions, governments, and 
world-wide public opinion.”[28]
Although there were isolated pockets of approval of the Sullivan principles as generally 
expected, this time from share-holders and board members of corporations with South African 
interests,[29] the popular view among Afro-Americans was that the Sullivan principles were a 
“smokescreen” and a publicity stunt for concealing the immorality in making profits at the South 
African market-place. [30] Even the moderate NAACP, whose Task Force on Africa had 
recommended imposition of punitive sanctions against South Africa including total disinvestment, 
was no less scathing in its attack of the Sullivan principles, while advocating a severe interim anti­
apartheid measure at the work-place pending total withdrawal from the South African scene. [31] 
Thus, Afro-Americans’ objection stemmed from their antipathy to apartheid and the fact that the 
principles only offered an escape route to corporate interests with South African connections, as 
opposed to Crocker’s that they interfered with corporate freedom.
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The harmony on Southern Africa between the President, his Secretary of State and his 
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs made unlikely any occurrence of policy differences within 
the administration arising from conflicting perceptions (as one saw with respect to the Carter 
administration after 1977). The prospect of utilising the “inside” strategy of exerting influence was 
thus poor. While perseverance may also be necessary, the prerequisite for successful utilisation of 
the “inside” strategy is possession of influence on or nearness to the powers that be (or both).
In the case of Afro-Americans, Reagan neither solicited nor received their votes in his bid 
for the presidency. He therefore owed no allegiance to them, and they in turn were not close 
enough to his administration to establish contact let alone pull strings. Rather his allegiance was to 
the larger American public whose right-wing fervour brought him into office. The administration’s 
pro-Pretoria but anti-Angola and anti-Namibian independence stance was seen as part of an on­
going battle to defeat communism and assuage American fears. Thus, the administration was 
fulfilling its electoral promise to the American people to see off Soviet “gains” in Southern Africa. 
The support for an anti-communist Pretoria through thick and thin could therefore be presented to 
the American people as fulfilling a necessary function. [32]
The absence of conflicting regionalist/globalist perceptions on foreign policy issues within 
the Reagan administration meant there was no window of opportunity for Afro-Americans to 
exploit. Had there been one, they might have capitalised on this avenue as the Republicans did to 
the Carter administration, to force a change in policy stance on Southern Africa. But there was to 
be no replay of the difficulties of the Carter years. If the “inside” strategy was outside the reach of 
FSAM, then what options were available?
FSAM’s identification of targets and utilisation of tactics and strategies : Thus, FSAM’s 
adopted strategy was to attempt to achieve three things simultaneously: by-passing the executive 
arm; cultivating goodwill in Congress; and above all an appeal to the public at large by means of 
political mobilisation.
Laying emphasis on Congress and the American public was a step in the right direction. In 
1980, at the height of the conservatism fervour, the House Subcommittee on Africa nonetheless 
had sought to minimise the effect of apartheid on its victims through imposition of the Sullivan 
principles on American multinationals. The refusal of Afro-Americans to cooperate should not
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obscure the efforts of the Solarz Committee. What that Congressional initiative meant was that, 
unlike the executive arm, there was still support for the cause being pursued by FSAM. This 
support was dormant because of the prevailing mood in the country.
That FSAM was aware that the American public possessed the capability to alter the 
administration’s Southern Africa policy was visibly portrayed in its tactics. Instead of haranguing 
the administration, which would have made it the perennial Afro-American irritant, FSAM 
carefully and deliberately made its desire the concern of the public at large. What FSAM did was to 
mobilise sympathisers for a sustained and illegal demonstration in front of the South African 
Embassy in Washington with effect from November 1984. To attract public attention, numerous 
prominent Americans (with anti-apartheid sympathies) offered themselves for arrest. Simon 
Jenkins’ description of the events was a true reflection of FSAM’s tactics:
“Each afternoon for the past four months, demonstrators have gathered in the cold outside 
the South African embassy in Washington’s Massachusetts Avenue. They have unfurled 
their banners and struck up a familiar mantra: “Apartheid out, out!”. A prearranged 
number then break away, walk and offer themselves for arrest. It is a symbolic act of 
trespass. Charges are not pursued. It is a painless and convenient way of publicising a 
currently very popular act of commitment. To date, more than 2000 Americans have been 
arrested outside South African premises as part of the “Free South Africa Movement”. It
began on November 21st last with a sit-in by three black leaders....Their action revived
the dormant anti-apartheid movement...The American apartheid issue now has a life of its 
own..”[33]
Some of those arrested or demonstrating in anticipation of arrest such as Robert Kennedy’s 
youngest son, 17 year old Douglas Harriman Kennedy, were not formally charged and brought 
before the Courts for trespass, but their presence made for good publicity thereby furthering the 
cause of the organisers. Part of the effect of this tactic was that soon arrest at the South African 
embassy premises while protesting against apartheid became a Congressional status symbol. 
Among those arrested were 18 Congressmen and the Republican Senator Lowell Weicker of 
Connecticut, who made history by being the first sitting Senator to be arrested for a breach of the 
peace. Others such as Jesse Jackson and Gary Hart, already well known for their implacable hatred 
for apartheid, and under pressure in view of their ambition for 1988, demonstrated repeatedly in
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front of the embassy in an unsuccessful attempt to be arrested. They were veterans of the anti­
apartheid crusade, but on this occasion, they like numerous others were responding to the 
bandwagon effect created by FSAM. The Embassy demonstrations had developed a momentum of 
their own.
The outcome of this was the restoration of the morale and enthusiasm of the Afro- 
American/White Liberal/organised labour coalition of the civil rights movement, including its anti­
war component, which in turn continued to sustain the demonstrations. Before long, the campus 
demonstrations for which the anti-war faction was famous also became a prominent feature of the 
strategy of the FSAM. It took no time for the demonstrations to move beyond the confines of 
Washington. Soon every American city that harboured a South African Consulate was being 
picketed by students and other concerned Americans aroused by their memory of the civil rights 
demonstrations of the 1960s. And with it came the grand-standing and oratory of practising and 
prospective politicians in front of the television cameras, emphasising their abhorrence of apartheid 
as a practice against American values, and the need for an American administration to move against 
its practitioners. They were endorsing calls for the imposition of sanctions against Pretoria. 
Congressman Walter Fauntroy’s visit to Alabama was characteristic of this type of media induced 
demonstration. Leading a band of demonstrators on what they called the “Southern wave” of 
protest, they sang, knelt and prayed to God in an attempt to wean South Africa from the patronage 
of the Reagan administration. Fauntroy defended the tactic on these grounds:
“We must correct (apartheid) not only because it is morally reprehensive but because it 
threatens American jobs. While jobs are being lost in the Birmingham steel mills, they are 
being opened up in South Africa by American firms attracted by the slave market 
there...It’s a policy (constructive engagement) really of all carrot and no stick. The (United 
States) problem is not colored people on welfare but rich people who have been investing 
in a racist country.”[34]
In the process corporate interests with South African connections became the easiest targets 
of criticism, while Universities with stock in such corporate concerns became the most vulnerable 
to the demonstrators. Their path was eased by the previous action on campuses over this issue, 
especially the war of attrition which demonstrators fought with Polaroid. For example, between 
1977-79, the Board of Trustees of five Universities - Antioch, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio and
Wisconsin - had sold their stock in corporate interests with South African connections while 26 
other Universities had also taken partial steps in that direction. Nor were the state and local 
authorities immune from the debate. Between 1977 and 1983,23 states had passed various pieces 
of anti-apartheid legislation prohibiting the use of their pension and operating funds in investing in 
South Africa related business ventures. Of these, California, Illinois, Michigan, New York, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Texas and Wisconsin had totally withheld their deposits from Banks with South 
African connections while Indiana, Iowa, Maryland and Oregon had embarked on more limited 
action. [35]
Yet others like Governor George Wallace of Alabama, plagued and tarnished by a record of 
opposition to integration in the South, now used the occasion to try to rehabilitate their image. That 
is the most reasonable explanation for the dramatic and unreserved support for an anti-apartheid 
cause in far-flung South Africa expressed by Wallace, who was not known to have atoned 
adequately for his past misdeeds in the civil rights era. He first won the governorship of Alabama 
in 1962 on an anti-integrationist platform, fulfilling his campaign promises by standing at the door 
of the University of Alabama in 1963, in a futile attempt to prevent integration; and then 
empowered the Alabama state’s Police Chief, Bull Connor, to confront anti-segregation 
demonstrators in Birmingham and other cities of Alabama with police dogs. Wallace subsequently 
attained notoriety throughout the US and beyond as the most articulate spokesman of segregation 
in the South. What role these racist credentials played in his governorship victory in 1982, twenty 
years after he had first won the office is not wholly clear. [36]
Yet not only did Wallace publicly endorse the campaign of the FSAM, but he displayed his 
enthusiasm by conferring on Congressman Fauntroy, who led the protest to Mobile, Alabama, the 
twin title of honorary citizenship of the city and the honorary lieutenant-colonel of the state 
militia. [37]
Helped by the continuing violence in South Africa as shown on home television screens, 
by December 1984 FSAM had all but succeeded in mustering enough public support across the 
political spectrum to make the issue of imposition of sanctions against South Africa take on a non­
partisan tone on Capitol Hill and expand the base of support for such measures beyond that of 
Liberal Legislators. The most vivid evidence of this was the ultimatum which 35 Republican 
Congressmen issued to the South African Ambassador on December 5,1984. It states:
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“Events of recent weeks in South Africa have raised serious questions about your 
government’s willingness to move more progressively and aggressively toward real human 
rights reforms. With this letter we wish to make clear that we view the violence in your 
country and the questions raised by it with alarm. Further more, we want you to know that 
we are prepared to pursue policy changes relative to South Africa’s relationship with the 
United States if the situation does not improve. If “constructive engagement” becomes in 
your view an excuse for maintaining the unacceptable status quo, it will quickly become an 
approach that can engender no meaningful support among American policy
makers [and we] are prepared to recommend that the US government take the
following two steps: 1) Curtailment of new American investments in South unless current 
economic and civil rights guarantees are in place. 2) Organize international diplomatic and 
economic sanctions against South Africa. [38]
This was unexpected to anyone familiar with the attitudes of conservative Republicans to 
South Africa. It had always been portrayed as a pro-Western country with a western oriented 
administration worth protecting. Any dissatisfaction with the regime had always been about the 
apartheid labour regulations which the right-wing regarded as an impediment to free enterprise and 
trade. There had never been a sustained attack on the political dimension of apartheid by so many 
right-wing Republicans since the legal introduction of apartheid in South Africa in 1948. This 
reversal of an earlier position was a reflection on the part of the Republican law-makers, especially 
the younger ones, that they ought to identify the party with issues relating to civil and human 
rights. Republican Congressman Vin Webber explained the rationale for the action in no 
ambiguous terms:
“It is important that the next generation of Conservative leadership send a signal to SA. If 
we are to become the majority party we have to change the perception of conservatives on 
civil rights. There is a consensus in the country on civil and human rights and need to 
chuck the baggage of an ugly strain of American conservatism in the past, the baggage of 
racism.”[39]
In this respect, FSAM’s strategy of coopting the public and the law-makers to its cause through the 
tactic of continuous demonstration had yielded dividends. But that still left unanswered FSAM s 
demand for imposition of sanctions against South Africa. What then was the significance of this
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support for FSAM?
Results of FSAM’s tactics and strategy: Republican Congressmen had publicly put 
pressure on South Africa, and the administration itself was not immune from their wrath. A few 
weeks before the Congressional ultimatum two Republican Senators, Richard Lugar, the Chairman 
of the Foreign Relations Committee and Nancy Kassebaum, had urged the President to condemn 
Pretoria on its human rights record. The smallness of the number of Senators involved in this 
exercise is mitigated by their ideological stance and their nearness to the President. Unlike some 
Republicans who occasionally identify themselves with liberal causes, these were Senators with 
unwavering right wing inclinations. Kassebaum in particular like most Republicans saw the need 
for Pretoria’s stranglehold on power in order to keep communism at bay in a vital area of US 
interests, as enunciated by the administration.
For the President, however, open criticism of Pretoria held uncertain consequences, not 
least the possibility of opening a Pandora’s box which could herald the demise of the only friendly 
state and last bastion of anti-communism in the region. The urgent meeting the President held with 
Chester Crocker on the issue on December 3,1984 and which led to an impromptu decision to 
meet with Bishop Tutu three days later rather than to a public condemnation of Pretoria, highlight 
the anguish the White House was facing over developments at Capitol Hill.
Because the decision to meet with Tutu was a mere damage limitation exercise to fend-off 
Republican anger for not doing enough over South Africa, it took no time for the President to 
disagree with the Bishop, who was speaking from a wealth of experience on the ground in South 
Africa. Responding to his charges that the administration’s South Africa policy had worsened the 
plight of the victims of apartheid, the President insisted before White House correspondents that 
“constructive engagement” was a step in the right direction: “I have to disagree with him on the fact 
that the situation has worsened. It has not. We have made sizable progress there in expressing our 
repugnance for apartheid and in persuading the South African government to make changes. And 
we’re going to continue with that policy.”[40] While this response was no doubt inspired by the 
ingrained suspicion of the unforeseeable consequences of radical change, the President had failed 
to realise that FSAM’s protest was eroding his popularity even among the conservative 
Republicans on the issue of sanctions against South Africa. The substance of his response to Tutu
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was not borne out by the intensity of violence and Police repression in South Africa shown daily 
on their televisions.
Although the President then tried to repair the rupture in Republican consensus over South 
Africa by criticising Pretoria’s human rights record on December 10,1984 the action was too 
modest and it came too late to improve his fortunes. Congressmen and Senators across the political 
divide entered 1985 aware that “constructive engagement” had achieved no tangible results which 
would eliminate the need to send a clear message to Pretoria about their repugnance for apartheid 
and the crisis it had precipitated. Although the argument that imposition of sanctions would 
threaten the jobs of the non-whites had been countered by the argument that apartheid was basically 
a creation of a political system and that the chaos in South Africa was in response to the 
repugnance being felt by the majority of the people of that country, the problem was the strength of 
signal which legislators could send to Pretoria.
Legislators as the representatives of the people had to formulate a means of responding to 
the public mood on the issue because not only had the campaign for divestment and disinvestment 
been intensified, but it had begun to yield dividends. According to the Investor Responsibility 
Centre, 40 US firms wound up operations in South Africa in 1985 followed by 48 more in 1986. 
These firms either packed up their bags and left, sold to South African managements, or “planned 
to involve blacks as shareholders in new structures to distribute their products in South Africa after 
disinvesting.”[41] Irrespective of the method, the exercise involved firms famous at the South 
African market place. They included Carnation, Coca Cola, Eastman Kodak, Exxon, General 
Motors, IBM and Pepsico. New US investments had by then largely dried up. In addition, 10 
states, about 30 cities and an additional 40 Universities (to bring to 80 the number that had 
responded to divestment) had taken action in 1985 to withdraw their funds in firms engaged in 
business in South Africa. Among the Universities which had completely severed links, as opposed 
to the previous limited actions, were famous names like Harvard, Yale, New York and Dartmouth, 
which brought the total from sale of Universities’ shares in South Africa related firms to $292 
million since the advent of the campus protest in 1978. [42] States which responded to the protests 
in 1985-86 included California which authorised the sale of its South African stock of R2.5 billion. 
Hesitations over divestment of so much stock had been softened by the experience of the states that 
took action earlier. According to its Governor, Michael Dukakis, Massachusetts was the first state
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in the nation to sell from our public pension fund portfolio all those investments in firms doing 
business in South Africa. It has been our experience that divestiture makes not only strong moral 
statement against apartheid but divestiture had proven to have had no significant impact on our 
pension eamings.”[43]
In addition, the campaign had moved beyond institutions to individuals involved in 
dealings with South Africa, with some encouraging results. While the demonstrations were 
intensifying in front of the Embassy and the four Consulates across the country, some activists had 
targeted the eight South Africa “honorary” consuls scattered across the country. These are US 
citizens appointed by South Africa to represent its interests on the strength of their contact with the 
country. In December 1984 the honorary consul in Boston announced his intention to resign his 
office after repeated visits by protesters. His counterpart in Seattle, Joseph M. Swing, indicated the 
scale of pressure he was under when he said: “They have been coming every Saturday since 
September, but the numbers have increased significantly since the demonstrations at the embassy 
in Washington.”[44]
In Mobile, Alabama, the decision of South Africa’s honorary consul, John H. van Aken to 
keep his office under lock and key to frustrate demonstrators attracted prolong singing of “Negro 
spirituals” and civil rights anthems such as “We shall overcome”, and prayers, amidst promises of 
further visits. One of the leaders of the protesters, Dr. Joseph E. Lowery, President of the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) summed up the groups’ attempt:
“We have made our statement to this community and we’ll be back....If he has a 
conscience, [ like his counter-part in Boston] he must be at least a little uneasy at what he is 
doing....He may flee from us but he can’t flee from the wrath of God.”[45]
Such efforts on the part of FS AM meant that it was not only ahead of the law-makers but 
that it had made it imperative for the latter to take action to demonstrate their recognition of public 
concern and anxiety over apartheid in South Africa. It was against this background, and amidst the 
unresolved issue of how far to go in signalling disapproval of apartheid, that the legislators 
embarked upon the process of drafting an acceptable sanctions bill. First to offer one in March 
1985 was Democratic Congressman William Gray III of Pennsylvania. With considerable input
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from Senator Edward Kennedy, this effort which became known as the Anti-Apartheid Act of 
1985 addressed four issues: the banning of US bank loans and of further investments by US firms 
until the institution of genuine reforms by Pretoria; and prohibition of the sale of computers to 
Pretoria and of importation of Kruggerands into the US.
While the Gray-Kennedy initiative did not go down well with some Republican 
Congressmen, it is necessary to realise that their opposition stemmed from its narrowness. To 
them, the bill confined itself to South Africa without including communist dictatorships which the 
Republicans felt were equally as bad. This was clearly evident in the counter-proposal of 
Republican Congressman Robert Walker of Pennsylvania which called for repeal of the Clark 
Amendment of 1976, banning aid to anti-government rebels in Angola, and the denial of 
favourable trade status to states that support international terrorism. But the rest of the Walker 
proposals were specifically directed at South Africa. These were prohibitions of government 
support to US firms in South Africa which failed to adhere to the Sullivan principles unless 
sufficient reform had been instituted by Pretoria to nullify them; a ban on loans to apartheid states 
and an imposition of restrictions on the amount of goods the US could import from countries that 
use force labour in the production process, These moves showed that the Republicans like the 
Democrats were equally concerned about the developments in South Africa. The Walker initiative 
should also be viewed in the light of the argument of some Republicans that the Gray initiative 
stood the risk of being vetoed by the President. It was therefore a means for circumventing a 
possible Presidential veto.
Nonetheless four of the ten Republicans in the House Foreign Affairs Committee voted 
with the Democrats to approve the Gray proposal by 29 to 6 on May 2,1985. This was indicative 
of the willingness of Congress to embark on a confrontation course with the President on an issue 
in which, they felt, the executive was at variance with the line already taken by the American 
public. This became clear when the President was warned against the use of the veto by his own 
Republican Congressmen following the approval of the bill. The administration’s wrongly timed 
imposition of trade sanctions against Nicaragua on May 1,1985 may also have encouraged the 
Congressmen to back the Gray proposal. But the enthusiasm to do something about South Africa 
preceded the imposition of sanctions against Managua, and was a function of FSAM’s successful 
mobilisation of the American public against “constructive engagement”. Congressmen were only
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responding to public concern, as the Staff Director of the House of Representatives Subcommittee 
on Africa pointed out:
“The peoples’ elected representatives will not act unless a situation is so critical that it 
impinges on U.S. interests in a harmful way, which in turn prompts the citizenry to appeal 
for Congressional action. Until recently, developments in Southern Africa have not been 
perceived by the general American public as interfering with its civic well-being. If the 
larger public interest does not force a Congressional reaction, then the executive branch 
looks to coopt legislative support for its traditional “crisis management” policy response. 
The Reagan administration since 1981 has taken this approach regarding South Africa and 
implemented it as a policy formula termed “constructive engagement”. However as events 
in Southern Africa escalated into violence and destabilisation, the Congress, under direct 
pressure from the nongovernmental wing of the Africa constituency,[FSAM] has sought to 
alter America’s policy direction. This has been especially true since the beginning of 
1983.”[46]
In this respect, the significance of the Nicaraguan misadventure lay in its ability to 
undermine the administration’s opposition to Congressional imposition of sanctions against South 
Africa. The imposition of sanctions against the Sandinistas was apparently inspired by the need to 
bring democracy to Managua; yet South Africa was no more democratic than Nicaragua. 
Congressman Steven Solarz brought home this point when he argued: “How can the US stand for 
democracy and pluralism in Central America while we stand for racism in Southern Africa?”[47] 
This perhaps accounted for the Congressional cynicism which greeted the repeated assertions of 
Chester Crocker, George Shultz and the President himself about the threat which sanctions against 
South Africa would pose to the means of livelihood of the non-white population. The 
Congressional view was encapsulated once again by Solarz: “Can anyone seriously doubt that it is 
far worse to live today as a Black man or woman in South Africa than as an opponent of the
Sandinistas in Nicaragua? If total sanctions are justified against Nicaragua, can we really say
that partial sanctions are not justified against South Africa?”[48]
When the full House met on June 6,56 Republicans - about a third of their strength in the 
House - had no qualms in voting with the Democrats to approve the Gray bill by 295-127. The 
situation in the Senate - which started its own proposal at the same time as the House - saw no 
marked difference as its legislation on economic sanctions against South Africa was earned 
overwhelmingly by 80-12. This was the first attempt at sanctions against South Africa by the 
1982-86 Senate.
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This consensus in the two chambers compelled the President not only to go against his 
better judgment and instinct, but also to retract his previous pronouncements. He then imposed 
milder sanctions against South Africa, as a preemptive measure. The Executive Order on 
September 9 barred transactions with South Africa on almost all Bank loans, export of computers 
and related materials that could be used in the furtherance of apartheid as well as almost all nuclear 
related exports, and prohibited the importation of South African arms and related materials like 
military vehicles from South Africa as well as Kruggerands. The administration also pledged 
government support to US firms in South Africa which had not adhered to the Sullivan principles, 
provided they had employed at least twenty-five persons.[49]
This was too little for Congress as Senator Joe Bidden made clear late in July 1986 during 
a hearing of Senate’s Foreign Affairs Committee on the administration’s “constructive engagement” 
policy: “These people [South Africans] are being crushed. And we’re sitting here with the same 
kind of rhetoric [of civil rights era]. We heard, “Go slow. We have to take care of the problem 
afterwards”... I hate to hear an administration and a Secretary of State [George Schultz] refusing to 
act on a morally abhorrent point.”[50]
By this time, various pieces of sanctions legislation were queuing up both in the House and 
Senate. Congressman William Gray’s bill, whose enactment was preempted by the President’s 
limited sanctions of September 1985, had been overtaken by a tougher one proposed by Black 
Caucus activist, Ron Dellums. Among its provisions was one compelling US firms to withdraw 
from South Africa within 180 days after the enactment of the proposal into law. In the Senate, 
exasperation at the President’s failure to provide leadership on the anti-apartheid issue had 
compelled Senator Lugar to propose a bill imposing sanctions against South Africa, which was 
duly accepted on August 15, 1986. It was on the strength of the need to avoid a floor fight on an 
issue now deemed so vital to the honour and dignity of the US that both the Senate and the House 
accepted the Lugar proposal on September 12,1986 by 308 votes to 77. This became the 1986 
Anti-Apartheid Act aimed at pressing South Africa into abandoning apartheid with a view to 
ushering in a multi-racial society. The bill’s economic features were:
- prohibitions on importation of South African uranium ore and oxide, coal, iron and steel 
as well as all agricultural products from South Africa. Only certain strategic minerals and all 
existing contracts on all facets of economic relations were exempt for the first twelve months from
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the enactment of the law. Obviously, this was an assault on the so-called importance of South 
Africa from a mineral point of view.
- prohibition of loans (unless for humanitarian purpose on a non-discriminatory basis) and 
a ban on sale of computers to the South African government or agencies.
- prohibitions on importation of Kruggerands and on nuclear cooperation with South Africa 
without the latter’s accession to the Non-nuclear Proliferation Treaty.
- termination of all air links and sale of petroleum products to South Africa, except to 
honour existing contracts on petroleum related affairs.
On the political front, the Act called for:
- the release of political prisoners including Mandela and resumption of meaningful 
negotiation between Pretoria and its opponents and full participation in political activities by all 
South Africans.
- definite time table for abrogating all pieces of apartheid legislation and cessation of 
incursions into Frontline States.
- conferment of authority on the US President to relax some of these measures in the event 
of concrete evidence of change on the part of Pretoria, including the repeal of the Group Areas Act 
of 1966 and Population Registration Act of 1950.
- authorisation of Congress to impose additional measures should Pretoria refuse to show 
willingness to abandon apartheid within 12 months of coming into force of the Act. [51]
The refusal of the law-makers to accede to the President’s demand to waive their Act in
preference for one he had in mind and the margin of their over-ride of the Presidential veto of
September 26,1986 by 313 to 83 in the House and 78 to 21 in the Senate,[52] should be seen as a
confirmation of the will of the legislative arm to respond to the public mood. (ty/WlA
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The implication in this was that the administration had summarily lost control of its 
Southern African policy to a legislative arm determined to act in accordance with the public pulse, 
which in this case was being generated and sustained by FSAM.
Conclusion.
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This chapter attempted to identify the objective of FSAM and the means to ensure its 
materialisation. While FSAM’s cardinal objective was to wean South Africa from the patronage of 
the Reagan administration by advocating the imposition of sanctions including the severance of US 
commercial activities, the realisation of this was complicated by President Reagan’s assessment of 
the importance of South Africa to the Western alliance.
Lacking any direct influence over the administration, FSAM overcame this daunting 
handicap by an adroit use of mass mobilisation as a tactical and strategic device. The initial 
outcome from this effort was FSAM’s success in setting the public and the law-makers against the 
President’s South Africa policy. The pressure arising from this harmony in objective between 
FSAM, Capitol Hill and public opinion, placed the President in a politically difficult situation 
because of the apparent erosion of his popular political base. It was this situation that compelled the 
administration to cave in to the will of public opinion and Congress, resulting in the triumph of 
FSAM.
In this respect, the need to rely on mass mobilisation (public appeal) is not a liability in the 
American system if its devotees can muster the necessary support. Unlike the “inside” strategy, 
which is a weapon of the powerful and the financial patron of politicians, mass mobilisation is the 
weapon of the individually weak. It exercises influence over governments by evoking societal 
factors, chief of which is public opinion, to compel policy makers to do what they would not have 
done. It is therefore not an “outmoded strategy of the civil rights era”; rather it is as current and 
capable of yielding results as it did in the civil rights era.
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS: INFO IFNCE OF FSAM.
The objective of the study was to analyse the triumph of FSAM over the administration '• 
Southern Africa policy known as “constructive engagement”. The central intriguing question the 
study had to answer was why was it that unlike previous Afro-American efforts, FSAM succeeded 
in bringing about the reversal of Southern Africa policy of an incumbent and “globalist” 
administration?
This necessitated putting FSAM in its historical context with a view to establishing in what 
sense and ways this movement succeeded while others failed. It was this that led us to identify four 
determinants of Afro-American influence. These were the Cold War, Afro-American electoral 
significance or otherwise, the organisational tactics of Afro-Americans in running anti-apartheid 
campaigns, and events in South Africa. These four determinants produced three scenarios which 
accounted for at best non-durable influence and at worst and quite often the case, failures on the 
part of Afro-Americans to influence the direction of Africa policy of successive administrations.
The first of these scenarios was that the emergence of a globalist president amidst public apathy to 
Africa issues and weaknesses in Afro-Americans’ ability to organise themselves effectively to 
lobby for policies favourable to independence and liberation struggle in Southern Africa, always 
resulted in adoption of Southern Africa policies by the executive which were favourable to Pretoria 
and other colonial minority regimes in the region. This was particularly true of the administrations 
of Truman, Eisenhower and Nixon.
The second scenario was that whenever non-globalist presidents emerged, a combination of 
liberal concerns and to some extent public interests coupled with changes in Afro-American 
organisational structure (such as changes at leadership level or challenge to the latter) resulted in the 
adoption of official policies unfavourable to minority and colonial (if applicable) administrations in 
the region. But this was always a short-lived phenomenon as the same administrations were
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notorious for their failure to carry through their policies whenever they encountered sustained 
criticism from their right-wing opponents. The administrations of John Kennedy and Jimmy Carter 
offered object lessons in this respect. The third scenario was that even if there was a globalist 
president articulating a Cold War prone Southern Africa policy, a well organised and effective 
Afro-American movement aided by events in South Africa could use mass mobilisation to register 
disapproval of the president’s policy to such an extent as to provoke substantial Congressional 
concern. This could lead to enactment of a policy contrary to that of the president’s. This was an 
unusual scenario and thus far, FSAM has been its first beneficiary.
FSAM succeeded where others failed because it had learned from the mistakes of its 
predecessors and pursued a single issue by confining its attention to a single country - South Africa 
- which it rightly recognised as the sole beneficiary of the administration’s “constructive 
engagement”. It predecessors were always pursuing multifarious causes covering the entire African 
continent or at least a region. FSAM also had a united Afro-American community unprepared to 
put up with four more years of “constructive engagement”. This coupled with the fact that it was an 
era in which Afro-Americans were conscious of their potential electoral strength within the 
Democratic Party and in a balance of power situation, meant that FSAM was better placed to reap 
the wealth of experience emanating from previous numerous failed attempts had it the 
organisational and institutional framework and viable tactical and strategic devices to pursue its 
cause. Although the organisational and institutional structure were provided by TransAfrica around 
which FSAM was woven, and the movement was operating in an atmosphere devoid of rancour 
and conflicting ideas of the way forward for which Afro-Americans were noted, it was by no 
means certain that FSAM would escape the fate of its predecessors. Tactics and strategies were 
essential to success or failure; and this was where Randall Robinson’s experience as an Executive 
Director of TransAfrica and former Congressional assistant to Diggs came handy. The ability to 
carry the public along as a tactical device made all the difference because the pressure which the 
public brought to bear on the administration to change its Southern Africa policy made it 
impossible for Congressmen as the representatives of the people to become passive spectators. The 
result was initiation of a Congressional response to the yearning of the people thereby isolating the 
President and his “constructive engagement”.
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Achievements of FSAM
FSAM’s success seemed remarkable when one considers the fact that it was during the 
tenure of a globalist president who specifically made “constructive engagement” and the need to 
cultivate Pretoria a major foreign policy objective. Afro-Americans were not natural constituents of 
the President’s party, nor would one say that Afro-Americans (unlike the Jewish lobby) had the 
financial capability to compensate for limited numerical strength or to wield influence. All Afro- 
Americans were armed with were their recognition of Africa as their ancestral homeland which as 
such should be accorded as much attention as Ireland, Israel and Poland; and their tenacity and 
determination to have a say in the direction of Africa policy. FSAM’s success in bringing to an end 
decades of Afro-American frustration at their inability to influence the Africa policies of successive 
administrations becomes illuminating in view of of the fact that the continent was important in the 
calculation of US foreign policy only as an adjunct of Washington’s world-wide response to 
communism.
The achievement of FSAM can only be measured against the target it sets for itself. This 
was to alter the direction of the Reagan administration’s Southern Africa policy and undermine 
South Africa’s most favoured nation state stance in its implementation. This in turn would isolate 
Pretoria and increase the cost to it of its apartheid at home and aggression abroad.
This being the case, FSAM can only be deemed to have succeeded if the policy was altered 
as a result of its actions and if there was visible effect of this on South Africa. Within the context of 
US Southern Africa policy, the changing of direction as evident by the administration’s imposition 
of sanctions against South Africa and the Congressional imposition of tougher sanctions over the 
head of the President could not have come about if FSAM did not bring the issue to the public 
notice and addressed it the way it did. The Afro-Americans’ lobby-group, TransAfrica, as the 
fulcrum of FSAM lacked the numerical strength to pose an electoral threat, but by forging an 
alliance of all American people against “constructive engagement” and apartheid, it was able to use 
the American public and Congress to exercise influence over the administration. The public and the
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law-makers were therefore the resources in the hands of FSAM for exerting influence.
What effect had this on the South African government? This calls for an assessment of the 
external dimension of FSAM’s achievement.
The international implication for South Africa of FSAM’s achievement: By orchestrating a 
campaign to make identification with South Africa politically unpopular, FSAM succeeded in 
depriving Pretoria of the political and economic succour it would otherwise have received during 
the upheaval arising from the internal unrest. One can understand the rationale behind this 
argument by comparing US reaction to the township unrest of 1984-86 to its attitude during the 
Sharpeville massacre of 1960. At that time, neither the Eisenhower administration nor the 
American public nor Congress withheld support from Pretoria beyond verbal condemnation. As a 
result, the flight of capital that followed the incident was a temporary phenomenon as more money 
flowed into the country thereafter following the effort of big business to raise loans to rescue 
Pretoria from economic collapse. In addition, the furore did not jeopardise South Africa’s ability to 
raise private and public loans in the US as aforementioned.
But during the eruption in the mid-1980’s, the situation altered fundamentally. Not only 
had the American administration been deprived of the ability to give political support to Pretoria 
without an uproar in Congress and the public in general, but the private Banks were in no position 
to embark on such a cause. US sources had virtually dried up in the heat of FSAM’s campaign. 
Most private Banks including Citibank and First National Bank of Boston had all placed a 
moratorium on loans to South Africa in response to the campaign to withdraw funds from firms 
engaged in business transaction with South Africa.[l]
South Africa’s dependence on international Banks was amply demonstrated in a 1985 
study for the World Council of Churches (WCC). The study identified a total of 202 Banks from 
18 countries which had provided varying amounts of loans to South Africa totalling $4244.1 
million between 1982 and 1984.[2] True, US Banks accounted for only 27 per cent of sources of 
loans to South Africa, but the reverberations which the issue was generating in the US could not 
have escaped the international community. For example, in spite of the administration s resistance 
to imposition of sanctions against Pretoria, the intensity of the anti-apartheid campaign was such
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that it immediately hit a responsive chord in the wider international community. The European 
Community (EC) which since July 1985 has been poised to take action (as evident by its 
withdrawal of its ambassadors from South Africa for consultation) had by the next month 
prohibited importation of iron and steel products from South Africa while deferring a decision on 
importation of coal in deference to the Federal Republic of Germany and Portugal who opposed the 
idea. Even the British government renowned for its opposition to sanctions against Pretoria ( ten 
per cent of British overseas direct investments worth £5 billion were located in South Africa as at 
1982) responded to the reverberations from the US.[3] This it did by re-affirming in August 1985 
(as a preemptive measure against responding to any action by the Reagan administration which 
judging by the unpopularity of its Southern African policy might impose a tougher measure) the 
existing restrictions of:
- observance of the mandatory UN arms embargo, military cooperation and sporting links 
with South Africa.
- a ban on new loans, sale of oil and discouragement of all cultural and scientific links.
As an additional measure, the government imposed a voluntary ban on promotion of
tourism, new investments and a commitment to honour any decision of the EEC on importation of 
South African coal, iron and steel. Meanwhile, tired of devoting hours of its board room 
deliberations to its South African operations which was hurting its reputation in its world-wide 
operations, Barclay's Bank of UK simply moved beyond the government by selling its South 
African operation.[4]
By September 1986, Canada had imposed a voluntary ban on loans to the South African 
government; on sale of Krugerrands, crude oil as well as an embargo on air links between the two 
countries. In addition, the Canadian government placed on their import list all South African 
agricultural products, uranium, coal, iron and steel with a promise by its Secretary for External 
Affairs, Joe Clark that no permit would be granted for importation of these items. This was 
followed by a moratorium on visas to South African nationals to visit Canada. [5]
Perhaps one of the most surprising aspects of this domino-effect was that in spite of its 
penchant for profit, Japan put at risk its lucrative South African market by banning importation of 
South African iron and steel; placed a moratorium on tourist visas to its nationals wishing to visit
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South Africa; banned computer sales to the South African military and reduced its diplomatic 
presence in South Africa to consular level.[6]
It might be argued that these countries only paid lip service to the sanctions issue by 
adopting measures that would not hurt their economies; Japan for example, failed to place a 
moratorium on the importation of South African mineral ores vital to its economy. The fact remains 
that they were registering in concrete terms their disapproval of the domestic policies of the regime 
in Pretoria, as opposed to the platitudes during the Sharpeville massacre of 1960. The 
responsibility for these concrete actions and the urgency being attached to them was at least shared 
by the mass protest being engineered by FSAM in the US. Anti-South Africa feeling in the US was 
such that countries which had a common economic destiny with America found it difficult to do 
normal business with South Africa.
FSAM had thus not only robbed Pretoria of its traditional political and economic support 
from the US, but South Africa could no longer count on support even from the international 
community to mitigate the effect of the domestic unrest on its economy. There could not therefore 
be a recurrence of the post-Sharpeville investment revival. This was played out in August 1985 
when South Africa’s reputable credit rating in the international financial circle suffered a severe set 
back. Following Pretoria’s inability to lend a helping hand to its international backers for its own 
benefit by announcing major reforms, as expected from President Botha in his speech on August 
15, 1985, the exchange rate for the rand plunged to an all time low of $0.34, forcing the 
Johannesburg exchange to close down on the 27th of the month. Investors were engaged in a panic 
selling of rands to buy dollars to diversify their business transaction because South Africa had all 
of a sudden become bad for business. This financial woe was the culmination of numerous 
difficulties that had afflicted South Africa following the intensification of township revolts from 
within and FSAM’s campaign in the US. The sliding rand had a knock on effect on the economy, 
resulting in the government’s inability to honour its financial obligations. It therefore came as no 
surprise that the government had to reneged on repayment of capital on its short term loans of 
about $14 billion by declaring a four month moratorium. [7]
In the past, South Africa’s reputation as the last bastion against communist onslaught in 
Southern Africa and as a lucrative market for investments would have been enough to see it
243
through the difficulties, but things had changed. Evidence of this changing relations between the 
international financial sector, their governments and South Africa was demonstrated in late August 
1985 when Pretoria’s Reserve Bank’s Governor, Dr. Gerhard De Koch undertook an hasty visit to 
London and Washington to arrange special credits. That the mission failed in its objective could be 
explained as a function of South Africa’s insolvency which was by no means peculiar to that 
country. But the curious development was that Washington and London chose to deal with South 
Africa through an intermediary - Dr. Fritz Leutwiler, former President of Central Bank of 
Switzerland - because it was not politically suitable under the existing political climate to be seemed 
to be negotiating with South Africa over an issue as emotive as finance, even if it was for servicing 
a current loan which their financial institutions gave to Pretoria.[8] This was due to the reluctance 
of the South African government to accept the fact that the difficulties were more political - the 
refusal to institute genuine reforms - than economic.
The implication in this development was that business operations especially those involved 
in mineral extraction would face difficulties in raising loans to finance their activities to yield the 
profits that motivated their involvement in South Africa in the first place. That big business would 
not pay the price of Pretoria’s refusal to reform apartheid became manifest on the eve of the speech 
when Jan Steyn, Executive Chairman of the pro-business lobby, Urban Foundation of South 
Africa, urged the President “to recognise the gravity of the situation and rally to the cause of rapid, 
peaceful, fundamental reforms.” To bring this about, he felt negotiations on power sharing should 
be on an equal footing between whites and blacks. In the interim, he wanted an end to enforced 
repatriation as required by the Group Areas Act and also called for the abolition of influx 
control.[9] But when the President failed to give any clear indication of a desire to institute genuine 
reform, the business community had had enough. The pro-business Business Day of 
Johannesburg roundly condemned the President Botha’s August 15th speech and went on to call 
for his resignation if not demise in no uncertain terms, saying that if he could not perform better, 
“then we believe the time has come for him to depart.”[10]
That the business sector would make sacrifices to maintain their South African operations 
was not altogether surprising in view of their effort in persuading the government to recognise 
black trade unions, which was duly achieved in 1979. But by calling for Botha s resignation if he
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could not do more to introduce genuine reform, the business sector was signalling its intention to 
terminate the unwritten grand alliance it had maintained with apartheid over the decades. It meant 
that unlike the white government of South Africa, the country’s big business was ready to respond 
to the international anti-apartheid climate by jettisoning the system under which it had prospered for 
decades. The boldness of the captains of industries in visiting Lusaka to confer with the exiled 
ANC leadership amidst the continuing financial squeeze on South Africa should be seen not only in 
this light, but also an affirmation by big business that it could operate in any climate irrespective of 
the political complexion.
The implication of this situation to the South African government was that not only did it 
have to cope with an on-going internal insurrection already made worse by a prolonged campaign 
against its domestic policies in the US, but these problems had been compounded by the 
opposition from the business sector.
All of this would have been far less possible had FSAM not mobilised, politicised, 
enlightened and educated the American public and by implication the international non-communist 
world to the reality of the situation in South Africa. FSAM had no force at its disposal to repeal 
“constructive engagement”, but by using the American people and their law makers, its 
achievements went beyond that. One of these was that by making South Africa and its system so 
reprehensible for it to be unjust not to do something about it, FSAM prepared Western 
governments for action against Pretoria. The spate of actions which the Western World took 
against South Africa were eloquent testimonies. For example, at a Security Council resolution 
calling for voluntary imposition of sanctions against South Africa in July 1985, not even the US 
and Britain were bold enough to exercise their veto power. Compare that to 1983 when 16 States 
cast a negative vote on a similar resolution in the General Assembly and (at the rudimentary stage 
of FSAM) in 1984 when two states did exactly that with ten abstaining.[l 1] The different voting 
pattern in 1985 had more to do with the fact that FSAM was at the zenith of its mobilising crusade 
which made it embarrassing to Western governments to appear to be friendly with Pretoria than a 
voluntary change of heart on the part of Pretoria’s traditional supporters. In this respect one can 
also say that FSAM succeeded in boosting the morale of the protesters in South Africa while 
demoralising the resolve of the government and the white minority to retain the system under
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which they had secured their privileges. The duration of the insurrection in comparison with 
Sharpeville in 1960 and the effort of the business community and white liberals not only to think of 
the unthinkable but to act on it prove the point being made.
Concluding Reflections.
The fact that FSAM was able to witness not merely an imposition of sanctions against 
South Africa by the legislative arm, but also one by no less a person than the President is intriguing 
in view of Reagan’s ability to convince the American public to give him a second mandate in a 
resounding electoral victory over his Democratic rival in the 1984 Presidential election. One is 
bound to ask: what went wrong with the “great communicator”?
The answer has much to do with the conflicting perception of “constructive engagement” 
and South Africa’s required contribution to its success between President P.W. Botha of South 
Africa, Crocker and President Reagan himself. While Reagan set the pace as a Presidential 
candidate in the 1980 election with his remarks about South Africa’s importance to the West, 
Crocker though sharing the same view expected Pretoria to contribute to the realisation of the 
targets of “constructive engagement” by relaxation of the most offensive aspects of apartheid as a 
trade in for its rescue from its “pole-cat” status, the achievement of regional peace in the form of 
“non-aggression pacts” with the regional states, expulsion of communist troops in Angola in 
exchange for Namibia’s independence and above all, reversal of the Carter administration’s South 
Africa policy. But neither Crocker nor the administration he represented thought it wise to 
predetermine the scope of reform expected from South Africa. Emphasis was on good faith.
Herein arises the mistake which later not only handed FSAM the public relations coup with 
which to beat the administration but also robbed the latter of public goodwill. By making South 
Africa the sole determinant of the scope and pace of reform, Washington ignored the fact that 
South Africa’s sole objective since 1910 and probably earlier irrespective of the inclination of the 
administration in office, had been the preservation of White power. After all it was not the
246
Nationalist administration of Dr. Malan that introduced the Land Act of 1913, the Master-Servant 
Act, the Job Reservation arrangements or the termination of the African franchise at the Cape. 
South Africa’s international relations either at the UN and affiliated organs or in manipulating 
Western fears about the Cold War are replete with a variety of subterfuges aimed at ensuring 
continuity of white rule. The frequently touted but unsubstantiated claim of communist 
encirclement and the ever-present “grabbing hands of communism” which the administration of 
Verwoerd took great pride in trumpeting to the delight of Cold War apologists in the West should 
be seen in this light.
By giving the South African government lee-way to determine its own scope of reform, 
Crocker had handed Pretoria a golden opportunity which was used to good effect by extracting all 
the benefits inherent in “constructive engagement” without making any notable concessions in 
return. P.W. Botha’s whistle tour of Europe in 1984, the first since he assumed the mantle of 
leadership of his country, should be seen as South Africa’s effort to use the platform of 
“constructive engagement” to rehabilitate its pariah image. All that South Africa was willing to pay 
for the numerous carrots of “constructive engagement” - export of US computers and evidently 
military related equipment, exchange of visits by military personnel, training of South African 
military officers and nuclear scientists in the US, increase in bank loans and direct investments and 
above all visible high level-contact as a negation of the Carter administration’s South Africa policy 
- was to embark on a number of publicised but minor relaxations of apartheid. These were 
combined with reforms in the institutions of apartheid with a view to strengthening as opposed to 
weakening it. An example of this was the tricameral Parliamentary structure in which the joint 
Houses would legislate on issues that affect the entire country. Yet, Whites enjoyed such a 
preponderant majority that they could have their way even on issues in which both Asians and 
“Coloured” legislators jointly opposed. Pretoria’s exercise was therefore nothing short of 
“modernising racial domination”, to borrow Heribert Adam’s phrase.
Surely elections into tricameral Parliamentary structure with all the trappings of apartheid, 
relaxation of apartheid at beaches and Post Office queuing and introduction of direct elections at 
local government level could not have been worthy concessions commensurate with the benefits of 
“constructive engagement”? Nor did the victims of apartheid feel any substantial changes to their
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predicament as evidenced by the chaos in South Africa. Under the circumstances, one would have 
expected the administration to speak with one voice in pressing Pretoria for substantial 
concessions. Instead what emerged from Washington was to say the least garbled, muffled and 
conflicting. While Crocker and the President’s Assistant on National Security Affairs, Robert 
Mcfarlane were urging further concessions from Pretoria as evidenced by Mcfarlane’s meeting in 
Vienna with officials from Pretoria on the need to rescue the President from the embarrassment of a 
possible Congressional veto, Reagan was making clear his satisfaction with the outcome of his 
Southern Africa policy: “the result we’ve had in this constructive engagement with South Africa 
justifies our continuing on that score.”[12]
This adoption of a hardline stance when compared to his behaviour in blaming the victims 
of the Police massacre in Uitenhage in March 1985 as earlier indicated was not only an 
endorsement of Pretoria’s stance but virtually akin to the position of the South African regime. The 
President compounded the situation when on July 22,1986, he ignored the advice of his Secretary 
of State, his Chief of Staff and Republican Senators Kassebaum and Lugar amongst others, that he 
should stem the rising public and legislative criticisms by registering disapproval of apartheid with 
an announcement of withdrawal of landing rights to South African planes, with a view to ensuring 
Presidential control of Southern African policy. Instead, the President thought it wise to deliver a 
speech that contained something for both the South African regime and its critics. While beginning 
the speech with what later turned out to be a pious statement that “America’s view of apartheid has 
been and remains, clear. Apartheid is morally wrong and politically unacceptable”, he defended the 
“reformist” credentials of the P.W. Botha regime and its right to crack down on dissent, which the 
President identified as communist inspired. He then launched a scathing attack on proponents of 
sanctions against South Africa on grounds that capitalism would be a device for facilitating the 
destruction of apartheid. Perhaps to answer his critics, he reminded them that there were more 
motor vehicles owned by non-whites in South Africa than the entire quantity of cars in the Soviet 
Union.[13]
This all too predictable presidential trifling of the struggle for freedom in South Africa 
attracted a chorus of criticism including his Republican Senators whose advice he had 
ignored. While Kassebaum was “deeply disappointed”, Lugar was visibly angry at the President s
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failure to provide leadership. More surprising was the apparent defiance of Secretary of State 
Shultz who at his testimony before Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee less than twenty-four 
hours after the speech, announced that the State Department would meet with the ANC for 
discussion - a proposition which the President in all but discounted by his recognition of the “long 
arm of communism” in the activities of that organisation. Presenting it as a clarification of the 
President’s speech, the Secretary of State left no one in doubt about the exasperation of the State 
Department when he bluntly refused a suggestion from Senator Jesse Helms that in line with the 
President’s position, the meeting with the ANC be delayed until that organisation renounced 
violence. [14]
That the President’s speech was diametrically at odds with the events on the ground in 
South Africa was encapsulated by Archbishop Tutu’s anger at the “nauseating” speech, accusing 
the President of behaving “like the great, big white chief of old...The West for my part can go to 
hell”, he announced defiantly.[15]
The truth however was that the President had taken the side of his Chief Speech Writer and 
Communications Director, Pat Buchanan who together with National Security Adviser John 
Poindexter and CIA Director William Casey warned against abandonment of South Africa in a 
communist infested region, a concern he was equally obsessed with.
In this respect, one might be forgiven for wondering if the President understood 
“constructive engagement” other than as a device for fighting communism in Southern Africa. His 
utterances about Pretoria’s anti-communist credentials and importance to the security of the West 
point in this direction. Consequently, he succeeded in giving P.W.Botha the opportunity to defy 
American public opinion as vividly illustrated in the latter’s speech on August 15,1985, as noted 
earlier. A follow-up speech in January 1986 which was advertised prior to its being made as an 
improvement on the previous one contained no surprises except that he would incorporate Africans 
into a “Consultative Council”, an issue on which he refused to give details. Instead he chose to 
defy his international audience by telling them that South Africa was not a country of “jellyfish” 
and that they were prepared to go it alone if need be instead of succumbing to foreign influence. In 
a world-wide live broadcast, the South African leader made his speech in his characteristic pose 
accompanied by the piercing side-ways glances and the wagging of the smallest finger of his right
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hand at his audience, which on the television screen appeared to be not only a challenge to the 
international community and all those who were concerned about the violence in that country but a 
rebuke at them for meddling in the affairs of his country. As if he was doing a favour to those who 
wanted him to institute reform, he asked: “If I release Mandela on humanitarian grounds, will the 
Soviet Union also set free Scharansky?” This no doubt was a ploy to do nothing as Scharansky did 
not come from South Africa nor did Mandela from the Soviet Union for the two countries either to 
do prisoner swap or undertake reciprocal action. So unsatisfactory was Botha’s speech (in August 
1985) that Mcfarlane who had earlier met officials from Pretoria in Vienna expressed his 
disappointment at the difference between what was announced by Botha and what he was given to 
expect during the meeting.[16] Nor was the situation improved by Botha’s second attempt at 
crossing the “Rubicon”.
This type of behaviour, though not entirely uncharacteristic of South Africa, was 
occasioned in the immediate post-Carter era by President Reagan’s attitude and paternalism 
towards Pretoria. The South African authorities which felt isolated in the early years of the Carter 
administration, now had every cause to defy international and American opinion by pocketing the 
advantages of “constructive engagement” without giving anything tangible in return. It was 
therefore a combination of President Reagan’s attitude, his understanding of America’s Southern 
Africa policy and South Africa’s correct interpretation and reaction to those attitude and 
understanding that undermined both Chester Crocker and his “constructive engagement”.
The President was sincere in his anti-communist crusade in Southern Africa and was 
fervently committed to it. As a result he failed to recognise the scale of public opinion which 
FSAM had mustered against his Southern Africa policy. Apartheid portrayed and seen as an affront 
to human dignity had not only drowned out South Africa’s familiar but unsubstantiated reputation 
of being the last bastion against communism which the President was still clinging to, but that 
identification with that country in any way or form had also become an electoral liability. It was 
this that necessitated the abandonment of the administration’s Southern Africa policy even by some 
Republican law-makers. In the end, the President was forced to do what was expected of every 
military General without sufficient foot-soldiers, namely, to surrender to the opposing force in 
order to avoid carnage. Yet, in the President’s own case, the impact of the anti-administration
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Southern Africa policy which FS AM had generated was so great that the honour he tried to salvage 
from his predicament - as evidenced by the limited sanctions he imposed upon South Africa - was 
deemed insufficient by the law-makers. They refused to know peace until they had overridden his 
veto in a last show of force. FSAM had therefore succeeded in influencing - one might also say 
sabotaging - the direction of the administration’s Southern Africa policy.
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APPENDIX ONE
ATTITUDE OF AFRO-AMERICANS TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA.
1. SUPPORT FOR SOUTH AFRICAN BLACKS ON RACIAL BASIS: Afro-Americans 
85 per cent; White Americans 59 per cent.
2. SUPPORT FOR PUNITIVE ACTION AGAINST PRETORIA: Afro-Americans 74 per 
cent; White Americans 42 per cent.
3. SUPPORT FOR SOUTH AFRICAN BLACKS ON PARTY BASIS: Democrats 73 
per cent; Republicans 52 per cent.
Source: George Gallup Jr.. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1985. (Scholarly 
Resources Inc., W ilmington, Delaware 1986.) pp. 244-247.
True, every revolution in this world has been led by the elites. FSAM was no 
exception. But if 85 per cent of Afro-Americans identified themselves with the 
predicament of the black population of South Africa in 1985, then it goes without 
saying that the FSAM campaign was a popular mass movement in the Afro- 
American community. Not only is this in consonance with the analysis in the thesis - 
that Afro-Americans had always identified with African causes - but it also explains 
why the Embassy demonstration was prolonged and sustained. The 73 per cent 
support for the South African blacks by the Democratic Party, as the poll found, has 
more to do with the presence of an overwhelming number of Afro-Americans in that 
party than in the Republican Party. Steven Metz and Don Beck were therefore not 
on a firmer ground when they inferred, as outlined in pages 196-7 in the thesis, that 
Afro-American elites used the South African issue for their own political advantage.
APPENDIX TWO
ACCEPTANCE BY BOTH HOUSES OF THE SENATOR LLJGAR PROPOSAL 
RESULTING IN THE ANTI-APARTHFID ACT OF 1986.




CONGRESSIONAL OVER-RIDE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN’S VETO OF
SEPTEMBER 26. 1986.
HOUSE SENATE
PARTY YES VOTES NO VOTES PARTY YES VOTES NO VOTES
REPUBLICANS 81 79 REPUBLICANS 31 21
DEMOCRATS 232 4 DEMOCRATS 47 0
TOTAL 313 83 TOTAL 78 21
SOURCES: CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY , 99th Congress, 2nd. session 1986. 
pp. 18-C; 100-110h.
The essence of the above was to illustrate the response of Congress to the anti­
apartheid initiatives as outlined in pages 231-2 in the thesis. The significance of the 
voting pattern was based on the fact that more than 55 per cent of the Republican 
law makers, present and voting, were prepared to turn their back on their president 
on the issue of South Africa. This is intriguing, not only in view of the anti-party of the 
Republican Party to issues relating to civil rights in America but the popularity of the 
President with his party and the American public at large. No one would have 
expected a revolt from the Republican Party against their President who was 
elected on a crest of right wing fervour. Rather what one saw was a siza e num er 
of Republicans voting with the Democrats to embarrass the President both in 
imposing punitive action against Pretoria and in the over-ride of his veto.
The explanation for this was that the law makers were reacting to the public mood, 
in this case, as generated and sustained by FSAM.
